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(Phi~lips, Ch. J. & ~ 
Cec1.l, S.C.J.; En~el, -..11.... 
con 1 ing & dis s 1 ng Q.(.(-4'~ -
Federal/Criminal 
Resps were indicted with the petrs in Spaganlo 
v. United States, No. 75-217, with which this 
case is listed. The Spaganlo petrs were severed 
for trial after the DC granted the motions a t 
issue here. The Court may dispose of the cases 
independently. 
Please see the pool memo in the related case, 
United States v. Bernstein, No. 74-1486 (Summer 
List 3, Sheet 3), held for this case. 
- Wi th extension granted by MR. JUSTICE WHITE. 
. . 
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1. SUMMARY: Resps -- Donovan, Robbins, Buzzacco, 
Merlo and Lauer-- were indicted (N.D. Ohio) (Krupansky) 
for conspiracy to conduct and for conducting an illegal 
gambling business, i n violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1955. 
As to resps Donovan , Robbins and Buzzacco, the DC granted 
a motion to suppress evidence derived from a wiretap, on 
the ground that at the time of application there was probable 
cause to believe that their conversations would be inter-
cepted, so that fa i lure to identify them by name in the ap-
plications and orders related to the wiretap violated 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2518(l)(b)(iv) and 2518(4)(a); this is the issue presented 
r 
in the Gove~ment's pending petition in No. 74-1486, United 
States v. Bernstein. As to resps Merlo and Lauer, not known 
' until after the applications for the wiretaps, the DC granted 
the motion to suppress because they had not been served with 
notice of the interception, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d); 
this issue is not in Bernstein. On a 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(b) 
appeal, CA 6 affirmed -- one judge dissenting on the Merlo/Lauer 
suppression as to which he would remand in light of Giordano and 
Chavez. 
The questions are whether the Government violated Title 
III in this case and, if so, whether suppression of the evidence 
derived from the intercept is justified. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10). 
2. FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW: On November 28, 1972, 
Chief Judge Battisti (N.D. Ohio) authorized a Title III 
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interception for fifteen days, ending . December 12, over 
two telephones used by Kotoch and Spaganlo and two used by 
Florea, of the communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Chickeno, 
Vara, Florea, Veres "and others, as yet unknown." On 
December 26, the DJ extended the order for 15 additional days 
as to two of the four telephones originally authorized, and 
issued an order authorizing intercepts over an additional phone 
at the same location. Each order authorized the interception 
of communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Chuc - - - - - - Slyman, 
Florea "and others, as yet unknown." On February 21, 1973, the 
DJ ordered notice served on 37 persons whose conversations had 
been overheard during both periods of interception; on the 
Government's motion, notice to two more persons was ordered on 
September 11, 1973. Conversationsinvolving all of the resps were 
2/ 
intercepted in both periods.- "Inadvertently," the Government 
did not give the court Merlo's and Lauer's names, an~ever 
received inventory notice. 
------------------------ The Government concedes that resps Donovan and Robbins 
were "known" to it at the time of the extension application. 
Though the Government was aware that Buzzacco wa.s involved in 
gambling activities, it disputes the conclusion that it was aware 
of the likelihood that Buzzacco would be overheard in conversa-
tions over the phones. 
2/ 
-All suppressed conversations, as in Bernstein, were with the 
named targets. 
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After a hearing, Judge Krupansky suppressed evidence 
as to Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco derived from the 
December 26 interception for failure to identify them and also 
ruled that evidence derived from both periods of interceptions 
be suppressed as to Merlo and Lauer for failure to notify. 
Affirming, CA 6 reasoned that the failure to identify 
meant that the communications were "unlawfully intercepted" 
(§ 2518(10)(a)), because the identification requirement "directly 
and substantially implement[s] the congressional intention to 
limit the use of i ntercept procedures." Giordano, 416 U.S., at 
527. Only if the known parties whose communications are to be 
intercepted are known to the DC can it exercise strict control 
over intercepts. The statutory language "would plainly seem to 
· require the naming of a specific person in the wiretap applica-
tion" when the person is known to be committing the offense. 
United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S., at 152. "[I]t makes no difference 
whether the omission was inadvertent or purposeful. The fact of 
omission is sufficient to invoke suppression." [Petn., lOa.] 
Buzzacco was "known" to the Government, because at the time the 
December 28 application was filed the Government "had 'suspicions' 
tha t he was involved in the gambling activities." 
Following United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533 (CA 9 1974), 
CA 6 concluded that the Government must be required to submit 
the names of all overheard parties to the DC, so that the DC may 
exercise informed discretion in determining who should be notified 
11 in the interests of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d). The 
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notice provision plays a " central role" and "suppression 
must follow when it is s hown t hat this statutory requirement 
has been ignored, " Giordano, 416 U.S., at 529, whether lack 
of notice was due to deliberate Government circumvention, 
United States v. Eastman_, 465 F .2d 1057 (CA 3 1972), or 
inadvertent error, United States v. Wolk, 466 F.2d 1143 (CA 8 
1972). Dissepting, Judge Engel agreed that the Government was 
obliged to advise the j udge of all persons whose convergations 
were overheard, but dis agreed t hat the conversations could J?e ---- -suppressed as "unlawf ully intercepted." Since notification 
1 
necessarily occurs a f t er i nterception, it has little to do with 
deterring improper ini tial resort to the procedure. Suppression 
should be limited to t hose instances where the violation was 
shown to be deliberate, or where there was actual prejudice not 
curable by less drastic means. Merlo's and Lauer's identity in 
the conversations was first known in August 1973, and no prejudice 
appears on the record . 
3. CONTENTIONS: 
a. Re Donovan, Robbins & Buzzacco 
SG recaps the arguments made in its Bernstein 
petition,~ pool memo. The lower courts' holding that Buzzacco 
should have been identified illustrates the "grave practical 
drawbacks" flowing from applying the probable cause standard in 
wiretap cases. At the time the applications were filed, agents 
also suspected that Buzzacco was involved in bookmaking with the 




targets had placed calls to a phone Buzzacco was using. 
During the first intercept period, someone using a Niles, 
Ohio telephone and nicknamed "Buzz" or "Buzzer" was overheard 
discussing gambling with several named targets. (Buzzacco 
used several aliases.) Only after the December 28 application 
did agents learn that Buzzacco was using the Niles telephone. 
There is a conflict on the identification issue between CA 4 
(Bernstein), CA 6 (Donovan), and CA D.C. (United States v. 
Moore, rehearing en bane denied, mandate recalled and held 
pending disposition of Bernstein), on the one hand, and CA 5 
(United States v. Doolittle, decided en bane in favor of the 
government), on the other. 
Resp Buzzacco contends that this Court has given 
' adequate guidance in this area and the issue need not be 
reviewed and rehearses the CA 6 opinion. 
b. Re Merlo and Lauer SG: On inadvertent failure 
3/ 
to notify, CA 6 conflicts with CAs 3, 8 and 9. - The 
notification provision is to ensure that the subject of 
surveillance will eventually learn that he was electronically 
surveilled, so that he may proceed with a civil action under 
18 U.S.C. § 2520, if he believes his rights were violated. 
That purpose was amply satisfied by the notice eventually re-
ceived here. There was no prejudice because Merlo and Lauer had 
3/ 
-United States v. Iannelli, 477 F.2d 999 (CA 3); United States 
v. Wolk, 466 F.2d 1143 (CA 8); United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 
533 (CA 9). 
,, 
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a full opportunity to file and argue their motions to 
suppress. Even if there was a duty to advise the court that 
they had been overheard, there is no basis for suppression 
under 18 U.S.C. § 5218(10)(a). The interception was manifestly 
l awful when made, and violation of the notification provision 
does not relate substantially to any congressional intention 
to limit the use of intercept procedures. Suppression was not 
proper under Giordano and Chavez. The standard of the dissenting 
judge should be affirmed and made governing. 
Resps Merlo and Lauer do not agree that the record shows 
that failure to notify them was due to administrative oversight. 
They claim that CA 6 did not require the government to give the 
names of all overheard persons to the DJ, but only to classify 
all persons and to make available information regarding the 
classes as the DJ requires. Since the government's own standard 
was to include persons if "positively identified," as Merlo and 
Lauer eventually were, the case does not intrude upon the 
Government's policy. Under prior decisions of this Court, sup-
pression is a proper remedy; in Chun, CA 9 held the notification 
provision "central or at least a functional safeguard in the 
statutory scheme." There is no conflict: In Iannelli, the deft 
was held to be in the inventory notice; in Wolk, defts' counsel 
had actual notice shortly after the 90-day-period lapsed; in Chun, 
on remand the DC suppressed after finding that the unnamed persons 
had actual notice shortly after the statutory period lapsed. Even 
if there is a conflict, only Chun post-dates Giordano and Chavez. 
4. DISCUSSION : 
a. Identifica tion 
There is a conflict on the issue, which is 
..... ..,. 
important to the administration of Title III. In Doolittle, 
CA 5 held that in the absence of any allegation of prejudice 
in not being named or of any indication of bad faith or at-
tempted subterfuge by the Government, and where most of the 
conversations were with the named party, there is substantial 
compliance with the requirements of the Act. Another view 
(Judge Godbold in dissent in CA 5) is that those who are "targets 
of the intercept" must be named. And there are the views of 
CAs 4 and 6 in Bernstein and Donovan, shared by CA D.C. in Moore. 
The language of Title III(§§ 1518(1)(b)(iv), 2518(4)(a)) may 
support the CA 4, 6 and DC view somewhat better than the Govern-
ment, but the statute is capricious if it means what those circuits 
hold it to. One purpose of naming persons in the application is 
to enable the DJ to determine whether there is probable cause to 
intercept that person's conversations. That person is named in the 
order, so that from the outset, or as the tap proceeds, the inter-
ceptions can be minimized. All of the conversations here involved 
one of the named persons and a resp. The Government had authority 
to intercept the conversation. It is difficult to see what the 
Government gains by not listing someone known to be involved in 
the crime, for it limits the opportunity to intercept conversations 
involving that person and other unnamed persons. On the other 
hand, it seems unlikely that in naming on an application someone 
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as to whom it had probable cause the Government would imperil 
its overall application as being too extensive. Accordingly, 
it is unclear why conversations between a named person and an 
unnamed person should be suppressed as to the unnamed person. 
Notification remains. Had the Government applied for the 
unnamed person and been turned down for want of probable cause 
to listen to his conversations, the conversation with a named 
person might still have been intercepted. 
b. Notification 
The split is less substantial on this issue, 
but not as weak as resps claim. For example, in Wolk and 
Iannelli CA 8 and CA 3 relied on lack of prejudice, as well as 
actual notice; the inventory was received in time to make a 
suppression motion, an argument the Government picks up here. 
Under§ 2518(8)(d), inventory notice must go 
to all persons named in the order or application and such others 
in the DJ's discretion as necessary "in the interest of justice." 
This connects the identification and notification requirements, a 
reason to prefer Donovan over Bernstein should the Court wish to 
grant on the identification question. 
It is not clear why suppression is appropriate, for the 
conversation was "lawfully intercepted" (§ 2518(10)(a)(i)), at 
least where, as here, the conversation was with a named person 
There are responses from (1) Buzzacco and (2) Merlo and 
Lauer, and a supplemental memo from the SG on Doolittle and Moo~e. 
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No. 75-212, United States v. Donovan, et al. 
This memorandum, dictated after a preliminary look 
at the briefs, is intended only as an "aid to memory" that will 
refresh my recollection when I return to a more careful study of 
the case prior to argument and decision. When an opinion is 
expressed or intimated, it is wholly tentative. 
* * * * * 
This is a case of considerable importance in the adminis-
tration of the wiretap provisions of Title~of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Street Act {18 u.s.c. § 2510-2520). The principal 
issue is whether § 2518(1) (b) (iv) requires the identification by 
name, in the application for authority to conduct a wiretap, of all 
persons whom the government has probable cause to believe may use 
the tapped telephone, in addition to the owner of that phone (usually 
referred to as the "principal target" of the tap)? 
.. 
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Brief Summary of Facts 
The government, after extensive investigation, filed an 
application for authority to tap four telephones, two listed under 
an alias of Spaganlo and located in an apartment used by Kotoch, 
and two telephones in the home of Florea. The application indi-
cated that these three "principal targets" were using the tele-
phones to conduct an extensive bookmaking business -- using the 
phones to make and receive telephone calls in connection with this 
business from many persons. Three of such persons were identified 
by name in the application. Pursuant to the application, the DC 
issued an order authorizing the taps of these four telephones for 
the purpose of intercepting gambling-related communications of 
Spaganlo, Kotoch, and Florea, the three other named individuals, 
and "others as yet unknown," to and from the four telephones. 
During the initially authorized interception, the govern-
ment learned that ~espondents Donovan and Robbins were talking about 
gambling activities with the named targets. The initial order was 
extended from time to time, and also expanded somewhat, but Donovan 
and Robbins were not named. 
Nearly three months after the taps were authorized, the 
government submitted to the court a list of thirty-seven (37) names 
in a proposed order directing service of the required "inventories" 
giving notice of the interceptions. This list was thought to contain 
all of the individuals who could be identified as having discussed 
..• 
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gambling over the monitored telephones. The order was signed by 
the DC and an inventory notice served on the persons named. 
Respondents Donovan, Robbins and Buzzacco were included in the 
list of 37, and they received notices pursuant to the order. 
Allegedly through "administrative oversights," respondents 
Merlo and Lauer were not included in any order and were not served 
with inventory notices. 
Decisions Below 
These respondents moved to suppress evidence derived from 
the taps. The DC granted the motion with respect to Donovan, 
Robbins and Buzzacco on the ground that the failure to identify 
them by name inthe applications and authorization m~ders violated 
§§ 2518(1) (b) (iv) and 2518(4) (a). The district court also held 
that, although Merlo and Lauer were not known until after the last 
application, evidence as to them must be suppressed because they 
were not served with inventories. CA6 affirmed. On the principal 
question (the "identification question" relating to Donovan, Robbins 
and Buzzacco), CA6 held-- relying on dructum in United States v. 
Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 152, 155 -- that where the government has 
probable cause to believe persons (other than the target individuals) 
will be using the bapped telephones, such p~rsons must be specifi-
cally identified by name in the intercept applications and orders. 
CA6 also held that the government had an implied statutory duty to 
No. 75-212 4. 
inform the issuing judge of the identities of Merlo and Lauer, and 
the government's failure in this respect required suppression of 
the evidence against them. 
Discussion 
As I dictate this, I have the SG's brief and that on 
behalf of Merlo and Lauer, but not the brief on behalf of Donovan, 
Robbins, and Buzzacco. 
The SG argues, persuasively I think, that CA6 has erred 
on both issues. Although CA6 read the "plain language" precisely 
to the contrary, the SG argues that the plain language supports 
the government's position. The argument runs as follows: 
Section 2518(1) (b) requires that the application 
for wire interception authorization set forth a 
full and complete statement of facts and circum-
stances relied upon by the applicant to justify 
his belief that an order should be issued, in-
cluding, pursuant to subsection (iv), "the 
identity of the person, if known, committing the 
offense and whose communications are to be inter-
cepted." Section 2518{4) (a) contains the same 
requirement for the interception order: it also 
must specify "the identity of the person, if known, 
whose communications are to be intercepted" (see 
United States v. Kahn, supra, 415 u.s. at 152). 
Thus the plain language of both Sections requires 
simply that "the person" committing the offense 
-- the target of the interception -- is to be 
identified if known. It does not require that 
"any person" or "all persons" expected to partici-
pate in incriminating conversations with the 
target over the monitored telephone must be so 
identified. Cf. 18 U.S.C. 2520. The most reason-
able interpretation of this statutory language is 
that although it would ordinarily be e~pected that 
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many persons will be overheard, only the princi-
pal target of the interception must be identified. 
This will almost always be the individual whose 
phone is to be monitored. 
I must say that the foregoing language is not quite as 
"plain" to me as it seems to be to the SG. Nor, is its meaning 
to the contrary as plainly evident as it seems to have been to 
CA6. Rather, my present reaction is that the precise language, 
standing alone, is ambiguous. It requires the identification 
"of the person, if known, committing the offense, and whose 
communications are to be intercepted." 
The SG's second point is more persuasive, namely, that 
in context, subsection (iv) must mean what the government contends. 
There are four specific subsections of § 2518(1) (b) specifying what 
"each application shall include." Subsection (i) requires the 
details of the offense; (ii) requires "a particular description of 
the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place 
where the communication is to be intercepted:" (iii) requires "a 
particular description of the type of communications sought to be 
intercepted;" and (iv) the subsection here involved -- requires 
"the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and 
whose communications are to be intercepted." All four of these 
subsections are in a single paragraph (see appendix 2a to the SG's 
brief). It seems reasonably clear, I think, that in context these 
provisions relate to a "particular offense," a "particular 
No. 75-212 6. 
description" of the telephone to be tapped, a "particular de-
scription" of the type of communications sought to be intercepted 
on that telephone, and the "identity of the person •.. committing 
the offense [the same offense referred to in subsection (i)] and 
[the person] whose communications are to be intercepted." If the 
Congress had intended that all persons, whom the government had 
probable cause to believe might be using this specifically identified 
telephone) must also be named, it certainly selected ambiguous 
language for the purpose. 
The SG also relies on the legislative history of the 
statute as supporting its interpretation, arguing that Congress 
hardly could have intended to impose more stringent requirements 
with respect to identification of persons who might use the tapped 
telephone than the Fourth Amendment would require. Although little 
evidence is to be found in the government's brief documenting the 
legislative history in this respect, I do think it reasonable to 
assume -- especially in view of the burdensome nature of a different 
view -- that Congress was attempting to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment requirements identified so particularly in Berger v. New 
York, 388 u.s. 4L and especially in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347. 
The SG also makes a reasonably persuasive argument that 
no genuine interests (in privacy or otherwise) are served by naming 
persons other than the "principal target" (owner or principal user 
No. 75-212 7. 
of the telephone to be tapped). See, e.g., pp. 31, 32 of the 
SG's brief. It is argued, realistically I would think, that if 
the view of CA6 prevails, law enforcement officers will adopt a 
policy of "over inclusion" with the result that intercept appli-
cations will identify all persons with respect to whom there is 
any possibility that probable cause may be found to exist. Not 
only would this impose a substantial burden on law enforcement, 
but it would result -- it is said in exposure and embarrassment 
of possibly innocent persons when the intercept papers become 
public during motions to suppress. The SG puts it this way: 
An expansive reading of the naming require-
ment thus will significantly complicate law en-
forcement efforts and subject those named, but 
not in fact overheard, to predictable harm. 
These disadvantages might be justified if the 
requirement protected any substantial private 
or public interest. But no important interests 
are served by the inclusion of the names of 
persons other than the principal target in an 
intercept application and order. Indeed, the 
consequences which flow from the failure to name 
such persons are so insubstantial that we submit 
that Congress could not have intended to hamper 
the use of electronic interceptions in combatting 
major crimes by requiring that all persons who may 
be expected to be overheard must be named. 
* * * * 
As to the second issue, whether the failure to name 
Merlo and Lauer in the inventory orders required suppression of 
evidence obtained against them, I am inclined to agree with the 
No. 75-212 8. 
views expressed in dissent by Circuit Judge Engel of CA6. See 
p. 18a, et seq., of the petition for certiorari. 
* * * * 
I appreciate, of course, that normally we construe 
Title 3 strictly. But this rule of construction derives from a 
desire to assure that the authority to invade the privacy of a 
telephone is not abused by the police, and conversely to protect 
the legitimate privacy of telephone users. It is not clear to me, 
at least in the absence of seeing the brief on behalf of the 
principal respondents and further consideration of the issue, that 
either of these purposes (i.e., preventing abuse by police and 
protecting legitimate privacy) will be furthered by affirmance of 
CA6. The invasion of privacy occasioned by a wiretap is a privacy 
of the person who owns or controls the telephone. Other persons 
who elect to call, or to talk with, the owner of the telephone 
normally do so at their own peril. As the Court held in United 
States v. White, 401 u.s. 745, if an interception_.has been made 
with the "named targets'permission~ persons talking with him would 
have no constitutional basis for complaint. It would be illogical 
to conclude that merely because the interception is authorized by 
a court, rather than by consent of the owner of the telephone, 
persons such as these respondents would have a greater right to 
complain. 
9122176 NOTE FOR THE FILE 
I sooke with Mike Rodak this morning, and he informed me 
that it a ppears that 
briefs in this case. 
Donovan and Robbins are not going to 
C.oepolt.<J -to ~ $ (,. l 
Thus, the only brief~e have on the 
file 
issue of failure to name someone in the initial application is 





TO: Mr. Justice Powell DATE: September 28, 1976 
FROM: Eugene Corney 
No. 75-212 U.S. v. Donovan 
I. THE EXISTENCE VEL NON OF A NAMING REQUIREMENT 
The first question presented by this case is whether 18 
U.S.C. 2518(l)(b)(iv) requires the identification in an 
application to intercept telephone communications of all 
persons whom the government has probable cause to believe it 
will overhear participating in conversations about illegal 
activity. This question is raised by only three of the five 
respondents: Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco. Unfortunately, 
the brief filed on behalf of respondent Buzzaco is fairly 
thin - both in terms of pages and in terms of analysis - and 
Mr. Rodak has informed me that respondents Donovan and Robbins 
are apparently not going to file a brief in this Court. The 
combination of those factors leaves us with an effective 
presentation for the government's position, but no effective 
presentation for the other s ide. Of course, that problem is 
alleviated to some extent given the availability of a number 
of CA opinions rejecting the SG's interpretation. 
A. The Precise Issue 
A good deal of the SG's analysis turns on the statutory 
requirement that the government's application include "the 
identity of ~ Eerson, if known, committing the offense and 
2. 
whose communications are to be intercepted." 18 U.S.C. 
~ lla. f Q.cld~d). 
See id. at 2518(4)(a)(the judicial order --
authorizing the interception shall specify "the identity of 
the person, if known, whose communications are to be inter-
- [f!./11\ hu~ o.JJ~d . 
cepted") The SG contends that under a reasonable interpre-
tation of this statutory language, the government is required 
to identify "only the principal target of the investigation." 
Brief at 18 (emphasis added). According to the SG, this will 
almost always be the person whose phone is to be monitored. Id. 
At the outs .e.+, it is important to stress the precise 
boundaries of the SG's interpretation. The SG does not contend 
"identif " 
that each application need only one person. To the contraryJ 
when the government seeks authorization to intercept conversa-
tions on a number of phone lines, the SG apparently concedes 
that the application would have to name the "principal target" 
(if known) for each separate phone number. Moreover, if two 
or more persons are known to be using the telephone "equally" 
to commit the offense, and thus are "equally" targets of the 
investigation, "all must be named." Brief at 18 n. 13. Thus, 
the SG reads the statutory phrase "identify the person" to 
mean "identify the 'principal target' of the investigation." 
He is not suggesting that the government can satisfy the 
statutory mandate merely by naming a single individual when 
there are in fact several principal targets. 
The application in the instant case, for example, sought 
authorization to intercept telephone communications involving 
} 
an illegal bookmaking business over two telephones listed 
under an alias of Spangalo at an apartment used by Kotech, 
and two other telephones in the home of Florea. The applica-
tion was accompanied by an affidavit containing extensive 
information from six reliable sources indicating that those 
three individuals were using the telephones to conduct an 
illegal gambling business. 
Interestingly enough, the application also identified 
3. 
I 
three other individuals - ~hickeno ~ Vara and Veres. 
to the papers filed by the government with the District Court, 
According 
the three principal targets (Kotoch ; J Spaganlo and Florea) 
would place calls to and receive calls from these three other 
named individuals as part of the illegal bookmaking business. 
But the government does not consider the three other named 
individuals "principal targets," and would apparently contend 
that it was unnecessary to identify them in the application. 
B. The Relevance of United States v. Kahn 
Before examining the SG's contention with respect to the 
language and legislative history of the statute, it would be 
'f 
fruitful to take a brief look at the relevance of the Kahn 
case to the inquiry sub judice. In Kahn, the government 
applied for an intercept order alleging that one Irving 
Kahn was a bookmaker who operated from his residence and 
used two home telephones to conduct his illegal business, 
and the DC authorized the interception. In the course of 
the wiretap, the government intercepted conversations between 
Irving Kahn and his wife, Minnie Kahn, concerning illegal 
gambling activities, and also conversations between Minnie 
Kahn and a "known gambling figure" concerning certain betting 
4. 
information. The government subsequently indicted both Irving 
and Minnie Kahn for a federal gambling offense, and introduced 
into evidence the intercepted conversations. 
The Kahns filed motions to suppress, and CA7 ruled that 
conversations involving Minnie Kahn had to be suppressed. 
According to CA7, in order to be admissible the intercepted 
conversations had to meet two requirements: (1) that Irving 
Kahn be a party to the conversation; and (2) that his inter-
cepted conversations be with "others as yet unknown." In 
effect, CA7 read these provisions of § 2518 as if they required 
that the application and order identify "all persons, known 
or discoverable, who are committing the offense and whose 
communications are to be intercepted." 
This Court reversed, noting that the statute requires 
identification "only of those 'known' to be 'committing the 
offense."' 415 U.S~ The Court held that: 
Title III requires the naming of a person in the 
application or interception order only when the 
law enforcement authorities have probable cause 
to believe that that individual is "committing the 
offense" for which the wiretap is sought. Since 
it is undisputed that the Government had no reason 
to suspect Minnie Kahn of complicity in the gambling 
business before the wire interceptions here began, 
it follows that under the statute she was among the 
class of persons "as yet unknown" .... 415 U.S., 
at 155. 
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There are two ways to read the holding in Kahn. The - -
first reading is fairly straightforward, and most ~ely 
comports with the language of the opinion: The statute requires 
the application to identify only those persons who are known 
to be committing the offense; Minnie Kahn, though "known", 
was not known to be committing the offense; therefore, it was 
not error to fail to name Minnie Kahn in the application. 
That reading would be dispositive of the instant case, since 
it is agreed that the government had probable cause to suspect 
that Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco would use the telephone 
wire and would do so while committing the offense. 
The SG urges a second interpretation of Kahn. In his 
view, this Court could have assumed that the statute required 
the identification in the application of all persons "known 
to be committing the offense." Since Minnie Kahn was not 
"known to be committing the offense," there was no error. 
On that view, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether 
the identification of only the principal target would be 
sufficient, since in any event the unnamed person was not a 
target at all. 
Both interpretations are plausible, and Kahn is thus not 
~~ . technically dispositive of the case sub judice. If it turns 
~ ~:~ that neither the language of the statute nor frs legislative 
~ ~istory proves to be dispositive, and resolution of the issue 
~~~urns on a balancing of competing policy considerations, Kahn 
/4f~ could be harmonized with a decision going either way. 
~ -------
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C. The SG's Contentions 
The SG relies primarily on three arguments to support his 
interpretation of the naming requirement: (1) neither the 
language nor the structure of the Act requires identification 
of all known persons; (2) the history of the statute does not 
indicate that a broad naming requirement is appropriate; and 
(3) policy considerations indicate that the preferable inter-
pretation is that only the "principal target" need be named 
in the application. 
(1) The language and structure of the Act. The SG first 
pursues a "plain meaning" approach to the interpretation of 
the statute. The statutory provision at issue refers to "the 
person" rather than to "all persons" or "any person," and 
therefore, so the argument runs, the statute requires identifica-
tion only of the target of the investigation. This argument 
is silly. The language of the statute is obviously ambiguous, 
and the mere fact that Congress used the term "the person" 
is not conclusive. I have no doubt that one could discover 
other statutes using the term "the person" which have been 
held to mean "more than one." Moreover, as noted above, the 
government has conceded that it must identify each and every 
"principal target" if a number of individuals use the telephone 
"equally" to commit the offense. As a result, the statutory 
language is no less consistent with the interpretation of 
CA6 than it is with the interpretation proffered by the 
government; if the term "the person" is consistent with 
"several principal targets," it seems equally consistent with 
"all persons known to be committing the offense." 
SG's second contention, and one which you have found 
7. 
more persuasiveJ is that the context of§ 2518(l)(b)(iv) 
supports the "principal target" interpretation. 
There is some merit to the SG's suggestion, but the 
argument loses much of its force when one takes into account 
the fact that the SG concedes that there can be several "primary" 
users all of whom must be named. There is no indication in 
§ 2518(l)(b) that Congress was aware of the~multiple primary 
user• problem, or that it intended to require identification •~~ 
of those "primary users" who utilize the facility "equally" 
to commit the offense. Most important, § 2518(l)(b) offers 
no basis on which to draw a line between a "primary user" and 
' ~------~-------------------------------------a "non-primary user." Indeed, the SG never suggests how it 
~ .. 
is that government officials are supposed to determine whether 
two persons "known to be committing the offense" use the 
phone "equally" in that regard. Thus, although the contextual 
argument has some surface appeal, it is a less · than satisfactory 
ground on which to choose between the interpretation proffered 
~ ._..._ 
by the SG and that adopted by CA6. 
For the same reasons I find unsatisfactory the SG's 
contention that the structure of the Act supports the "primary 
target" interpretation. For example, § 2518(i)(e) requires 
that an intercept application disclose all previous applications 
8. 
"involving any of the same persons, facilities or places 
. (e,.,. ~ .... J .·~ a..JJuJ) . 
specified in the application." On its face, t at language 
suggests that Congress expected that in some cases intercept 
applications would identify more than one person. Unfortunately, 
the statutory language itself gives no indication of the circum-
l t"ko .. ,l.,. f-./ 
stances that Congressrm~ght give rise to such a situation. 
It may well be that Congress recognized that a given applica-
tion might cover more than one phone, and thus the application 
would list several "primary" users. But the language in 
2518(l)(e) is just as consistent with the view that Congress 
expected an intercept application to name all persons "known 
to be committing the offense." Section 2518(l)(e) thus provides 
no additional insight concerning the statutory construction 
issue before us. 
The SG makes a fairly peculiar argument with respect to 
~I § 2518(l)(e). According to the SG, if one ~eau~ ~l)(b)(iv) 
to require identification of all persons "known to be committing 
the offense" rather than just the "primary target," persons 
will often be named who are not in fact subsequently overheard. 
The SG then goes on to contend that "[n]o purpose would be 
served by requiring that such persons be identified in 
subsequent applications for intercept orders as having been 
listed in previous applications." Brief at 21. In effect, 
the SG contends that it is silly to require the naming of 
( +t..e_ flo" - p'f i i)<O.>' 
persons other than "primary targets" since if they eventually 
are named as targets in subsequent applications (relating to 
the same or different offenses) the government will have to 
disclose that the nontarget had be~n~ed ~t not overheard 
in a prior application. The SG's observation may be accurate, 
but he errs when he concludes that g£ purpose would be served 
by requiring the naming of persons other than primary targets. 
Indeed, unless the government is required to name all those 
persons it has probable cause to believe will be overheard, 
the District Court on subsequent applications may be denied 
9. 
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relevant information. Suppose for example, that the government 
has probable cause to believe that primary target A uses his 
phone to conduct a gambling business with B, C, D, and E. 
Each person has his own phone and each is in daily contact with 
the others. The government applies for an intercept order 
identifying only A, the primary user, and gets an order 
authorizing a tap on A's phone. Suppose also that the tap 
proves to be of no value and the District Court refuses an 
extension. The government can then file an application (probably 
with a different District Court) identifying B as a primary 
target and seeking an intercept order with respect to B's phone. 
Since A is not named in this application, the government is 
not obligated to disclose the prior application indicating 
that it has already made one intercept attempt concerning this 
same gambling business and the intercept was unsuccessful. 
Indeed, the government would be free to do this again with C, 
then with D, and finally with E. If the "primary target" 
interpretation of 2518(l)(b)(iv) obtains in the subsequent 
10. 
application processJthe government would not be required to 
disclose the prior applications. Thus, there are at least some 
situations in which the disclosure requirement of 2518(l)(e) 
- - .,.ov:cl,,. V'el-e.v~ •A o.,.,.,.a..J..·-. 4... 'f1..L~C:.--
could serve a useful function under the interpretation of 
2518(l)(b)(iv) adopted by CA6. 
Finally, the government suggests that its reading of the 
identification requirement is supported by § 2510(11), which 
grants standing to seek suppression to any party to an 
intercepted conversation or to "a person against whom the 
interception was directed." The government correctly notes 
that there are only two classes of persons who have standing 
under § 2510(11) to move for suppression: parties to inter-
cepted conversations; and the person whose telephone is 
monitored. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 n. 9, 
176. From that the SG concludes that "a person against whom 
the interception was directed" is simply the "principal target," 
the same person referred to in§ 2518(l)(b) (iv). 
l 
But the standing provisions under § 2510(11) are unrelated 
to the naming requirements of § 2518(b)(l)(iv). Regardless 
of whether Donovan, Robbins, or Buzzaco were named in the 
intercept application, they would not have standing to seek 
suppression of conversations to which they were not a party. 
The fact that they would not have standing under such circum-
stances is not probative of whether Congre ss intended that 
only the "principal targets" be named in the application. 
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In fact, the government's reliance on the standing provision 
raises more questions than it answers. If the SG is correct in 
his contention that "a person against whom the interception was 
directed" is "simply the principal target, the same person 
referred to in§ 2518(l)(b)(iv)," Brief at 22, why did not 
Congress refer instead to "the person identified in the 
application." At other points in the statute, Congress does 
refer to "the persons identified in the application"; and 
given the government's contention, it would have made sense 
for Congress to have used more precise cross-reference in the 
standing provision. The use of different language could suggest 
that Congress intended the standing provision to be more narrow 
than the naming requirement. 
Second, the relevance of the standing provision becomes 
even less clear when we analyze one of the SG's own hypotheticals. 
Suppose for example, that two men (A and B) use a telephone 
in a store "equally" to commit an offense, and that neither 
A nor B is the proprietor of the store. The intercept order 
is authorized naming A, B, and P, the proprietor. Suppose the 
only intercepted conversation is one between C and D, which 
implicates A, B, C, D, and P in the illegal activity. Who has 
standing to make a motion to suppress? Certainly C and D, 
since their conversation was intercepted. And certainly P, 
the proprietor, since it is his phone that is being tapped. 
But A and B would not have standing ·to seek suppression of 
~ ~eve.-~ 




§ 2518(l)(b)(iv) to name A and Bin the application for the 
intercept order. That disposes of the suggestion that there 
is a connection between the standing and naming provisions. 
In conclusion, I cannot find anything in the language of 
the provision at issue or the structure of the Act which is 
dispositive of the question sub judice. 
(2) The history of the statute. The SG argues that 
the history of the statute supports his construction of the 
naming requirement. He begins by noting that this Court's 
decisions in Berger v. New York 388 U.S. 41, and Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, served as guidelines in the drafting 
of Title III. Moreover, Title III has a dual purpose: (1) 
protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications; and 
(2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and 
conditions under which the interception of wire and oral 
communications may be authorized. 
The SG's strongest "history" argument is that it would 
be inconsistent with this legislative history to interpret 
§ 2518(l)(b)(iv) as imposing a broad naming requirement extending 
beyond what is constitutionally necessary. The SG contends 
i n. " IAsv& 11 sea..Y""C.~ 
that there is no constitutional requirement that the person 
whose property is to be searched and whose things are to be 
seized be nam~ and that in the electronic surveillance 
13. 
context there is no constitutional necessity to name anyone, 
even if known, in the application order. The SG notes, however, 
that Congress may have read Berger and Katz as requiring the 
naming of the subject of the surveillance. But he concludes 
that: "[Congress] would hardly have read those cases as requiring 
the naming of all parties likely to be overheard conversing 
about the offenses under investigation. In neither case was 
that issue involved, either directly or by implication." Brief 
at 25-26. 
It is difficult to assess the weight that should be given 
this particular legislative history argument. Unfortunately, 
the Senate Report makes it almost impossible to determine 
exactly what it was Congre ss intended to require. Take for 
example the discussion in the report concerning the requirements 
for the intercept application: 
Subparagraph (b) requires that a full and 
complete statement of the facts and circumstances 
relied upon by the applicant be set out, including 
(i) the details as to what type of offense has been, 
is being, or is about to be committed, (ii) the 
place where, or the facilities or phone from which 
the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a 
particular description of the type of the communica-
tion which it is expected will be intercepted, and 
(iv) the identity of the person, if known, who is 
committing the offense and whose communications are 
to be intercepted. Each of these requirements 
I reflects the constitutional command of particulari-zation. (Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-56 
(1967) .) -
Senate Report at 101. The cited portion of Berger includes a 
summary of the New York statute at issue in that case, e s pecially 
its requirement that the application name "the person or persons 
14. 
whose communications are to be overhead. or recorded." See 
388 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added). The Berger opinion 
describes that statutory requirement as one which "does no 
more than identify the person whose constitutionally protected 
area is to be invaded." 388 U.S., at 59. On the basis of 
the Senate Report's citation to that language in Berger, I 
think it is simply impossible to tell whether Congress thought 
it was necessary to name just the "primary target" or "all 
persons known to be committing the offense." Unfortunately, 
the cited portion of Katz is of no help in clarifying that 
ambiguity. 
The section of the Senate Report dealing with the require-
ment that the intercept order itself identify "the person" 
whose conversations are to be intercepted is just as troublesome: 
Subparagraph (4) sets out in subparagraphs 
(a) through (e) the requirements that each order 
authorizing or approving the interception of wire 
or oral communications must meet. Subparagraph (a) 
requires the order to specify the identity, if 
known, of the individual whose communications are 
to be intercepted. See West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78 
(1894). Senate Report~ 
The citation to West is confusing since that case concerns 
proper identification of the subject of an arrest .warrant, 
and it has no particular relevance to search warrants. 
Yet the Report cites West, without explanation, for the 
requirement that the order identify "the person" whose 
communications are to be intercepted. 
The final aspect of the legislative history relied on by 
the SG is also inconclusive. The SG points out that the 
15. 
discussion of the inventory requirement of§ 2518(8)(d) in 
the Senate Report reflects the assumption that only the person 
whose telephone is to be monitored is to be named in the order. 
That discussion discusses a hypothetical in which "the subject" 
of the interception order moves from one location to another, 
and suggests that in such circumstances the court could postpone 
service of the required inventory. Read in context, that 
discussion has little bearing on the pr ecise requirements of 
the naming requirement with respect to applications. The 
SG also errs in this regard when he claims that the bill as 
reported out of committee required an inventory to be served 
only on "the person named in the order." To the contrary, the 
bill as reported out of committee required service of such 
inventories to "the persons named in the order of the applica-
tion." Senate Report at 17 (emphasis added). 
~YJ.A 
gA· ~ The 2:._e~~lati~~~ry i s.:_s inco~c.2:usive a~ the 
~ langua~e ~~t~e ~f~ A~t. Consequently, the decision 
~ in this case may h~~e~n~ balancing of the relevant 
~ ~~ ~ overnmental and private interests. The SG apparently recognizes 
r1 ~· as much, since he devotes almost as much attention to the policy 
· arguments (12 pages) as he does to the statutory language 
and legislative history arguments (15 pages). 
D. Policy Considerations 
(1) Adverse effects on the effectiveness of law enforce-
ment. The SG contends that a naming requirement for "all 
16. 
persons known to be committing the offense" would be practically 
impossible to comply with. According to the SG, information 
with respect to various suspects will be in the hands of 
different federal officers, some of whom may well be scattered 
across the country. Moreover, information is likely to be in 
different government files under different aliases and nicknames. 
Despite these practical difficulties, under a broad naming 
requirement the government must make two probable cause 
determinations with respect to every suspect: first, whether 
he is committing the offense, and (2) whether he will be over-
heard during the interception participating in the offenses 
under investigation. 
A broad naming requirement would obviously place more of 
an administrative burden on government officials than would 
the "primary target" requirement interpretation suggested by 
the government. But the fact that the administrative burden 
would be heavier does not mean that it would be intolerable, 
or that it would bring an end to the usefulness of the wire-
tapping device. In short, I think the SG's administrative 
burden argument exaggerates the effect a broad naming require-
ment would have on the "average" application for an intercept 
order. 
In the first place, when an individual's complicity in 
the crimes being investigated and his likely use of the target 
telephones is merely "discoverable," he is not "known" within 
the meaning of the statute's particularity requirements. 
17. 
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United States v. Kahn, supra. It is only when the government 
has probable cause as to both complicity and ~ of the phone 
that the government must name the individual in the application. 
The SG suggests that it will be difficult to "gather" informa-
tion from various government officials so that it can be "totaled 
up" to determine whether it rises to the level of probable 
cause. But in the context of the other requirements for an 
intercept order, such information will normally come to the 
attention of the government officials seeking the order. The 
statute requires that the intercept application contain "a 
full complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied 
upon by the applicant . including details as to the 
particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be 
committed." 18 U.S.C. 2518(1)(b)(i). And the statute also 
requires the application to set forth "a full and complete 
statement as to whether or not other investigative techniques 
have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear • 
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." 18 
U.S.C. 2518(l)(c). I think it is fair to conclude that in ~ ...... ________ - - -the process of collecting the data and information necessary ------ --- --to present the required "full and complete statements," the -- -~-- -- -- -appropriate government officials are likely in most cases to 
have before them the relevant information on which to base a 
probable cause decision relevant to the naming requirement. 
(2) The overinclusiveness problem. The second difficulty 
~ighlighted by the SG is that the agents and government attorneys 
must make these decisions themselves, at least in the first 
19. 
simply means that at the time of the application the marginal 
participant did not qualify as a "person known to be committing 
the offense." As long as there was probable cause to justify 
l f o.. d-re r (?().ttf/4-Jtl 
an intercept order with respect to the major]preetj~ pert(i~ 
it is not unconstitutional to seize conversations of those who 
were "unknown" at the time of the application. Thus, had the 
District Court ruled ab initio that there was no probable cause 
as to the marginal participant, interception of his conversations 
would nevertheless have been permissible. Consequently, 
suppression is inappropriate when an appellate court upsets 
a District Court's finding of probable cause as to the marginal 
participant. 
The second difficulty asserted by the SG is that those who 
are not overhead engaging in illegal conversations will suffer 
when the intercept papers become public during motions to 
suppress. According to the SG, in a similar context the naming 
of persons as unindicted co-conspirators has been held to 
impinge on judicially cognizable personal interests in 
reputation and ability to obtain employment. Brief at 32, citing 
United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d (CAS). The SG surprises me! 
His recent petitions and briefs in this Court have made 
considerable use of last Term's decision in Paul v. Davis, 
96 S. Ct. 1155, and I am sure he must realize that Paul takes 
the punch out of this second asserted difficulty. 
The third and final asserted difficulty is that agents 
cannot realistically present to the issuing judge all the 
I 
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information they possess about every suspect who might be 
overheard. The assertion rests on two assumptions: that there 
will be a large number of suspects with respect to every 
telephone intercept order, and that the government has con-
siderable information on each of those suspects. I doubt that 
a gambling or drug operations makes such widespread use of any 
one given telephone that the SG will have to name hundreds of 
suspects for each phone. Moreover, the larger the alleged 
conspiracy using the phone, the more suspicious an issuing 
judge would become with respect to the availability and useful-
ness of alternative investigative techniques. Realistically, 
the agents in most cases will face a manageable number of 
suspects with respect to each tap, and they need only present 
to the magistrate information in the government's hands 
pertaining to complicity in the particular crimes under 
investigation. Finally, the underlying difficulty of requiring 
agents to guess about "probable cause" applies only to marginal 
cases; surely there are a number of suspects as to whom govern-
ment agents have absolutely no doubt that probable cause is 
lacking. 
In sum, there is some merit to the administrative burden 
argument, but I would probe the SG at oral argument to determine 
how significant a problem this really is. 
(3) The Other Side of the Coin - Compensating Benefits 
from a Broad Naming Requirement. The SG contends that the 
burdens imposed under a broad naming requirement do not achieve 
any compensating benefits. I think the SG is wrong. 
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The SG starts by pointing out that the chief safeguard 
of privacy under the Act is the minimization requirement, and 
that the inclusion of names in the application in addition to 
the subject of the application will not facilitate minimization. 
On this point the SG is correct, and I would conclude that 
minimization is not furthered by a naming requirement. 
But the SG errs I think when he suggests that a broad 
naming requirement would not aid a judge in deciding whether 
an interception order should issue. There are at least two 
ways in which a broad naming requirement would prove useful i ~p~~~i·~ 
~ 4 
to an issuing judge. First, disclosure~rior application~ for 
intercepts must be presented to the issuing judge only with 
respect to individuals named in the application under considera-
tion. Since Congress believed that information about prior 
surveillance is necessary to judicial consideration of whether 
the proposed intrusion on privacy is justified by important 
crime control needs, identification of all persons as to whom 
the government has probable cause facilitates judicial control 
by providing the complete history that Congress deemed necessary 
for an informed decision. Suppose for example that two of 
three persons named in an application were named in five prior 
applications which produced no useful information. The issuing 
judge would certainly want to weigh that evidence in the balance 
in determining the need for instant application. But if the 
government names only the third person, who is the "primary 
target", there is no requirement that the government disclose 
prior applications as to the other two unnamed individuals. 
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The second way in which a broad naming requirement could 
prove useful to the issuing judge is by providing information 
._ ,_, -- ,. 
relevant to the judge's resolution of the question whether 
normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed 
or reasonably appear likely to fail or to be too dangerous. 
If the judge is aware that the government actually has probable 
cause with respect to five persons rather than simply one 
·"primary target," he might expect the government to meet a 
.~higher standard of proof with respect to the failure of normal 
~~ investigative techniques. Congress noted that normal 
~ investigative procedure would include, for example, standard 
sual or oral surveillance techniques, general questioning 
~ ~'~ interrogation under an immunity grant, use of regular 
~~ search warrants, and the infiltration of conspiratorial groups 
~ ....4 .. V, 
~ ~~undercover agents or informants. Senate Report, at . 
~  This is not to say that the government would be required to 
~ show that alternative investigative techniques were i~effective 
with respect to each individual. But when the issuing judge 
has to decide the need for an intercept order to get at a 
particular gambling business or drug operation, the availability 
of alternative techniques might be evaluated somewhat differently 
if the issuing judge has information concerning other members 
of the group as to whom the government has probable cause. 
Finally, the SG notes that naming a person in an intercept 
application triggers two statutory requirements: first, if 
named in the order, the person must be furnished with an 
inventory notifying him that the interception was authorized 
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and advising him whether and for how long~ in effect; and 
second, any subsequent applications to monitor calls in which 
the person is named must disclose all previous applications 
in which he was named. I have already indicated how a broad 
naming requirement when considered in the context of the latter 
requirement could facilitate proper administration of the Act 
\ ~ Pf 1-~ s~=-' 
by the issuing fUdge.~ There remains for discussion the mandatory 
notice provision • • 
The SG argues that whether or not named in an order a -
person whose conversations are intercepted will receive notice ~ 
if the issuing judge so directs. The statute provides not only 
~ for mandatory notice to those named in the order but also for 
,-~discretionary notice to those whose conversations are intercepted. 
~ ·~~It is clear f r om the Senate Report that Congress thought that 
_ ~ mandatory notice was essential with respect to the "subject" 
~ of the intercept. "Yet the intent of the [mandatory notice] 
~~provision is that the principle of postuse notice will be 
a.A""' retained. This provision alone should insure the community 
that the techniques are reasonably employed. Through its 
operation all . authorized interceptions must eventually 
become known at least to the subject, He can then seek 
appropriate civil redress . . . if he feels that his privacy 
has been unlawfully invaded." Senate Report at 105. 
Unfortunately, as I noted earlier, it is difficult to determine 
what Congress meant by the "subject," especially since the 
statutory language implementing the mandatory notice provision 
has always referred to "the persons" named in the order. 
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Since the language of the provision and the legislative 
history provide no firm basis on which to resolve the statutory 
construction issue, the oply principled approach to the problem 
is to weigh the administrative costs against the compensating 
benefits in light of the expressly stated dual congressional 
""-" ... 
objectives. See page /a supra. Such a balancing leaves the 
Court with three alternatives. {fir~~the Court can go to 
-one extreme and adopt the "primary target" interpretation -suggested by the SG. The~alternative is to go to the 
other extreme and adopt the "all persons known to be committing 
the offense" approach suggested by respondents. Under the 
latter interpretation, failure to name such a person results 
in suppression of evidence derived from the tap in a proceeding 
against the unnamed individual. 
Fortunately, there is ~alternative, though it is 
somewhat difficult to square with the language of the statute. 
CAS, sitting en bane, has adopted a "bad faith or attempted -subterfuge" approach. Under this approach, CAS interprets 
§ 2Sl8(b)(l)(iv) to establish a broad naming requirement, 
but refuses to require suppression of evidence as long as the 
government was in "substantial compliance" with the statutory 
provision. This seems to make considerable sense to me. On 
the one hand, I don't think the administrative burdens outweigh 
the compensating benefits, and for that reason I prefer the 
broad naming requirement. On the other hand, if the authorities 
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are about to move in and seek an intercept order to put the 
crunch on an illegal drug operation, you don't want to require 
suppression of valid evidence simply because there was an 
agent in Brooklyn who had probable cause to believe that X would 
participate in incriminating conversations and who forgot to 
mention that fact to his superior officers. The dual purposes 
of the statute are best served if we attempt to force the 
government to gather as much information as possible about all 
real subjects and present that information to the issuing judge. 
But as long as there is no evidence of bad faith or attempted 
subterfuge, there is no need to require suppression, if the 
government is nevertheless in substantial compliance with 
the requirement. 
The difficulty with this compromise approach is that it ... 
must somehow or other be worked into the portion of the statute 
d 1 . . h '' . h ea ~ng w~t suppress~on. Since the SG devotes the third 
portion of his brief to the availability of suppression as a 
remedy, I will discuss the good faith alternative again in 
Section III of this memo. See page 11 infra. 
I I. THE NATURE OF THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
The second question presented by this case is whether 18 
U.S.C. 2518(8)(d) requires that the government advise the court of 
tD the identity of every person whose conversation has been over-
heard in the course of a wire interception so that the court may 
~·~·••• determine whether to require that such person be served 
-. with notice of the interception. In the instant case the 
government intended to provide the DC with the names of all persons 
whose conversations the government had overheard during the inter-
ceptions. Respondents Merlo and Lauer were not named in the proposed 
orders submitted to the DC and a.-IIi. were never 9~-lli served with 
inventory notice. It is worth noting that the Department of 
-tkA..._ wA.S. rov :cled. :111 'tk..iA el'od. ). 
Justice's policy is actually to provide less information to 
~ 
current policJ y • is to provide the issuing judge with the name of 
every person who has been overheard as to whom there is any 
reasonable possibility of indictment, and to provide other names 
only • if so requested by the issuing judge. See Brief for the 
SG at 39 n. 34. 
The SG makes two brief arguments on this issue. First, the 
statute does not expressly require that the government routinely 
~ 
provide the issuJ ing judge with any sepcific information upon which 
ro base his exercise of discretion, either precise identification 
~ of individualsj;M i'Ju &aunt 11 r 7 aw eppali'a'A• J 9 rr iJ:Hi:MI~ or descriptions 
of categories of individuals, as the court found ••••• lae 
necessary in United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 540 (CA9). In 
this regard the government notes that it is a simple matter for 
the judge to ask for whatever information he thinks he needs to 
makes a notice-order decision. The government's second argument 
is that if it is appropriate to read into the statute some duty 
+It~ 
on the part of the government to inform the court of ~ whose 
conversations have been intercepted, that duty should only 2' 
require the government to use its best efforts to provide a complete 
list of such persons. 
Respondents (Merlo and Lauer) argue, as did both the majority 
and the dissenting judge .. below, that the judge has no inde-
oendent information as to the unnamed parties who have been over-
heard on the intercepts and must &1pr1& sa •h~ 
depend on the government to disclose that information in order that 
he may exercise his discretion. According to respondents, the 
government must perform its disclosure duty with some greater 
degree of care than was exercised in the instant case. 
To me, this is not a difficult issue. The statute clearly 
makes no express reference to the nature of the information, if 
OWfl\ 
any, that the government must on its ~ initiative provide to 
the issuing judge in order that he can exercise his statutory 
discretion. But it is silly to suggest that the government is 
under no obl~gation to provide any information until the issuing 
~ .,..... 
j udge furnis~hes a request for certain data. A fair compro~ise ~19 1 
~ between~s competing interests at stake is the standard4'~ 
adopted by CA 9 and by the panel (and dissenter) in the instant 
case: 
[A]lthougA t he the judicial officer has the duty to cause 
the filing of the inventory, it is abundantly clear that the 
prosecution has greater access to and familiarity with the 
intercepted conversations. Therefore we feel justified in 
imposing upon the latter the duty to classify ~~· all those 
whose conversations have been intercepted, and to transmit 
this in format ion to the judge. Should the judge des i~ more 
information regarding these classes in order to exercLl se his 
§ 2518(8)(d) discretion, we also hold that the goevernment 
is required to furnish such information as is available to 
it. 
F.2d at 540 United States v. Chun, supra, I think 
JG, .. JL ~ ..... ~ ~~..:..... it ~--...A ~ 
c..o~t,luW 
CA 9 correctly &9Ael·~~ that such an allocation of responsibility 
will best serve the dual purposes of Title III. 
The real issue with respect to the notice provisions of the 
Ac ~ i~~ whether the government has to name all the names or 
c/~ 
merely ae 7 Jt•• of persosns who were overheard, ~t rather whether 
suppression is an appropriate remedy for violation of the oappwipnist e 
whatever notice requirements are considered appr opriate. That 
question is discussed in the next section. 
III. SUPPRESSION AS A REMEDY 
Section 2518(10)(a) permits motions to suppress on the following 
grounds: 
(1) the communications was unlawfully intercepted; 
~ 
(2) the order of autjori~ation or approval under which it was 
intercepted is insufficient on its face; or 
(3) the interception• was not made in conformity with the order 
of authorization or approval. 
The only arguably relevant section of the J So statute is subdivision 
(1) t~D dealing with instances in which the communication was 
unlawfully intercepted. 
This Court has two considered section 
2518(10)(a)(i). In Unitd~d States v. Giordane 1 u.s. 
u 
l ~+- s t,.c)-,·"""' ......... 
, the Court held that ~ embraced "any of those 
statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement 
the congressional ~neeneii8H ee ~intention to limit the use 
of intercept procedures to those s~tuations clearly calling for 
the employment of this extraordinary investigative device." 
D 
It is clear that section 2518(l)(a)(i) does not require 
~ 
suppression for "every failure to comply fully with any require-
ment of Title III." United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574-75. 
A. Suppression for Failure to Comply with a Broad Naming 
Requirement 
If l; accept the government's "principal target" interpre-
tation of the naming requirement, there is no real problem with 
suppression. The only suppression situation would be where the 
government failed to name even the primary target, and I doubt that 
the SG would contend that under such circumstances suppression was 
inappropriate. On the other hand, if you think there is a , •!l 
~ ~ broad naming requirement, is suppression an &:~available remedy 
under the statute as interpreted by this Court? 
~ I think the answer is yes. As I noted earlier, the statutory 
• --
language and legislative history is n81! a f m•" fail to resolve 
;-..... ~ 
the merits of the issue co~cerning the sc~ope of the naming 
requirement. But the policies that would justify imposition of 
a broad naming requirement, ~ pages 21-22 s~, are s~sh as t~ 
would also warrant the conclusion that the naming requirement 
"directly and substantially implement[s] the congressional 
\ 
intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those 
situations ~ clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary 
investigative device." Giordane , supra, at 527. 
--
I also mentioned earlier that it might be difficult to work 
a "good ~ faith" approach into the statutory language. On 
reflection, I ~ don't think the problem is all that serious. 
One would simply argue that the intercept order is lawful where 
the application all those known to be committing the offense. Thus, 
mere inadvertent failure to name a person whose conversations 
~re subsequently overheard would not make the intercept unlawful. 
On the other hand, if the government knowingly and intentionally~ 
refused to give the issuing judge the name of ~ a person known to 
be committing the offense, the basic intercept is unlawful as 
to that person and suppression is appropriate. 
B. Suppression for Failure to Comply with a Notice Requirement 
For similar reasons I agree with Judge Enge~s d•aas~ 
dissenting opinion which analyzes the availability of the .. 
suppression remedy for violations of the notice requirement. 
[7) The wiretap authorization re-
ferred to "Billy Cecil Doolittle and oth-
ers as yet unknown." Anderson and 
Baxter contend that the Government 
had reasonable cause to believe that 
their conversations would be intercepted. 
Relying on certain langu age in the Su-
preme Court's opinion in ll!;b.n, they ar-
gue that, not being "unknown," they 
shou ld have been named in the autho-
rization. They contend that since they 
were not named, the wiretap order was 
illegal as to their conversations. The 
same argument cou ld be made for Sand-
ers.· We reject this argument. Tb e ~e­
fendants neither allege nor demonstrate 
any prcj ud ice to t"Fiem I n not being 
nariieo 1n tJie au t horization. The 
Government contends that its agents had 
personal knowledge, as opposed to infor-
mation, to support probable cause as to 
illegal activity only of Doolittle, the co-
owner of the Sportsman's Club, the es-
tablishment wherein the telephones were 
located and to which the telephone bills 
were sent. All defendants received an 
inventory of the intercepted conversa-
tions, were allowed to listen to the tapes 
and received transcripts of the conversa-
tions prior to use against them at trial, 
as if they had been named in the order. 
Most of the conversations of each de-
fendant were with Doolittle, the person 
named in the order. There is no indica-
tioJL ~. J~ith or attempted subt!;!r-
fug~ b~ the G_gvernme.nt in its wiretap 
application. The application and affida-
vit delineated specifically the informa-
tion expected to be gathered from the 
tap. We hold there was substantial com-
pliance with the requirements oT the 
Act, and that the failure to name other 
defendants does not render the evidence 
obtained as to them inadmissible under 
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TO: Gene Comey DATE: November 20, 1976 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 75-212 United States v. Donovan 
I like your first draft and, subject to the questions 
below, think it fairly close to being ready for a printed 
Chambers draft. 
Apart from minor editing, I have no comments or questions 
with respect to Parts I and II. These are well and tightly 
written. 
I do have some questions as to Part III . although I 
could be satisfied - after discussion - that it is substantially 
adequate as drafted. In Parts I and II we categorically "hang" 
the government with two statutory violations. In Part III we 
reprieve the government and the dissent will say that, for 
practical purposes, we have written out of the statute the 
provisions addressed in Parts I and II. It is therefore 
desirable that our Part III be as persuasive as we can properly 
make it. 
As presently drafted, as you and I agreed at the outset, 
principal reliance is placed upon language in Giordano and 
Chavez. The language we rely upon makes three points: (i) 
every failure to comply with requirements of Title III does 
not render the "interception of the wire or oral communications 
2. 
'unlawful'"; (ii) suppression is required only for a failure 
to comply with statutory requirements that implement congressional 
intent "to limit the use of intercept procedures"; and (iii) 
suppression is not appropriate where the requirement violated 
does not play a "substantive role" in the regulatory scheme. 
The SG's brief (p. 46 et seq.) relies primarily on the 
language of § 2518(10)(a)(i), authorizing suppression only (so 
far as we are concerned) where the conununication was "unlawfully 
intercepted". The SG disposes of Merlo and Lauer by saying 
that this subsection has no application to violations arising 
after the interception is completed. Subsequent errors are 
irrelevant to the lawfulness of a prior interception. 
This precise line of analysis does not fit the other 
three respondents. The SG nevertheless makes a rather good 
argument: by virtue of the intercept order, the government 
was entitled to overhear the conversations of the named targets 
and others unknown to the government. There probably were 
scores of persons whose conversations thus were intercepted, 
but this did not make these interceptions unlawful. Also, 
as you state, the failure to identify by name in the application 
and order all those likely to be overheard does not, under the 
statute, affect the decision of the Court whether to authorize 
the interception. That decision turns upon the statutory 
conditions you have outlined. 
'· 
3. 
In short, the fact that incriminating conversations of 
others not named may be overheard is, as the SG puts it, simply 
not relevant to the judge's decision. This being so, the SG 
reasons that the failure to name suspected co-conspirators, 
no more than the failure to name unsuspected co-conspirators, 
cannot invalidate the interception order and render unlawful 
the communications intercepted. 
The SG thus emphasizes, more than our draft does, the 
precise language of subsection (i) "unlawfully intercepted", 
rather than the more generalized language from Giordano and 
Chavez. 
The fouus of the emphasis in your draft is summarized at 
the top of page 21: 
"Although both statutory requirements are 
undoubtedly important, we do not think that 
they function directly and substantially to 
limit the use of intercept procedures." 
The foregoing reference to limiting the use of intercept 
procedures appeared first in Giordano, 416 u.s., at 527, and 
was repeated in Chavez (p. 575). I do not read it as a 
judicial broadening of subparagraph (i). Rather it is an 
elaboration of its purpose. 
* * * 
At this point, Gene, I emphasize that I have no dobbt 
as to the basic soundness of your analysis. I am simply 
saying that perhaps it can be buttressed by a more specific 
reliance on the language of subsection (i). 
* * * 
4. 
The SG's brief on "suppression" makes several other points 
that may be worth considering as possible additions to, or 
elaborations of, our footnotes. 
1. There is nothing in the legislative history to suggest 
that the inventory or naming requirements "occupy a central, 
or even functional, role in guarding against unwarranted use 
of wiretapping or electronic surveillance". Chavez, at 578 
(SG, pp. 49, 50). 
2. There is no occasion to create an exclusionary rule 
where none is provided by Title 111. The SG argues, with 
reason, that the statutory provisions for suppression are 
exclusive where, as with respect to the issues in this case, 
there is no constitutional violation (SG, pp. 50, 51). 
3. No substantial rights of respondents were affected, 
a thought you had in mind with your ''second" suggestion in 
your memo to me. In the cases of Donovan, Robbins and Buzzacco, 
each of them received inventory notices even though they had 
not been named. They do not suggest anywway in which they 
were disadvantaged. Nor did Merlo and Lauer suffer any impair-
ment of substantial rights. They certainly had actual notice, 
5. 
as a practical matter, that their conversations had been 
intercepted when inventories were served on 37 of their 
confederates. But apart from this irrelevant observation, the 
intercept papers were made available to all of the defendants 
no later than December 1973, affording - as the record in this 
case demonstrates - abundant time to permit pretrial suppression 
motions, and prepare for trial (which has not yet been held). 
The SG also notes that the primary statutory protection against 
surprise at trial is 18 u.s.c. 2518(9). (SG 1 s brief p. 53). 
4. In footnote 43 (p. 51) the SG cites a number of 
Courts of Appeals decisions said to have refused to suppress 
errors of the types involved here wher,e there has been no 
showing of prejudice. This is no issue of "prejudice" in the 
case before us, and perhaps it is unwise to address it even 
in a footnote. What do you think? 
* * * 
Despite the length of this memorandum, I do not think 
substantial revision of Part III is indicated. But I am inclined 
to think that the opinion would be strengthened by a more explicit 
reliance upon the language of subsection (i), and by including 







.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~u:prttttt <ijnu:rt ttf tfrt ~b ~Udtg 
'IJa:gftinghttt.!l. Qt. 2ll.;i,.;l 
December 7, 197 6 
Re: No. 75-212, United States v. Donovan 
Dear Lewis: 





Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
;iuprtmt <!}llurlltf tlrt ~ttb ~htttg 
..-~lthtghtn. ~. Of. 2llgt'!~ 
December 9, 1976 
Re: 75-212 - United States v. Donovan 
Dear Lewis: 
Although I agree with Parts I and II, I will 
await the dissent before deciding on Parts III and 
IV. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
.in:prtutt ~tturl d tqt ~tb .itatts 
._asltington. ~. ~· 2llgt~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
December 9, 1976 
Re: No. 75-212 United States v. Donovan 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
.i~tmt <!Jcurt cf tqt 'Jitttittb ,jhtttg 
~agfrin:ghm. ~. <!f. 2ll&'J!.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
December 10, 1976 
Re: No. 75-212 - U. S. v. Donovan 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
,ju.prtmt afourl of tqt ~~ ,jtattg 
JfuJringhtn. ~. <!]:. 2ll.;t~~ 
December 10, 1976 
PERSONAL 
Re: 75-212 - United States v. Donovan 
Dear Lewis: 
As written, I can only concur in the judgment and in all but 
Part IIA of the Court's opinion. I cannot agree, however, with yo~Ar 
~~ Cru,rtLs construction of the identification provisions of 
§ 2518(1) (b) (iv). In my view, the statute plainly requires a 
wiretap application to identify by name the principal target of 
the investigation. The application in the instant case complies 
with that requirement. Since Congress demanded no more, I would 
conclude that no statutory violation occurred with respect to the 
application. 
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 
(1975), you stated the familiar proposition that the starting 
point in every case involving construction of a statute is the 
language itself. The statute before us requires no more than 
that a wiretap application specify the "identity of the person, 
if known, committing the offense and whose communicat1ons are 
to be intercepted." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (b) (iv). While requiring 
only the identification of "~ person" whose communications are 
to be intercepted, Congress manifestly contemplated that inter-
ceptions effected pursuant to a single application and order could 
well potentially affect a large number of persons, particularly on 
incoming calls. Under the statute, notice of the intercept can 
be provided by order of the federal district court to "parties" 
other than persons named in the application. Id., § 2518(8) (d). 
Similarly, standing to object to intercepted communications is 
conferred upon "[a]ny aggrieved person .... " Id., § 2518(10) (a). 
Finally, the statute confers a civil damages remedy upon "[a]ny 
person" whose communications are unlawfully intercepted or used 
in violation of the statute. 
Congress' clear recognition that multiple parties would 
potentially be affected by a single wiretap does no more than 
recognize the reality that numerous persons may call in and that 
some of them will be fellow "hoods." This is manifest from the 
statute itself. This has significant bearing upon our interpre-
tation of§ 2518(1) (b) (iv). In fashioning highly specific 
- 2 -
requirements with respect to wiretap applications, Congress care-
fully avoided the use of plural language found in other parts of 
the same statute; instead, Congress spoke in the singular, re-
quiring identification of "the person" whose communications are -to be intercepted. Unless Congress meant something other than 
what it said, Congress had not thought to require the naming of 
"any [other] person" who might be c~ught up by the intercept. 
You emphasize, however, that the statute expressly recog-
nizes that more than one person may be named in a wiretap 
application. Ante, at 10. That is indeed true. See§ 2518(1} (e), 
(8} (d). But I would think this is all the more reason for focusing 
upon the precise language in the provision establishing specific 
requirements for an application. Since Congress expressly con-
templated that applications might contain more than one name, its 
failure in §2518(1} (b) (iv} to require the naming of "any [other] 
person" or "the persons" whose communications are to be inter-
cepted must mean that the suggested open-ended identification 
requirement was not intended. In other words, Congress reason-
ably foresaw that for a variety of reasons actual wiretap 
applications might contain the names of more than one person. 
But Congress did not translate its recognition of what an appli-
cation might contain into a command as to what it must contain, 
as is now proposed. 
The plain words of the statute, of course, might have to bow 
in the face of compelling legislative history to the contrary. 
But there is none. Indeed, you observe that Congress' intent is 
enwrapped in its interpretation of this Court's decisions in 
Berger and Katz. But I think it is neither necessary nor appro-
priate on this sparse record to decide how Congress decided to 
read the prior decisions of this Court. The point is that we 
do not know. What we do know is that these provisions "'[were] 
intended to reflect the constitutional command of particularization.'" 
Ante, at 12. The language of the four precise statutory requirements 
confirm that purpose. !/ For me, the very precision of the 
1/ 
-Thus, § 2518(1} (b) requires the application to contain a 
"full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances", 
including "a particular description of the nature and location of 
the facilities .... " Likewise, the provision requires "a 
particular description of the types of communicatbns." 
- 3 -
language employed by Congress in§ 2518(1} (b) strongly points 
to the conclusion that Congress meant exactly what it said in 
establishing an identification requirement in the singular. Also 
important, that exact language comports with Fourth Amendment 
requirements under our subsequent holding in United States v. 
Kahn, 415 U.S., at 155, and thus fulfills the express legislative 
purpose. 
I would therefore interpret this statute to mean what it says. 
Whether wisely or not, Congress decided, consistent with Fourth 
Amendment strictures, to require only the identification of 
"the person" whose conversations are to be intercepted. Since 
it is clear Congress shifted from plural language to singular, 
I would take Congress at its word. 
I hope you have not "hardened"! 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
December 13, 1976 
United States v. 
1;.: ,. 
\,_; (, 
(:'·"'-'' ;..,:!';. ,, 
! • f:·)· ,. Dear lk (.'"~ "'i· ,,,~ 
Thank you 1 for your thoughtful letter of December 10. 
}<.10 ·' 
i\f' 
Although I would agree that the statutory construction 
question with respect to § 2518(l)(b)(iv) is not free from 
doubt, I reached a different conclusion after rather careful 
,~ study. Moreover, my Conference notes indicate clearly that 
your .:view of. t:he ,1statute did not attract a "Court". ·· ' · 
•• , My opinion, ·as now written, will impose a hortatory 
obligation on the government to name persons whoae · communica-
tions it reasonably expects to intercept. But the important , 
holding 1n the case is that a failure to name will not reaul~ ''' 
1n exclusion of the intercepted coDillUQicationa. , . ' 




.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.hpuuu <q:curt ttf tJrt ~a ~hdtg 
'~1hu~Jrington. ~. <q:. 2ll.;i'!~ / 
December 13, 1976 
Re: No. 75-212 - United States v. Donovan 
Dear Lewis: 
By a separate letter I am joining your opinion. I have only 
the following minor comments: 
MJ# ~· 
.g f~~ /:P 1. You will recall that at conference I was somewhat attracted 
;vvV1 rv ~ to Judge Godbold's position in dissent in United States v. Doolittle, 518 
~F. 2d 500, 501, 503 (1975), where he thought the standard might be "a 
i'V. Q.)l person against whom the ip,terception was directed. 11 On further reflec- "' 
~- J tion, I have concluded that robable cause is erha s the better standard. 
1 1 • 0/'~., I :wonder, however, whether a footnote reference to Judge GOdbokl'ssug-
~#,.V, sted standard and our rejection of it might be in order. Perhaps not. 
U r ~.lfJb. s you wish about this. I mention it only because it might shore up 1 
~~ j;~Ifttle for me personally • 
r-;~ n. 21, with which I agree, might not be more strongly stated if the foot-
. 'J..A; 2: 2. I wonder whether the adoption of the Chun Test, p. 16 and 
r;A"' note were worked into the text and if the conclusion as to Merlo and Lauer 
were spelled out there. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~ttltt <!}ottri of f!rt :Jluittb .jhdtg 
Jl'MJritt¢.on~ ~. <!}. 2ll,?Jl.~ 
December 13, 1976 
Re: No. 75-212 - United States v. Donovan 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
gc/lab 12/14/76 
Government carries a greater administrative ,, t3 \\ 
burden under this holding than would be the case under the 
principal target interpretation, a fact which has prompted 
some to suggest that Congress did not intend to require the 
probable cause standard. Preferring a middle ground between 
principal target and probable cause, Judge Godbold, for 
example, takes the position that the statute requires the 
naming of all those individuals "against whom the interception 
was directed," as that phrase is used in the definition of 
aggrieved person in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11). United States v. 
Doolittle, 518 F.2d 500, 501, 503 (CA 5 1975)(en bane) 
(concurring opinion). Under this interpretation, a suspect 
as to whom the probable cause standard is satisfied would 
not have to be identified in a wiretap application if, in 
light of the information the Government has already collected, 
it can reasonably be said that the Government is not invest-
igating that suspect. Although this interpretation might 
ease the Government's administrative burden, we can find 
no more support in the legislative history for this 
restrictive reading of the statutory language than for 
the Government's principal target approach. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~ttpTtntt Qfonrlltf tJrt ~)~hUts 
JfuJri:ttghttt. ~. <!J. 2llc?'!~ 
December 14, 1976 
75-212 - U. S. v. Donovan 
Dear Lewis, 
Although I was tentatively of the other 
view with respect to one of the issues involved 
in this case, I think you have written a most 
persuasive opinion. Accordingly, I do not plan 
to write in dissent. I shall look carefully at 
whatever is written by anyone else, but, sub-
ject to that condition subsequent, I acquiesce 
for now in your opinion for the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
J 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE~oulateci: DEC 27 1976 
Rectroula.ted l -------No. 75-212 
United States, Petit ioner. On Writ of Certiorari to t1lC 
v. rnited States Court of Ap-
Thomas vV. Donovan et al. peals for the Sixth Circujt. 
[January -, 1077] 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
The Court today holds that an application for a. warrant 
to authorize a wiretap under Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control a.nd Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. ~~ 2510-
2520, must name all individuals whom the Government has 
probable cause to believe are committing the offense being 
investigated and will be overheard. See 18 U. S. C. ~ 2;')18 
( 1) (b) (iv). It also holds that the Government must provide 
sufficient information to the issuing judge to allow him to 
exercise the discretion provided by 18 U. S.C. ~ 2518 (8)(d). 
I fully agree with both of these holdings. The Court con-
cludes, however, that if the Government violates these statu-
tory commands, it is nevertheless free to usc the intercepted 
communications as evidence in a criminal proceeding. I 
cannot agree. 
I continue to adhere to the position, exprcs<oed for four 
Members of the Court by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent 
in United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S. 562, 584 (1974), that 
Title III, does not authorize "the courts to pick and choose 
among various statutory provisions, suppressing evidence only 
when they determine that a provision is 'substantive,' 'cen-
tral,' or 'directly and substantially' related to the congres-
sional scheme." The Court has rejected that argument, how-
ever, sec United States v. Chavez, supra; United States v. 
Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and nothing is to be gained 
by renewing it here. But even under tho standard set forth 
'·' ' I 
~
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in Giordano and Chavez and reaffirmed by the Court today, 
ante, at 18-19, the evidence at issue here should be suppressed. 
I 
Title III requires that an application for a warrant to au-
thorize ·wiretapping disclose "the identity of the person, if 
known, committing the offense and whose communications 
are to be intercepted." 18 U. S. C. § 2518 ( 1) (b) (iv). The 
Court properly rejects the Government's contention that this 
provision requires it to name only the "principal target" 
of an investigation. In doing so, the Court relies both on 
the pl:1in language and legislative history of the section, which 
do not support the Government's position, and on the statu-
tory context. Ante, at 8-13. Part of that context is the 
obvious assumption of other portions of Title III that wirc-
ta,p applications will name more than one target. See 18 
U.S. C.§§ 2518 (1)(e), (8)(d). Another part is 
"the fact that identification of an individual in an ap-
plication triggers other statutory prov·isions. First, 
§ 2518 (1) (e) rrquires an intercept application to dis-
close all previous applications 'involving any of the same 
persons . . . specifird in the application.' . . . Second, 
§ 2518 (8) (d) mandatrs that an inventory notice be 
served upon 'the persons named in the ord('r or the 
application.'" Ante, at 10--11, n. 14 (emphasis added). 
Yet in determining whether the identification rcquiremeut 
"directly and substantial1y imp1ementf s l the congressional 
intention to limit the usc of interce}it procedures," United 
States v. Giordano, suzmt, 416 U. S., at 527, or plays a "sub-
stantive role" in the "regulatory system" rstablished by Con-
gress, United States v. Chavez, supra, 416 U. S., at 578, the 
Court ignores the requirement's function as a statutory "trig-
ger." In its analysis, the Court focuses solely on whether 
a list of additional names would affect a judge who must 
decide whether to issue a warrant. The Court reasons that 
once the judge has concluded that the sprcific requirements 
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of § 2518 (3) 1 have been met, the presence of additional 
names in the warrant application could not change his deci-
sion. Ante, a.t 19-21. Failure to provide those names is, 
therefore, insignificant. 
The Court's reasoning IS d~ed. First, a judge 
is not required to issue a warrant if the prerequisites of 
§ 2518 (3) are satisfied; he may do so. Once he determines 
that the § 2518 (3) requirements have been met, he still must 
decide whether the invasion of privacy by the proposed 
wiretap is justified under the circumstances. 2 Second, what 
is at issue here is more than a simple list of names. Section 
2518 (I) (e) requires that the Government disclose to the 
court the history of all prior applications to intercept the 
communica.tions of anyone named in a warrant application. 
A history of recent applications would at the least cause a 
judge to consider whethrr the application before him was 
an attempt to circumvent the restrictive rulings of another 
1 18 U. S. C. § 251.'\ (3) providr~. in pertinrnt part: 
"Upon such application i hr .iudgr m•1y entrr an ex partC' ordrr .. . if 
the judge determines on the ba~i:; of the farts submittrd b~· tlw appliPant 
that-
" (a) there i.,; probable eau~.e for brlicf that an individual is rommittin11:, 
has committed, or is about to commit a pari irular offen:;c enumerated in 
section 2516 of this chaptc·r; 
"(b) there is probnhlr catn'c for belief that pnrtirular romm\mi<•ntions 
concerning that ofTrnRe will be obtainrd through such intrrreption; 
"(r) norm:ll inyr.,;tip:aiiYr prorrdure:< have been tried and ha ·e failed 
or reasonably nppear to bP unlike]~· to snrreccl if tri C'cl or to hC' too 
dangerous; 
" (d) there i~ prohnhle c::u~e for belief I hat the facilit iC'H from which, 
or the plnce where, the wire or or:1l communications arc to be in I erccpted 
arc bein~J; used, or are about to he w;Pd. in comJertion with the commis-
sion of such offense. or arr len~<·d I o, li 1'1 !'d in the n:tmc of, or commonly 
usrd by surh prrson." 
2 The informal ion whi<'h the applicant is rrquirrcl to provide to the 
Dist1ict Court b~· §§ 251R ( 1) (d)-( f) would br ~uprrnuous if 1 he dc><·ision 
whether io is5nc a warrant dcpendrd only on thr Jinding' ~per ifi cd in 
§2518 (3). 
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judge or to continue an unjustified invasion of privacy.3 The 
decision whether to issue the warrant would certainly be 
affected by such consideration.4 
It is true, as the Court notes, ante, at 20 n. 23," that there 
is no allegation in this case that had the District Court been 
informed that the Government expected to overhear respond-
ents Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins discussing illegal gam-
bling activities it would not have issued a warrant. But 
that fact is irrelevant to an analysis of the role of the 
naming requirement in the regulatory system established by 
Congress. In Giordano, the Court rejected the argument 
that the Attorney General's failure to authorize the applica-
tion for a warrant could be disregarded because the Attorney 
General had later ratified the application, thus demonstrating 
that he would have approved it originally. 416 U. S .. at 
523-524, n. 12. The important consideration was whether 
the requirement of high-level authorization was clesignC'd 
to play an important role, not whether it would have mat-
tered in the particular case. The same analysis should be 
used here. 
Moreover, even where there is no prior interception or 
application to disclose, as is apparently the case here, the 
naming requirement plays a vital role in the system designed 
by Congress. For unless that requirement is complied with 
3 Cf. United States v. Bellosi, 1G3 U. S. App. D . C. 273, 501 F. 2d 
833 (1974). 
4 Thus, this cn~e is unlike United States v. Chavez, supra. There-, the 
Court concluded that the mi~identification of the authorizing official as an 
Assi,;tnnt Attornry Gmll'ral when the Attorney General had actually 
authorized the warrnnL npplil'ation could not hn.vc allected the judge's 
decil'lion to iFsue t.he warrant. 41G U. S., at 572. 
5 The Court nctu:dly state~ only that there i~ no suggr.~tion that. the 
failure to nnme rrspondents krpt from the judge informn.t ion "11w t 
might ha\ e prompted t hr court to conclude- that probable cause was 
Jacking." As I h!.lxe shown, thn.t formulation nnder:;tates the District 
Court's role. 
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from the first interception, no judge will know that a later 
interception is not the first. In addition, the naming require-
ment triggers the mandatory notification provision of § 2518 
(8) (d), another important component of the congressional 
dcsign.6 
Thus, I conclude that the naming requirement recognized 
by the majority docs play a "substantive role" in the system 
designed by Congress to limit the usc of electronic surveil-
lance. Failure to comply with that requirement, therefore, 
should lead to supprcRsion on the ground that "tho commu-
nication was unlawfully intercepted." 18 U. S. C. ~ 2518 
(IO)(a) (i). 
II 
The Court's discussion of the consequences of the Gov-
ernment's failure to comply with the notice provif:ion of 
§ 2518 (8) (d) parallels its discussion of the naming require-
ment, and is similarly flawed. The Court does recognize that 
the notice provision was designed to assure the community 
that the wiretap technique is reasonably employed and that 
"Congress placed considerable' emphasis on that aspect of 
the overall statutory scheme." Ante, a.t 23-24. But because 
notice Of'eurs after the intercept is completed, and because 
notice is not itself "an independent restraint on resort to 
the wircta.p procedure," the Court concludes that failure to 
notify docs not render an interception "unlawful" under 
§ 2518 (10) (a) (i) . Ibid. 
Again, the Court takes too narrow a view of the provision 
at issue, ignoring its place in the system Congress has created 
to restrain wiretapping. That system involves not only direct 
restraints on applying for a warrant, but also restraints 
which reduce wiretaps by providing sanctions for misuse of 
surveillance techniques. Those sanctions arc both criminal, 
18 U.S. C. § 2511 (1), and civil, 18 U.S. C.§ 2520. Congress 
6 See Part II, infra. 
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designed the notice provisions of § 2518 (8) (d) to provide 
tho information necessary to make the civil sanctions of 
~ 2520 meaningful. The congressional analysis of § 2520 
states: 
"Iujunctive relief. with its attendant discovery proceed-
ings, is not intended to be available. . . . It is expected 
that civil suits, if any, will instead grow out of the 
filing of inventories under section 2518 (8) (d)." S. Rep. 
No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 107 (1968). 
See also id., at 105. 
The Court's conclusion that the notice provision is not 
central dismantles this carefully designed congressional 
structure. 
III 
The Court's opinion implies that if the violations of Title 
III considered here had been intentional, the result would 
be different. Ante, at 20 n. 23, 23 n. 26. This must be so, 
for surely this Court would not tolerate the Government's 
intentional disregard of duties imposed on it by Congress. 
I also assume that if the Government fails to establish 
procedures which offer reasonable assurance that it will 
strictly adhere to the statutory requirements, sec ante, at 24, 
resulting failures to comply will be recognized as inten-
tional. There is, therefore, reason to hope that the Court's 
admonition that the Government should obey the law will 
have some effect in the future. 
But that hope is a poor substitute for certainty that the 
Government will make every effort to fulfill its responsibilities 
under Title III. We can obtain that certainty only by ac-
cording full recognition to the role of the naming and notice 
requirements in the statutory scheme created by Congress. 
I respectfully dissent from the Court's failure to do so. 
lfp/ss lZ/27/76 Donovan - Possible Additional Footnote 
Do •ot- ,..J~ (!. lk -h...._ ~ · ~ , 
The per se rule of exclusion urged by the dissenting 
opinion, infra, would impose upon society the consequences 
a.-.:1-
of aborting merited prosecutions GE overturning deserved 
- convictions merely because of the omission of the name of 
a person who was known to someone on the government's side 
as a possible target. Such omissions may occur even when the 
utmost care is exercised to avoid them. For example, in a 
major bookmaking or narcotics case, involving extensive 
interstate operations and a H multiplicity of parties sfXH 
often operating under aliases, investigating government 
agents would be confronted with difficult problems of 
identification and determination of probable cause as well 
as of coordination with the prosecutorial team. The SG 
therefore argues, e~eaialy not without reason, that an 
inflexible exclusionary rule would "significantly impede 
the use of electronic surveillance as a law enforcement 
tool without safeguarding legitimate privacy interests 
or protecting against official abuses''. Br. 27. In 
these circumstances, we are reluctant to impose a 
judicially created exclusionary rule where Congress has 
failed to do so in clear and explicit language. 
C H .AMBE ~S OF 
..%tttrrtm.e Qiou.rt of tq.e ~trite~ ..§tat.ee-
~ae-Irmgton. ~. QI. zogrJ~~ 
JUST ICE Ww. . J . B RE NNAN, JR. 
December 28, 1976 
RE: No. 75-212 United States v. Donovan 
Dear Thurgood: 
, ... 
Please join me in the dissenting opinion 
you have prepared in the above. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 




JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.fttpTtlltt Q}ouri ltf tlrt ~~ .jtaf.tg 
~MJri:ttghttt. ~. <!}. 21lbt'!~ 
January 4, 1977 
Re: No. 75-212, U. S. v. Donovan 
Dear Lewis, 
I have decided to join your opinion 
for the Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
gc/ss/lab 1/10/77 
The concurring opinion of the CHIEF JUSTICE 
contends that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and 
~ Buzzaco ~tanding even to seek suppression. 
at This contention rests on the ground that 
Congress rejected an amendment proposed by Senators 
Long and Hart that would have added a fourth ground 
justifying suppression-" namely, that the person against 
whom the government sought to introduce the evidence 
was not named in the court order. Since these three 
respondents would have been entitled to suppression 
. 
under the rejected amendment, the concurring opinion 
concludes they cannot seek suppression here. 
I 
This view . fails to recognize that § 2518(10)(a) 
establishing the suppression remedy provides alternative 
grounds on which one can seek suppression of evidence 
derived from a wiretap. Thus, the mere fact that 
Congress chose not to add a fourth alternative could 
not mean that it intended to prevent persons who would 
have been covered by that alternative from seeking 
2. 
suppression on one of the other grounds. As the Justive 
Department commented, in the same statement cited in 
the concurring opinion: "The [Long and Hart] amendment 
is designed to limit the scope of electronic surveillance, 
but it accomplishes this objective in an artificial 
manner. So long as the court order is validly obtained, 
evidence obtained under the order should be admissible 
against any person not merely against the person named 
in the order." 114 Cong. Rec., at 14718 (1968)(emphasis 
added). Here, respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
challenge the validity of the court order, and nothing 
in either Congress' rejection of the proposed amendment 
or the Justice Department's comment thereon suggests 
that § 2518(10)(a)(i) is unavailable to persons who 
might have had a remedy under a provision not enacted 
by Congress. 
- lfp/ss 1/17/77 Donovan 
I~~ j-H- }k. '~ 4.~4-.:t • ~ 
This caseApresents a number of issues~rni:S~he 
c otiS'ilsuctiOR ilif Title III of tkw Qc:saMlrua Cnjwe Ci'A&JHiW and 
the federal wiretap~ statute. 
In an opinion filed today with the Clerk, the Court 
first holds~that applications for judicial authorization 
of wiretap~must identify all persons whose relevant 
conversati~ns;fhe Government has probable cause to believe 
it will intercept. The statutory requirements are not 
satisfied~hen the government identifies only the principal 
target of the investigation. 
Second, the Court holds that the Government must supply 
the issuing judge~with sufficient information about the 
parties who were overheard,j to enable him to decide whether 
such parties must be notified of the interception. 
ca,.U. ~ .tr1 _, 
Finally, we hold that underAthe circumstances~~d 
~ this case, the faiture of the Government to comply fully 
with these statutory obligations/ did ~t make the intercept 
order unlawful. 
We therefore conclude that it was error to suppress 
the evidence obtained by these interceptions. The order 
of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is 
remanded to that court. 
2. 
The Chief Justice filed a concurring '3pin~. 
~ r:• 4&ro C-""••..., '"-' ~·~ .. ~1....;~ 
Mr. Justice "Reh:n:~l!W t :! iled a g QlumrriAS" opinion _ Mr. 
/t 
Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion, in which Mr. 
Justice Brennan joined. 
. .. 
February 16, 1977 
Holds for No. 75-212 - u. s. v. Donovan 
Dear Chief: 
I would appreciate all of the holds for 
Donovan being taken off the list and carried 
to the February 25th Conference. 
These holds appear on pages 33 and 34, List 9, 
Sheets 2 and 3, of the February 18, 1977 Conference 
List. There are some 16 cases being held and I 
s~ply underestimated the complexity of some of 
them. · 
There is also a case on List 1, Sheet 2 of 
the February 18 Conference List, No. 76-597, U. s. v. 
Cabral, that I would like to take off the list. In 
my view, it is a hold for Donovan, and I will include 
it in my memorandum. 
The Chief Justice 
LFP/lab 
Sincerely, 
Copies to the Conference 
cc: Mr. Michael Rodak, Jr. 
':f.. 
' 
.§ltprtme C!J!llUt tlf Hlt> ~lni.trcr. ,$htf~ti 
'J,'ll'H ·~ I!innton, ~l. C!J. :w,?:•t-~:r 
CHAMGCilS OF" 
.JUST ICE LCWIS r: POWE.LL, dF<. 
<I· _flov~ · 
El.bl;_ CO F~ ~y 
PLEASE RErL;R·N-
ro FrLE 
February 23 , 1977 
MEMOHl'-.NDUM •ro THE CONFERENCE 
No . 71-1486 United States v. Bernstein. CA 4 re-
j ectcd the GoverniTten.t. 's "pr:In"'C.ipal--tarsi(:;-Eii--interpretation 
o f § 2518 (1) (b ) (iv ) and held inst:eud t.hat a v·:iretap appli-
cation must identify an individual if the Government has 
probable cause to believe that the person will be overheard 
engaging in the criminal activity under investigation. 
CA 4 also held that failure to comply fully with the identi -
f i cation requirement triggers the statutory suppression 
r emedy . Since Donovan reaches a contrary result with res-
pect ·to suppression , --:[" wi 11 vote to grant , v ac::.i.:e , and 
r emand in ligh·t of Do~van . 
No . 7 5-500 Anderson v. United States ; No. 7 ~-509 
Ma ll._o~·,r.r'l v. uni teJ .st a·tes ; No-:-· T.s=·si::(·i5-ooli tt.le v. united 
Stut.es . 'rhere--are-s-rx--p-eti tioners in .fhc;~ie~l:.hree cui\-;e·--
-l inedpeti tions . In adc1it.ion to pe·titioners in ·; 5-500 and 
75-509, those in 75-513 are Doolittle , Sanders , Union, 
a nd \Yhi t<:.~d. CA 5 , si t:l: ing _gn punc. , held that. suppression 
vTould be appropriate if t.he Governmeut had procured the 
wi retap in bad faith or if the defendants could show that 
t hey were prejudiced by the omission of their names from 
t he wiretap upplication. 
Petitioners first contend th~t evidence derived from 




application did not name Sanders or Anderson.- Doolittle 
was identified in both the application and order. Malloway, 
Union, and Whited do not contend that they should have been 
identified. I have doubts as to the standing of these four 
petitioners to seek suppression . Sec No. 76 -232 , Haina v . 
Maryland, discussed infra. In any event, under Do~ovan 
the failure to name Anderson and Sanders does not n:wke --the 
wiretap "unlav,rful" within the meaning of the SUJ?pression 
provision. I would note in this regard that the CA 5 J?l:l _l}_~! 
concluded tha·t ·there was "no indication of bad faith or 
attempted subterfuge by the Government in its wiretap 
application." I will vote to deny on this issue with res-
pect to all six petitioners~ 
There is a second issue which is raised only by the 
petitioners in No. 75-513: should the monitored conversa-
tions h ave been suppressed because the intercept application 
failed to establish sufficiently the inadequacy of other 
investigative procedures. We recently denied certiorari 
on this same issue with respect to a different wire~ap 
application. Green v. United States , No. 75-962, denied at 
the April 23, 1976, Conference. ·-r\-lill also vote to deny 
on this issue in the instant petition. 
No. 75-611 Ganem v. United States. There are tvw 
petitioners: Ganem and Dick. Ganem argues that the 
Government's wiretap application should have identified him 
as a target, and that the failure to do so warranted sup-
pression. CA 5, relying on its en bane decision in United 
Stat_~~ v. }2_?o~J:!_!:le, discussed sup_~-:..9-_, l~os. 7 5-50 0, ------
75-509 , and 75-513, held that since Ganem had not shown 
that his rights were prejudiced by the failure to name him, 
suppression was not required. Under Donovan, this result is 
correct, and I will vote to deny on this issue. 
*/ The Government contends that Sanders and Anderson 
were iden·tified in the appl ication since ·they were mentioned 
in the supporting affidavit incorporated by reference in 
the application. In my view, this does not me e t the statu-
tory identification requirement. In any event, after 
Donovan the Government is required to identify all targets 
in the application, and I for one am of the view that: the 
targets should be identified together in one specific part 
of the application. 
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The second issue is unrelated to Donovan: Ganem 
and Dick contend that the evidence should have been sup-
pressed on the ground that the order authorizing the wiretap 
was insufficient on its face. They contend that the wiretap 
had been approved by an Acting Assistant Attorney General 
whose authority h ad lapsed. CA 5 found that the Attorney 
General had in fact approved the application, and that intro-
duction of the evidence was therefore permissible . He 
denied c er tiorari on this issue in Vigi v . United States, 
No. 75-101 , Oci:ober 17,1975 , and as to peti·tioners ' co-
defendants in Joseph v. United States , No. 75-600 , 
February 20 , 1976. ·-· -I wilr-vote to-cteny . 
No. 7 5-9 63 Kilg~re v. United Stat.es. Petitioner pre-
sen-ts a "laundry-lis·t" of claims, none of which seems cert-
worthy to me. The factual situation is somewhat complicated. 
According to petitioner , the Government , by failing to name 
him as a known target in an application f6r a wiretap in 
GEORGIA, unlawfully seized his conversations and unlawfu lly 
used the evidence obtained in subsequent wiretap applications . 
The nex~ wiretaps were placed on petitioner ' s telephones in 
CALIFORNIA. Among the conversations seized \vere talks 
between petitioner and Green, a Florida resident. Thos e 
conversations were used as a basis for obtaining a wiretap 
on Green's telephone in FLORIDA. Pursuant to that tap, a 
number of conversations betv1een Kilgore and Green were seized. 
Kilgore was not named as a known target in the FLORIDA 
application. 
Petitioner first contends that evidence derived from 
the FLORIDA wiretap should have been suppressed because the 
FLORIDA intercept application did not name him as a person 
"known " to be committing the offense although the Govern-
ment had probable cause to believe that his conversations 
would be overheard. Relying on its en bane deci~ion in 
United States v. Doolitt.le, Nos. 7s-soo-;---r5-509 , 75-513 , 
aiscussed supra , CA 5 upheld the District Court ' s refusal 
to suppress. At this first level of analysis , that is the 
c orrect result under Donovan. But the situation is compli-
cated by petitioner Kllgore ' s next contention . 
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Kilgore contends (i) that the evidence derived from 
the FLORIDA tap on Green' s phone should have been suppressed 
because the Government did not mention all of the previous 
wire interceptions of Kilgore's conversations in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. 2518(1) (c ) and (ii) that he was entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing on this issue.*/ The FLORIDA 
application did reveal that a previou~ application had bean 
made to tap Kilgore's phone in California, and that convcr-
sa·tions with Green h ad been intercepted pursuant to tha·l: 
authorization. But nowhere did the application mention 
one prior GEORGIA t~p and several prior C~LIFORNIA taps in 
which Kilgore had been overheard. Kilgore argued that the 
Government's motive in failing to disclose these prior taps 
was to keep the issuing judge from concluding that the wiretap 
was unnecessary as to Kilgore. 
The District Court refused to include within the scope 
of the suppression hearing any consideration of the prior 
taps on I<ilgore. As a cautionary measure, given some ques-· 
tion concerning the CALIFORNIA tap mentioned in the applica-
tion, the District Court struck all references to the 
CllliiFORN IJ\ tap that ~vent to the question -of probable cause 
to tap Green. The District Court concluded that there was 
still sufficient information to justify the _tap on Green's 
phone. C~ 5 held that in light of these actions of the 
District Court, the FLORIDA application was valid on its 
face. 
CA 5 then proceeded to determine whether suppression 
was required for failure to name Kilgore in the FLORIDA 
application. CA 5 noted that under its decision in United 
St.ates v. Dooli ttl~, suppression was required only iftl~ 
*/ Kilgore was not named in the applications for other 
interceptions in Georgia and Californi a during which con-
versations of his were overheard. His argument that he was 
improperly denied an evidentiary h earing on the legality of 
all previous interceptions apparently includes, in addition 
to his third contention, discussed infra, with respect to 
the CALIFORNII-\ interception mentioned in the application, 
the complaint that he was thereby precluded from proving 
that "he was a known but unnamed target in Georgin." 
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Government acted in bad faith in failing to name Kilgore, 
or if Kilgore were prejudiced by the omission. With respect 
to bad fai ·th, CA 5 noted thut the District Court "must have 
found implicitly that the Government wus not in bad faith 
when it omitted Kilgore's name. Surely if h e hud agreed 
that the Government was deliberately disobeying the statute, 
he would have delved further in·to the question." As to pre-
judice, CA 5 concluded that the District Court who approved 
the FLORIDA applicution would not have placed any additional 
limitations on the use of the evidence or on the sur-
veillance conducted if Kilgore's name and prior taps had 
been disclosed. Although Kilgore argues that the tap was 
not necess ary with respect to himself, the tap was still 
necessary for the investigation of Green, and mjnimiza-
tion would not have required the Government to stop 
listening to criminal conversations between Green and 
Kilgore. CA 5 also concluded that Kilgore received a 
timely inventory. 
Given CA 5's analysis of the case, I will vote to 
deny as to this second issue. Under Donovan, mere failure 
to name Kilgore does not justify suppression. Here, 
however , there wer~ allegations that that failure to 
n ume Kilgore was in bad faith and thaL disclosure of the 
prior applications would have prompted the District 
Court to deny the FLORIDA application. These allegations, 
if supported , might have justified suppression. See 
Donovan, slip opinion at 21 n.23. But given CA 5's 
~iscussion of bad faith, prejudice, and provision of inven-
tory notice, I see no reason to grant, va.cute, and remand 
in light of Donovan. 
Kilgore's final contention is that he should have been 
given an evidentiary hearing with respect to the legality 
of the CALIFORNIA tap that was mentioned in the FLORIDA 
application. Sec note * supra. At our April 23, 1976, 
Conference, we denied certiorari on this issue presented in 
a petition by Green, No. 75-962. There is no reason to t ake 
a different view no1r.r. 
I'll vote to deny on all isues. 
No. 75-1393 Principia v. United States; No. 75-1394 
Labriola and Slomka v. United States. The three petitioners 
raise a num-ber of-Donovai-1 relC\te_d_ i -ss ues. Labriola (No. 
1394), contends th~t once a suspect is identified in the 
course of an electronic interception, the government (h ere , 
state officials) must obtain an amended orde r naming that 
suspect before continuing to intercept l1is conversations. 
Don<?.._'::_~.m :n~quircs the government to name all "known" 
,I 
- 6 -
individuals, but the opinion says nothing about when the 
identification of the suspect mus·t be accomplishecr:- CA 2 
interpreted Title III as requiring the indentifica tion of 
"known" individuals only at the time of initial application 
or upon any extension. I think that is the proper inter-
pretation. 
Principle (No . 1393) makes a similar argument. He 
points out that he was ide ntified only as "Ralph" in inter-
c ept orders of July 5 , July 27, and September 11, d espite 
the fact that his full identity was known to the government 
by August 17 or perhaps by late July. With respect to the 
September 11 order, any error would seem harmless since no 
conversations were intercepted pursuant to that order. 
And it does not appear that petitioner Principie seriously 
contends that he should have been named fully in the July 27 
order . 
Labriola (No. 75-1394) contends that ~here was insuf-
ficient prob able cause to name him in the order of July 27 
and that it was accordingly imprope r to intercept his conver-
sations pursuant to that order. CA 2 coricluded that there 
was probable cause to name him, and I see no reason to review 
that determination. In any event, th~re apparently was 
probable cause to issue the intercept order to seize the 
conversations of others, and petitioner's criminal conver-
sations were properly intercepted under that order. 
Labriol a a nd Slomka (No. 74-1394) seek suppression of 
all conversations seized pursuant to the July 27 order as 
well as those seized pursuant to subsequen t orders on the 
ground that the Governmen t failed to honor a time restric-
tion imposed by the District Court. The court had directed 
tha·t certain ini:erceptions were not to take place after 
7:30 p.m. on any day, and the Government violated this con-
dition. The court accordingly suppressed all conversations 
that were seized in violation of the time restriction. 
Petitioners seek suppression of all evidence seized during 
the t aps . CA 2 properly rejected that argument. 
Finally, all three petitioners contend that they were 
not served with inventory notice within 90 days of the 
termination of the interception. Labriola was notified 
within 90 days of the final extension of the initial order. 
At one point there was a change of location, and Labriola 
contends that the 90-day period should commence to run 
- 7 -
whenever the original interception is changed in any signi-
ficant degree., as with a change in location. The argument 
is frivolous. Principie was named in the extension orders, 
but he was not given inventory notice as required by the 
statute. Labriola was never named in an order and he did 
not receive inventory notice. Since there is no allegation 
that the Government knowingly sought to keep petitioners 
from receiving notice, and since CA 2 found that no prejudice 
resulted from the failure to provide notice, suppression would 
have been inappropriate under Donovan. See slip opinion 
at 24 n.26. 
I will vote to deny these petitions. 
No. 75-18 13 Civella v. United States. There are three 
petitioners in this case: Tousa, Nicholas Civella, and 
Anthony Civella. CA 8 found that the Government had probable 
cause to name Tousa and both Civellas in its wiretap appli-
cation, and consequently that identi1ying only Tousa con-
stituted technical noncompliance; w:L'i:h § 2518 (1) (b) (iv). 
CA 8 held, however, that under the circum~tances of this 
case suppression of evidence was not warranted for non-
compliance with the statute. 
Petitioners raise two issues of possible substance. 
They first contend that a wiretap application must identify 
all persons as to whom the Government has probable cause, 
and that failure triggers the statutory suppression remedy. 
Since Tousa was named, I doubt his standing to raise the 
issue. See !~~a v. l·1aryli:1.l].0_, No. 76·-232, discussed i_-_0~£~· 
CA 8 found "nothing to suggest that the governmen+·. ac·ted 
in bad faith or with deceptive intent." Under Donovan 
suppression was not required. 
The other issue is ~ot directly related to Donovan: 
whether the late service of inventories warrants su1J"pression. 
The inventory question in Donovan concerned the nature of 
the Government 's obligation adequately to inform the court 
concerning those to whom inventory notice might be served. 
At issue here is the statutory provision requiring service 
of inventory notice \vi thin 9 0 days after the termination of 
an interception order. Petr Tousa was served five days after 
the expiration of the 90-day period, and the Civellas were 
served 13 days late. Petitioners do not contend they were 
- 8 -
prejudiced by the delay. In my view , suppression is no more 
warranted here for late service of notice than it was in 
Donovan for the negligent failure of the Government to 
proviCJ.e the issuing judge with the names of all those on 
whom such service might be made. 
I will vote to deny this petition. 
No. 7 6-169 United States v. Barletta. This case is 
c urve--lined with -No :-75-=-18-~LJ; Ci vella --v:-uni ted States, 
d iscussed supra. The two petitioners in th[s case---=--:-r3arletta 
and Fontanella - were overheard during the course of a 
wiretap. The SG notes that the District Court did not request, 
and no attempt was made to provide him with, a comprehensive 
l ist of all the identifiable "sub-agents" overheard during 
t he course of the wiretap. As a result these petitioners 
were not served with inventory notice. They were indicted 
about a year and a half later , and during .pretrial discovery 
were informed of the interceptions and allowed to listen to 
t h e tapes. CA 8 nevertheless h eld that the evidence should 
h ave been suppressed with respect to theie two petitioners, 
and reversed their convictions. Since Donovan indicates that 
CA 8 erred \vi th respect to suppression, I \vilT vote to grant, 
v acate , and remand in light of Dono~~ · 
No . 7 5-1838 Green v. United States ; No. 7 5-695 7 Hill 
v. United s·tates; No. 75-iOOl Kirk-V.Unitec1 Stat.es. -This 
i s amassi ve- drug conspiracy case; nin-e p8-ti.t-ioncrs have 
r a i sed numerous issues in three separate petitions . 
The petitions were held for United States v . Donovan 
because petitioners contend that evidence should h-ave been 
s uppressed on the ground that t h e wir~tap applic~tion failed 
to ·i dentify petitioner Deborah Barnett. I have serious 
doubt as t o the standing of t h e eight petitioners other than 
Barnett to seek suppression on the ground that the applica-
t ion failed to nu.me someone else , see I-Iaina_ v . M~c:md , 
No. 7 6-232 , discussed infra , but it is unnecessary to rest 
on that consideration . - CA -8 f ound that "the fact t hat some 
o f the appellants (mainly Deborah Barnett ) were not named 
in t he application does not mean that t h e authorization order 
was invalid . The application n amed all t h e individuals 
wh om the government had probable cause to suspect would be 
involved in telephone communications with the principal, 
Eugene Kirk ." CA 8 ' s assessment of the existence of probable 
- 9 -
cause is uncertworthy. Moreover, even if we were to disagree 
with CAB's conclusion in that regard, Donovan makes it clear 
that suppression is not required. I wiJ:-1 vote to deny on 
this issue. I am also not inclined to vote to grant with 
respect to the other issues.*/ I will, however, vote to 
hold No. 7 5-70 01 for J'effers._v. United States, No. 7 5-·18 0 5, 
cert. gran·ted at the Septen1ber 2~J':-97~Conference. One of 
the petitioners in No. 75-7001 -- Eugene Kirk -- was convic-
ted of conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise. In 
Jeffers, CA 7 concluded that conspiracy was a lesser included 
offense of continuing criminal enterprise, but that a defen-
dant could constitutionally be convicted of both offenses. 
I recognize that petitioner Kirk attacks the continuing 
criminal enterprise statute on vagueness grounds and makes 
no mention of either the Double Jeopardy Clause or the 
decision of CA 7 in Jeffers, but I think it advisable to 
hold No. 75-7001. 
In sum, I will vote to deny 75 -1838 and 75-6957, but 
to hold 75-7001 for Jeffers v. United States, 75-1805, on 
the possible double jeopardy issue. -
No. 75-1816 Labriola v. New York. The contentions 
raised by petitioner Labriola wi ti1 ____ respect t:o his sta·te 
conviction are, with one exception, identical t:o tEos·e--pre-
sented by Labriola with respect to his federal conviction 
*/ (1) Whether the evidence at trial established the 
existence of multiple conspiracies or the single conspi:racy 
charged in the indictment. (2) Whether evidence of recorded 
telephone conversations between certain petitioners and a 
government informant sh·mld have been excluded because the 
informant was not available to testify. (3) Whether the 
application for the wire interception order in this case 
sufficiently established that other investigative procedures 
were inadequate. (4) Whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in allowing the jury to use transcripts while 
listening to the recorded conversations at ·trial . ( 5) 
Whether the continuing criminal enterprise statute , 21 U.S.C. 
848, is unconstitutionally vague. (6) \.Yhether the jury 
selection plan of the Eastern District of Missouri is impro-
per because it compiles the names of potential jurors from 
voting lists at four-year intervals. (7) Whether the court 
erred in admitting the expert testimony of government chemists 
who identified certain substances as heroin . 
- 1 0 -
in No. 75-1394, discussed supra. The one difference concerns 
the failure of the police to~l1onor the time restrictions 
established on the July 27 hu<Jg.ing order. Counsel for 
petitioner failed to raise that point at the initial sup-
pression hearing, and the state court subsequently denied 
as untimely a motion to reopen the suppression hearing. 
Regardless of the propriety of applying the state procedural 
rule in these circumstances, the case does not warrant full 
review . I will vote to deny. 
No. 7 6-2 3 2 HaiEa v. ~1arY1:_9-n~. Pe·ti tioner Haina and one 
Strawbridge lived in the same house. The police obtained a 
wiretap order authorizing interception of calls over two 
telephones located in the house. The order identified 
11 Pete:r: Xavier Haina [petr] and others as yet unknown. 11 
The state court concluded that the police had probable 
cause to name, and should have named, petitioner's house-
mate (Strawbridge) , arid petit~oner now argues that the wire-
tap order was invalid since it named only petitioner. 
Relying on Al~erman v. United States, 394 u.s. 164, the 
state cour·t·- h.R ld th.at pe-E"I"·tion-(~r lacked standing to object 
to the failure to name Strawbridge. I think the state court 
ruled correctly on the basis of standing, but in any event 
Donovan makes clear that the failure to identify in the 
application a person as to whom the Government had probable 
c ause does no·t make the wiret.ap 11 Unlm117ful" within the meaning 
o f the suppression provision. 
There are two other issues in the case which are not 
related to Donovan. One issue is whether the wiretap appli-
c ation suffid_entTy dct:ailed the nonfeasibility of o·ther 
investigative techniques , and the other concerns the warrant-
l ess seizure of petitioner's goods from under the por6h 
of petitioner ' s neighbor. 
I consider none of these issues certworthy and will vote 
t o deny . 
No . 7 6- 7 20 United States v. Billy Ray Lee. Petitioner 
was mentioned in the-i1f£·CdavTt submi ttad--:-Lnsupport of the 
Government ' s wiretap application , but h is name was omitted 
. ·~· ·' 
- 11 -
from the list of individuu.ls whose communications were to 
be intercepted. CA 6, relying on its eu.rlier decision in 
United States v. Donovan, reversed u. conviction based on 
certain evidence derived from the court-approved wireta p. 
Our decision in Donovan mandu.tes a different result with ------respect to suppression, and I will vote to grant, vacate, 
and remand in light of Donovu.n. 
No. 75-6944 Schwartz v. Unitea States. Petitioner 
raises three issues in this case, two of which are related 
to. Donovu.n. Petitioner first contends that the failure to 
name him 1n a wirct.ap application was error requiring sup-
pression. CA 2 found insufficient evidence of probable 
cause with respect to petitioner, and that it was there-
fore unnecessary to name him in the application. 
Petitioner next contends that the failure to provide 
the issuing judge with information as to petitioner's 
involvement in the conspiracy precluded t~e judge from pro-
perly exercising his 18 U.S. C. § 2 518 ( 8) (d) <liscre·tion as to 
whether inventory notice should be served on petitioner. 
The Governmcn± points out that the issuing judge was provided 
with a complete list of names of the persons who had been 
overheard, and that petitioner's name was included on the 
list. It seems to me that such a list is permissible under 
Donovan, see slip opinion page 17, and upon submission of 
the list, the District Court could have requested additional 
information from the Government. I do not read Donovan u.s 
holding that the Government must initic.ll_y supply the issuing 
judge with both a list of names and additional information 
as to each namE;d individuul. In any event suppression vlOUld 
be an inappropriate remedy under these circumstances. 
The final issue raised by petitioner concerns the 
seizure which CA 2 upheld under the plain view doctrine. 
Although there may be some doubt as to the correctness of 
that ruling, I do not consider the issue ccrtworthy. 
I will vote to deny this petition. 
No. 76-597 United States v. Cabral. This case, which 
is relisted from the Ju.nuary 7, 1977, Conference, is not 
listed as a "heretofore held for United Stu.tcs v. Donovun." 
Since my vote on January 7, 19 77, \voulcl hu.vc been 'Fo hold the 
case for Donovu.n, I thought it would be convenient if I 
took thisopportuni~y to recommend a disposition in lisht 
of Donovan. 
- 12 -
CA 9 held that the Government _had probable cause to 
believe that respondent would be overheard, and therefore 
that respondent should have been named in two relevant 
wiretap applications. CA 9 ·also concluded that violation of 
1 8 u.s.c. § 2518(1) (b) ( iv) required suppression. The SG 
filed this petition , noting that the questions were at that 
t ime pending before the Court in Donovan. Since Donovan 
mandates a different result vli th respect to supprGS::sion, I 
will vote to grant, vacate, and remand in light of !?onov~~· 
Sincerely , 
• I 
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No. 75-212 UNITED STATES v. DONOVAN 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
n (\. e t..J c. f" ~4-Q..,...::t., ~ c. 0-t c.« V'" (" ,j 
!n th:i so case \te are once again called upon to resolv~ 
·important issues i:l the construction of Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 
r; 
U.S.C. 2510-2520. Specifically, we must decide whether 
18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(b)(iv), which requires the government ---
to include in its wiretap applications "the identity of 
the person, if known, committing the offense, and whose 
conversations are to be intercepted", is satisfied when 
the government identifies only the "principal targets" 
~ 
I' 
of the intercept. Second, we must decide whether the 
government has a statutory responsitility to inform the 
issuing judge of the identities of persons whose conversa-
tions were overheard in the course of the interception, thus 
enabling Ee c~erei~e his eiss•s~ioA . >--
P'"' ouailt to l!! !1. ~.e. § l518 (8)(d) ;;:• :e::=ti::! • .:;; 
P""""~""'-'"Q ,.iGQ ""~iee ef Efte fact of hrtetceptie"':>-
2. 
/ 
ef e v h:J:enee fo~ failure to 
r-------------------------------------
supf:>ressier'l: with '('e O\Ji-IJ.A 
s\lr ~t'.t.A.4i~ 1 
e \J,· ~  Cl"cle~ ,., ....... 
If l(.J.~.~ t1SI8(to)(-.). I. 
On November 28, 1972, a special agent of the Federal 
~ ... ~~ , .. QJ j 
Bureau of Investigation S~Q it d ~~ ;pplisatig~ to the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio for an order authorizing a wiretap interception ~rsuaa~ 
:" Q. e c.ord~ w;th.... 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
~ 1 
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.~ l 2510-2520. The application requested 
Q.lt\ ,,,.. - ye, '"f .. J 
authorization to intercept an 
i4legal gambling operation condnQtse~over two telephones 
l A+ 0'\Q Q.dcl lrA..CI.) . j 
1. in North Olmstead, Ohio, uh!rdi .. a~istee \!Hleer a~ al .i~ 
of Joseph AnthonJ SpartgartlQ at aa apartmsqt ~sea b9 Albe~ 
o.+ ~ ~."".e. 
Ke~oe~ and two other telephones in Canton, Ohi~~~ £k~ 
itOliiC ef Coerge Fle~e~ 
illegal gambling business, and 
that in conducting that business they would place telephone 
I 
calls to and receive telephone calls from various persons, 
three of who~ a~o 2 named in the wiretap application. 
3. 
The affiant also stated that the government's informants 
......;. . , 
would refuse to testify against the persons ~amed in the 
. 
. ~ 
applicationJthat telephone records alone would be ~ufficient 
to support a gambling conviction, and that normal investigative 
gambling-related wire communications of Kotoch, 
Spaganlo, Florea, three named individuals other than the 
res.pondents_, and "others as yet unknown~' to and from the 
2..1 
four listed tele phones. The District Go~kt's order>-, 
~ 
a\:lthorbwd the iatoreepti.oc. of a maxi mpm of 1 5 Q.ays-,_ 
--= 
learned that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco were 
discussing illegal gambling activities with the named 
subjects. -~Vf:~eleo~ ~December 26, 
~ 
~~~ an extension of the initial intercept order. 
T"t ~ -+,m-e_ ;f- J · 
~veijiQ"n) sought authorization to int ercept gambling-
related conversations of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, two 
other named individuals, and "others as yet unknown•~t~ 
l Do .. ov..... a\1'2.-z.,.co I ~ R.o'''~ 
respondents -wel!e not ieel"lffi~ in this second 
s: 
application. The District Court again authorized inter-
ception of gambling-related conversations for a maximum 
of days. 
On February 21, 1973, the government submitted to the 
= 




apparently thought included all individuals who could be 
identified as havin9 discussed gambling over the monito~ed 
"· telephones. The District Court signed the proposed ·order, 
and an inventory notice was thereaftc~ served on the listed 
persons, including respondents Donovan, Buzzaco, and 
Robbins. On September 11,1973, after the government submittec 
the names of two additional persons whose identities ha~ 
allegedly been inadvertently omitted from the initial list, 
the District Court _entered an amended order giving notice 
to those individuals. As a result of what the government --=-
labels "administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and 
Lauer were not included in either list of names and 
the~efor:l were never served with inventory notice. 
On November 1, 1973, an indictment was returned in 
the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents, 
~ <.o"Jud,· .. 
10 
and ~ other individuals with conspiracy to conduct a 
gambling business in violation of 18 u.s.c:~~l955. 
Thefive respondents filed motions to suppress evidence 
5. 
derived from the wire inter~ion. After an evidentiary 
hearing on the mo~ions, the District Court suppressed as 
to respondents · Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco all evidence 
derive·d from the December 26 intercept order on the ground 
that failure to identify them by name in the application 
~ . jj 
and order of that date violated 18 U.S.C. l 2518(l)(b)(iv) 
and 2518(4)(a). With respect to Merlo and Lauer, who were 
not known to the government until after the December 26 -:: 
application, the District Court suppressed all evidence 
derived from both intercept orders on the ground that they 
had not been served with inventory notice. 
The Court of Appeals 
On the identification issue, the~urt ~f - Ap~9al~held that 
the wiretap application must identify every person whose 
conversations relating to the subject criminal activity 
the government has probable cause to believe it will -::::. 
intercept. Agreeing with the District Court that at the 
time of the December 26 application the government had -::::. 
probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan, 
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court 
.. 
·. 
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived 
from the December 26 order. On the notice q~estion, ~ 
i-4-Gert e£ A:r>pea~ held that the ; overnment has an implied 
6. 
statutory duty to inform the issuing judge of the identities 
of the parties whose conversations were overheard so that 
Lk.t.. e."""- I 
Hte j~ge coul~determine ;~ether discretionary inventory 
' notice should be required. Because the government had 
~ 
failed to perform this duty with respect to Merlo and Lauer, 
the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order 
suppressing evidence derived from both intercept orders. 
The ,.eDurt -ef Appea~ found it. unnecessary to determine 
. whether the failure to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, 
and Buzzaco in the December 26 application and to name 
respondents Merlo and Lauer in the proposed inventory 
notice orders was ;r:advertent or purposeful,~ince the 
mere fact of omission was sufficient to require suppression, 
'" under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10(a). 
~ 
We granted certiorari to resolve ~~Q~ingly importaa~ 
-4- ~"'«"'- ....... ~~~ ... ...> 
issuekinvV in;, the construction of a major federal statute, 
\ (,.. ~ d ~ -.w-./ 




The United States contends that § 251,8 (1) (b) (iv) 
requires that a wiretap application id~htify ~ly the 
principal target of the ~~ interception,~Athat § 2518(8)(d) 
does not require the government to provide the issuing ---
j.udge with a list of all identifiable persons who were 
overheard in the course of an authorized interception. 
\ ~ ~ ~'""- ~ ~CHAJ. ~ 
We d.iea.grg~ '¥ith. 'b1?* c.gntentions) 
Avv 
We turn first to the identification requirements of 
§ 2518(l)(b)(iv). That provision requires a wiretap 
application to specify "the identity of the person, if 
known, committing the offense and whose communications 
are to be intercepted." In construing that language, 
this Court lli@ alreadyl rul~d that the government is not •• 
required to identify an individual in the application 
:~ i 
unless the tvernHl:e~ has probable cause to believe (!) 
. 
I 
that the indi~ual is engaged in the criminal activity 
· under investigation and' <t! that the individual's 
conversations will be intercepted over the target telephone. 
United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974).· The question 
8. 
at issue here is whether the government is required to 
. -.,,. 
name all such individuals. 
' 
-
The United States argues that the most reasonable 
interpretation of the ;;lain language~ the statute is 
that the application must identify only the ~incipal 
target~f the investigation, who "will almost always be 
is .._o,i+ov-eJ . E.:J B~rof' .fft. -11.& u",· ~·J J+~f-..., 
the individual whose phone 
t( ~ d ~II" ~I" •• " +t ., ,., t'~ ..._. t. \ O'W\. I I f "f""'.t.. 
he United States does not suggest that 
circumstances a wiretap appli 




are using the 
are "equally" 
of the investigation, 
~estiou is whieh per:H H'l:S FR\Hlfs he nawg'il 
''~Fi:H:ei~al tar get." iAt.81Fpreeatieft sttgges Led by the tJnif!~ 
( (iovernment has 
Tftl~ 
reason to believe that an individual will 
use the target telephone to place or receive calls, and 
the government has probable cause to believe that the -
· re~; 
(f(r~J 
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under 
investigation, the individual qualifies as a ~incipal _ 
' ~ . 
targe.t~ must be named in the wiretap application. 
On thetther hand, an individual who uses a different tele-
phone to place calls to or receive calls from the target 
telephone is not a principal target even if the government 
= 
has probable cause to believe that the individual is 
engaged in the criminal activity under investigation. In 
other words, whether one is a ~incipal target~£ the 
investigation depends on whether one operates the target 
• 13 . 
telephone to place or receive calls. 
Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we 
L'; H1.e. I 
are unable ~ findl support for it in the language and 
structure of Title III or in the legislative history. 
+a hegin wit~ ihe statutory language itself refers only 
'\\ 
to the person, if known, committing the offense and whose 
communications are to be intercepted." That description 
is as applicable to a suspect placing calls to the target 
;) 
telephone as it is to a suspect placing calls from the 
~ 
target telephone. It is true, as the United States 
suggests, that when read in the context of the other 
10. 
subdivisions of § 2518(l)(b), an argument can be made that 
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user 
of the target telephone~ But it is also clear from other 
sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap 
applications would name more than one individual. F9r 
example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served 
order ~the application." 
§ 
added), ~~'j ~~;i{l) (e) 
upon "the persons named in the 
18 u.s.c.l 2518(8)(d) (emphasis 
requires that an intercept application disclose all 
previous intercept applications "involving any of the same 
person~ • . . specified in the app~ic~tion~' ~mphasis 
added). It may well be that Congress anticipated that a 
given application would cover more than one telephone or 
that several suspects would use one telephone, and that 
an application wenl~ for those reasons 
identification of more than one individual. But eher~ 
~nothing on the face of the statute ~toel~~suggests 
that Congress intended to remove from the identification 
requirement those suspects whose intercepted communications 





Nor can we find support for the principal target inter-
pretation in the legislative history. Title III originated 
as a combination of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception 
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several months 
prior to this Court's decision in Berger v. New York, 388 
U.S. 41 (1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance 
Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few 
days after the Berger decision. Both bills required that 
wiretap applications include a full and complete statement 
of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant 
and specification of the nature and location of the communica-
tion facilities involved. ~~lthough neither bill 
contained an express identification requirement such as 
that at issue here, both bills required the application 
to include "a full and complete statement of the facts 
concerning all previous applications • • . involving any 
person named in the application as committing, having 
committed, or aee~~eing about to commit an offense." 
Hearings on Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law 
Enforcement Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and 
12. 
Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8(a)(3) and 1006, § 2518(a)(4) 
\.._(eJW\r"cw.M ~dJa~). _., 
(1967)1 Thus, even .at this early stage, it was recognized 
that an application could identify several individuals, and 
there is absolute~no indication that the identification 
would be limited to ~incipal targets.~ 
While S. 971, eke "e~mbiuatiou" btl~as pending 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court decided 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). S. 971 was then 
redrafted to conform to Katz as well as Berger, and the 
identification provision was added at that time. Ana i~ 
~at regar~ ;he Senate Report states that the requirements 
... 
set forth in the various subdivisions of § 2518(1)(b), 
o.f U!4 .. ~ ~' 
including the identification requirement "[were] intended 
to reflect the constitutional command of particularization." 
S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess •) 101 (1968), ,citing . 
4:)... 
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60, and Katz .cv. United 
. 3 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-56 (1967). 
H---The United States now contends that although it may 
be that Congress read Berger and Katz to require, as a 




be named if known, Congress "would hardly have read those 
cases as requiring the naming of all parties likely to be 
' ':0/ 
overheard •.. .. " Brief1 at 25-26. The difficulty with 
t k.. (.., t.J..fl.-.. f-:v c. k ,·d·• r o..·L, ..J.o lA J,·c.l~ 
that argument elefi;t that Congress was 
thinking in terms of "subjects" of surveillanc: ,':;e ~ 
considered "subjects" of surveillance to be the principal 
users of the target telephone. 
Moreover, to the extent that Congress thought it 
was meeting the constitutional commands of particularization 
established in Berger and Katz, ~t js gRtirgllpo~sihl~ 
~Congress may have read those cases as mandating a 
broad identification 
confronted in Berger 
requirement. The statute that we 
requi~identification of "the person reJ.: ~ 
., ~ 
or persons whose communications --~+----•a·r~~ to be overheard. 
- 'C) .-\ "' 
And we expressly noted that that provision "[d:J_d] 
no more than identify the person whose constitutionally 
=l' \~· / 
protected area is to be invadec;J: •.• "1 Given the statute 
at issue in Berger and our comment upon it, Congress may 
have concluded that as a constitutional matter a wiretap 
application would have to name all suspects rather than 
~ .. ''· just the primary user. 
14. 
In any event, for our 
l Afecvlct..~L o.,.., +o _.) . 
present purposes it is unnecessary 
, to Hadertake ~e iFRpos siblo t-sk of determi~i~ exactly how 
Cl.... 
Congress interpreted 
\ :I:'+ ;, ~"ft•'et ~ 
Berger and Katz with respect to the 
~ rto+~ ~o.-i- t.-w,~ 
identification issue. ~ response to those decisions Congress 
included an identification requirement which on its face 
draws no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and 
the United States ~as Beea ~ao~le ~~oi~o~dence in 
the legislative history that supports such a distinction. 
t:.~ ... ffD..V'.Ilh f-.Lc, 
Indeed, 4.a readiag ~d legislative materials •ue havej failed)... 
\ c. Cl "+"',; .., )1. 0 
ee ttf'l:eofr a:~ use of the term "principal ·target" or any 
"-
discussion of tbo poton~al fo~ different~ treatment based 
JJ:j 
on the telephone from which a suspect speaks. We therefore 
conclude that a wiretap application must name an individual 
if the government has probable cause to believe, that the 
individual is engage·d in the criminal activity under 
investigation and i£ the govornFRon~expects to intercept the 
individual's conversations over the target telephone. 
15. 
B 
The other statutory provision at issue in this case 
J 
is 18 U.S.C. A2518(8)(d), which provides that the judge 
\ ov ~ en,... 
the persons named in the~ 
~· "e. 
~vGato~ which must i:n1-'tie'!) 
, s-1-~ f.~ -> 
notice of the entry of the order or application, l the 
shall cause to be served on 
l ~ it1V.t..~~V: 
application or the ~der~ 
, it\ d c ccA-+"'- J 
disposition of the application, andl Ghe fact that ~ 
}w"-~~~ B it. 
~commun1cat1ons were CHi' Here fto~ntercepted. Although 
the statute mandates the provision of that inventory 
. noti~ersons named in the application or the order, 
the statute also provides that the judg~ovide 
similar notice to other parties to intercepted communications 
k.e. 
if t~ lua~ concludes that such. action is in the interest 
l'l. tOi:>.st,"' ": ~ . 
of justice. Th; Unit:p St ts&oA.teod~that this notice 
proviGion does not eeat:aia ":> expres"1_require~ ~ 
+o 
law enforcement authorities routinely~provide the judge 
with any specific information 
1 t1._ U."'.· ~4! J. S ~ ~e s 
upon which to exercise his 
CO~& f-t.~ 'f1lJ J 
discretion, ana ~a~it would be inappropriate to read 
~ 
such a requirement into the statute givga tf- e fe:et: t:ha~ 
the judge has the option of asking the law enforcement 
authorities for whatever information he requires. 
•' 
16. 
Our reading of the legislative history of the 
discretionary notice provision in light of the purposes 
of · Title III leads us to reject the government's interpreta-
=-- • .., .u.-+ .. ~ r 
tion. As reported from the Judiciary Committee, 2518(8)(d) 
contained only a provision mandating notice to the persons 
named in the application or the order; the disc~etionary 
notice provision was added. by amendment on the floor of the 
Senate. In introducing that amendment, Senator Hart 
explained its purpose: 
"The amendment would give the judge who issued 
the order discretion to require notice to be served 
on other parties to intercepted conversations, 
even though such parties are not specifically 
~named in the court order. The Berger and Katz 
 decisions established that notice of surveillance 
is a constitutional requirement of any 
surveillance statute. It may be that the required 
notice must be served on all parties to intercepted 
communications. Since legitimate interests of 
privacy may make such notice to all parties 
undesirable, the amendment leaves the final 
determination to the judge." 114 Cong. Rec. 
14485-14486 (1968) -~ .MJ 
~n deciding whethe~ ~egiti~ate privacy interests justify 
/ " ~eeioien t~ withh~ventory notice from parties to 
\ ~ , •. ,~ -h, 
intercepted conversations, a judge t;rill al tJ •lt~y~ 
require information and assistance beyond that contained 
in the application papers and the recordings of intercepted 
conversations made available by law enforcement authorities. 
17. 
No purpose is served by holding that those authorities 
have no routine duty to supply the judge with relevant 
·information'£ o 
are 
The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted this problem of 
dual responsibility, and we ·adopt the balanced construction 
I z:wol ~J 
that court placed on2518(8)(d): 
the judicial officer has the dutl 
to cause the filing of the inventory [notice , 
it is abundantly clear that the prosecution has 
greater access to and familiarity with the inter-
c:=z51 cepted communications. Therefore we fe~l 
justified in imposing upon the latter the duty 
to classify all those whose conversations have 
been intercepted, and to transmit this informa-
u "; ~=t J s .... 4-~­
;.. c.."'""J $63 
~. cld S33, SJ.f o 
tion to the judge. Should the judge desire more 
information regarding these classes in order to 
exercise his statutory § 2518(8)(d) discretion, 
. • . the government is also required to furnish 
such information as is available to it." 
1~ agree with the Ninth Circuit that this al~ocation (..&17 )~ of 
. iW----
~ responsibility best serves the purposes of Title 111'.~~ 
"To discharge this obligation the judicial officer must have 
at a minimum, knowledge of the particular categories into which 
fall all the individuals whose conversations have been intercepted. 
Thus, while precise identification of each party to an intercepted 
conversation~is not required, a description of the general 
class, or classe ~ which they comprise is essential to enable 
the judge to determine whether additional information is 
necessary for a proper eval ation of the interests of the 




We turn now to the question whether the District Court 
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at 
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement 
authorities to comply fully with the provisions of 
l J......;f-,·""'" cit s- / r __, 
§§ 2518(l)(b)(iv) and 2518(8)(d). ~ftiiJjii, expressly 
prohibits the use at trial, and at certain other proceedings, 
of the contents of any intercepted wire communication or 
any evidence derived therefrom "if the disclosure of that 
information would be in violation of this chapter." ~ 
the circumstances that trigger suppression under § 2515 
are in turn enumerated in§ 2518(10)(a): 
1~i) the communication was unlawfully inter-
cepted; 
~ii) the order of authorization or approval 
under which it was intercepted is insufficient on 
its face; or 
''< .. . ) h . . d . f . ~~~ t e ~ntercept~on was not rna e ~n con orm~ty 
,, 
with the order of authorization or approval. 
~ . c ruu·~'j ., 
k =h"fl d h~ appaxgR.fa tal>Lae ehc only t:cle ;.'af'l:t:: eategoL;;{jMaei£, i:liil 
wjtb respect to thg fi:vc tespondents . i> 
~ 
as-18' c B) (d) 
19. 
There is ~M~ no basis on the facts 
~ 
of ~case to suggest that the authorization orders are 
facially insufficient, or that the interception was not 
conducted in conformity with the orde rs. Thus, ~ only 
«S"Ii (to)(A) {i\ V, re}.ctv~: wer-..e. ,, 
~~~~~~~h+th~ the communications ~ unlawfully 
t rr u,Jf. o-
the violations of §§ 2518(l)(b)(iv) and 
Resolution of that question must begin with United 
States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1?71), and United States 
v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (177r). Those cases hold that 
"[not] every failure to comply fully with any requirement 
provided in Title III would render the interception of 
wire or oral communications 
~7"/- s'ls-·_~ 
Chavez, 416 U.S., at h 
'unlawful'" United States v. 
~ 
To the contrary, suppression is 
required only for a "failure to satisfy any of those 
statutory requirements that directly and substantially 
implement the congressional intention to limit the use of 
intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling 
Un.·hJ. .St"'t.-14 v. (;,·o.,clc..Ho 1 ~'' t/~. J J 
for the employment of this extraordinary device." 
S~7 ) 
~ jQiordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring 
. I 
Jil' tJ. ~.) 
~+- s? f. 
20. 
that an application for an intercept order be approved by 
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General 
specially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding 
that Congress intended to condition the use of wiretap 
procedures based on the judgment of senior officials in 
the Department of Justice, the Court required suppression 
for failure to comply with the approval provision. Chavez 
concerned the statutory requirement that the application 
for an intercept order specify the identity of the official 
authorizing the application. The problem in Chavez was one of 
misidentification; altnough the application had in fact been 
authorized by the Attorney General, the application identified 
an Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing 
th~ application. The Court concluded that mere misidentifica-
tion of the official authorizing the application did not 
make the application unlawful within the meaning of 
~ . 
§ 2518(10)(a)Asince that identification requirement did 
not play a "substantive role" in the regulatory system. 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded 
~ 
that both the identification requirement of § 25l~(l)(b)(iv) 
.. 
21. 
and the notice requirement of 1~ 0.~.~ § 2515(8)(d) 
played a "central role" in the statutory framework, and 
for that reason affirmed the District Court's order 
suppressing relevant evidence. Although both statutory 
requirements are undoubtedly important, we do not think 
that the failure to comply fully with those provisions 
renders unlawful an intercept order that in all other 
respects satisfies the statutory requirements. 
A. 
LAs -~-a__., 
\lietj\ r ;qect to l8 '"1j .S. ~ § 2518(1) (b) (iv), the 
issue is whether the identification in an intercept 
application of all those likely to be overheard in 
,Su b ~~M4.-+;v ~ 
incrimi~ating conversations plays a "eeitr~ role" 
with respect to judicial authorization of intercept orders 
~ ro"'Qv., "- ~~ 
and a consequen~ limitation 4tJlthe use of intercept 
procedures. The statute provides that the issuing judge 
may approve an intercept application if he determines 
that normal investigative techniques have failed or are 
unlikely to succeed and there is probable cause to 
22. 
believe that: (i) an individual is engaged in criminal 
~ 
activity, (ii) particular communications concerning ~ 
offense will be obtained through interception; and (iii) 
the target facilities are being used in connection with 
the specified criminal activity. That determination is 
based on the "full and complete statement" of relevant 
facts supplied by law enforcement authorities. If, after 
evaluating the statutorily enumerated factors in light 
of the information contained in the application, the judge 
concludes. that the wiretap order should issue, the failure 
to identify additional persons who are likely to be 
overheard engaging in incriminating conversations could 
hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial authoriza-
. ~:d 
tion. The intercept order ~s~9 kav) issue~ only if the 
-4. ~ 
issuing judge determinet that the statutory factors ·  
f"~' 
ae~~£ie~ and the failure to name additional targets 
in no way detracts from the sufficiency of those factors. 
This case is therefore unlike Giordano ·, n8\ilfU!:2_ where 
failure· to satisfy the statutory requirement of prior 
approval by specified Justice Department officials bypassed 
a congressionally imposed limitation on the use of the 
.. 
23. 
intercept procedure. The Court there noted that it was 
.. . 
reasonable to believe that requiring prior- approval from 
senior officials in the Justice Department "would inevitably 
foreclose resort to wiretapping in various situations where 
investigative personnel would otherwise seek intercept 
authority from the court and the court would very likely 
authorize its use." 416 U.S., at 528. Here, however, 
the statutorily imposed preconditions to judicial authoriza-
tion were satisfied, and the issuing judge was simply 
unaware that additional persons might be overheard engaging 
in incriminating conversations. In no meaningful sense 
Lfr~__.J 
can it be said that the ~e~ of that information as to 
additional targets would have precluded judicial authoriza-
of f} a.,~t., 
tion ~the intercept. ~an~~ag, this case resembles 
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful 
simply because the issuing judge was incorrectly informed 
as to which designated official had authorized the 
application. The Chavez intercept was lawful because 
the Justice Department had performed its task of prior 
approval, and the instant intercept is lawful because 
the application provided sufficient information to 
24 -a.s a 
enable the issuing judge to determine that the statutory 
preconditions were satisfied.~ 
t\0~'"'5 
Finally, we note that i;heze l ! no cvidenc;1 in the 
legislative history ~suggests that Congress intended 
f1~ 
this broad identification requirement to et a? "a central, 
or even functional, role in guarding against unwarranted 
use of wiretapping or electronic surveillance." United 
States v. Chavez, 416 U.S., at 578. Neither S. 675 nor 
S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971, contained tki~ 
aM.; 
~identification provision. See p~ ~supra. 
~J[Jhe only explanation given in the Senate Report for 
the inclusion of the broad identification provision was 
w ~ca.i- Q" e~,,.e.c:l -f..e (,.a_ 
that it was intended to reflect the constitutional command 
of particularizatio~planation whic:twas offered 
Lo..ll ~ 
with respect to ~~~~~e~i;~~~Ie~r i~e~c~r~rrs~oo~f~nformation required 
by § 2518~(~to be set out in an intercept application. 
No additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor 
debates, since they contain no substantive discussion of 
~ 
the identification provision. 
B 
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the 
government's duty to inform the judge of all identifiable --
persons whose conversations were intercepted. As noted 
earlier, the version of Title III that emerged from the 
Senate Judiciary Committee provided only for mandatory 
notice to the "persons named in the order of the applica-
ll..a. s~V\.CAJ.C. Q.~ ff- de_ i-a:f.ecl 
tion." purpose of that provision: "ilBJil Q81ia:ile@ i l). 
ehe SenB:ee 
inte t of the prov~s~on is that the principle 
ostuse notice will be retained. This provision 
a one s ou sure the community that the techniques 
are reasonably employed. Through its operation 
all authorized interceptions must eventually 
become known at least to the subject. He can then 
seek appropriate civil redress, for example, under 
2520 . . . if he feels that his privacy has 
been unlawfully invaded." 
.S. K.-.1. "'•· 1o1, k-----------
t(b tk. eo"a· , 
~ ,S&&.o. ) JD~ 
<..t'fG,ff). 
The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding 
the provision for discretionary notice merely indicates 
an intent to provide notice to such additional persons as 
may be constitutionally required. 
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative 
history suggests that incriminating conversations are 
"unlawfully intercepted" whenever parties to those 
d() .... t 
conversations faif t~ receive ~discretionary inventory 
notice as a result of the~ilure e f tl~iGovernmen~to 
inform the District Court of their identities. At the time 
inventory notice was served on the other identifiable persons, 
the intercept had been completed and the conversations 
had been "seized" under a valid intercept order. The fact 
3? 
that discretionary notice reached teaxty fifrie rather than 
identifiable persons does not in itself mean 
that the conversations were J,:nlawfully 
;}.7. 
The legislative history indicates that postintercept 
notice was designed instead to assure the community that 
the wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even 
recognizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on 
that aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not 
think that postintercept notice was intended to serve as an 
~~-independent restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure. 
IV 
Although the government was required to identify ,.,.. 
~ 
respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 
26 application for an extension of the initial intercept, 
failure to do so in the circumstances here presented did 
• 
~{ ... ~.-.... ~ . 
· . fv~ 
not warrant suppre ssion under 1~ M.S. ~ § 2518(10)(a)(i). 
Nor was suppression justified UftQQs tke p•ouiaio~with 
respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply because the 
L o,..df.Qd 
government inadvertently &8~~ their names from the 
comprehensive list of all identifiable persons whose 
hold that this is the correct result under the provisions 
of Title III, but we r~emphasize the suggestion we made 
in United States v. Chavez that "strict adherence by the 
Government to the provisions of Title III would nonetheless 
be more in keeping with the responsibilities Congress has 
imposed upon it when authority to engage in wiretapping 
iseerr4"'!, t'in~!JJ..with this opinion . . 
. 
~ 
It is so ordered. ------
"t: l cs""t~ -rev<-~ ~ 
V'e W1CH1duf2 -h -t~c..+ la~N+ 
I 
U.S.· v. Donovan 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The wiretap application procedure is set forth 
at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1), which provides: 
(t. J) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the 
interception of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writ-
ing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction 
:md shall state the applicant's authority to make such application. 
Each application shall include the following information: 
tt (a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement offi-
cer making the application, and the officer authorizing the 
application; 
1{b) a full and complete statement ·"Of the facts and circum· 
stances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belie( th:1t 
an order should be issued, including (i) details as to the flU· 
ticular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be com· 
mitted, (ii) a particular description of the nature and location 
of the facilities from which or the place where the communic:1· 
tion is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of th~ 
type of communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the i<l.:n-
tity of the person, if known, committing the offense and who .'" 
communications are to be intercepted; 
/~c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not oth\·r 
investigative procedures h~ve been tried 1 and failed or why 
they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or 
to be too dangerous; . · 
/ l(d) a statement of the period of time for which the int<'r· 
ception is required to be maintained. If the nature of the 
investigation is such that the authorization for interception 
should not automatically terminate when the described type 
·of communication has been first obtained, a particular descrip-
tion of facts establishing probable cause to believe that :trltli-
tional communications of the same type will occur thereafter; 
1ie) a full and complete statement of the facts concernin!: 
all previous applications known to the individual authorizin~: 
and making the application, made to any judge for authoriza-
tion to intercept, or for _approval of interceptions of, wire or 
oral communications involving any of the same persons, facili-
ties or places specified in the application, and the action takl'n 
by the judge on each su~h application; and 
II(!) where the application is for the extension of an order, .:t 
stat.ement setting forth . the results thus far obtained from tl:~ 
interception, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to ob-
tain such results.l' 
issuing judge is free to require the applicant to 
furnish additional information. 18 u.s.c. § 2518(2). 
, ...... 
N-2 
2. The affidavit set forth extensive information 
indicating that the named individuals were conducting a 
gambling operation. This information was derived from 
physical surveillance by agents of the F B.I., an 
examination of telephone company toll records, and the 
personal observations of six informants, whose past 
reliability~a~als~detailed in the affidavit. 
18 
3. The D~strict Court's order was issued pursuant 
§j 
U.S.C.l2518(3), (4) which provid~: 
11 (3) Upon such applic a tion the judge may enter an ex parte ord_l'r, 
as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving intercepbl'" 
of wire or oral communica tions within the territorial jurisdic· 
' tion of the court in which the judge is sitting, if the judge deter· 
mines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that-
'' (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is 
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a P.articular 
offense enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter; 
It (b) there is probable cause for belief that particular com-
munications concerning that offense will be obtained through 
such interception; 
11(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have 
failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if. tried 
or to be too dangerous; 
11
(d) there is probable cause for be1ief that the facilities from 
which, or the place where, the wire or oral communications are 
to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in 
connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased 
to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person. 
I( 4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any 
wire or oral communication shall specify-
1/ (a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communica-
tions are to be intercepted; 
/l(b) the nature and location of the communications facilitiea 
as to which, or the place where, authority to intercept is grant-
ed; 
ll (c) a particular description of the type of communication 
sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular 
offense to which it relates; 
/l (d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the 
communications, and of the person authorizing the application; 
and 
/l(e) the period of time during which such interception is au-
thorized, including a statement as to whether or not the inter-
ception shall automatically terminate when the described com-
munication has been first obtained. 'I 
N-3 
4. In addition to the December 26 application 
requesting an extension of the initial intercept order, 
the government also filed on that date a separate applica-
a 
tion seeking authorization to monitor a third telephone 
\ c:L·s.c.o\J~I('e d. J 
~at the same North Olmstead address. Tfie 9xictoRee o~ 
applications 
were accompanied by another affidavit setting forth the 
results of the initial monitoring, the manner in which 
the third phone was discovered, the facts indicating that 
the newly discovered telephone was being used to conduct 
a gambling business, and reasons why continued interception 
was necessary. A copy of the affidavit filed on November 
28 was also attached to the December 26 applications. For 
the sake of clarity, the two. applications filed on 
December 26 will be treated as a single application. 
N-4 
The United States conceded in the Court of 
Appeals that respondents Donovan and Robbins were "known" 
within the meaning of the statute at the time of the 
December 26 application, but challenged as clearly erroneous 
the District Court's finding that respondent Buzzaco was 
"known" at that time. The Court of Appeals upheld the 
District Court's finding, and the United States has not 
sought review of that disposition. Thus, for our purposes, 
all three respondents were "known" on December 26. 
'i: An inventory notice must be served within a 
designated period of time to "the persons named in the 
order or the application." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d). 
~:v.t. - . 
The inventory must iae~Q~ notice of the entry of the 
\ .s+~.f.-c ~ 
intercept order or application, l the disposition of the 
c .J..a. wk• 
were or 
were not intercepted. filing of a motion, the 
judge has discretion to make available the intercepted ~ 
communications, the applications, and the orders. f d. ) 
Title III also authorizes the District Court to cause 
an inventory notice to be served on "other parties to 
intercepted communications" if the judge determines that 
such notice is in the interest of justice. Those 
other parties may also be given access to the intercepted 
, 
communications, the applications, and the orders. 
~/ Although respondents Merlo and Lauer were not served with 
inventory notice pursuant to § 2518(8)(d), the intercept order~ 
applications, and related papers were made available to all the 
defendants, including~ Merlo and Lauer, on Nov~ber 26, 
1973. Thus, the ee1st!ent:~ntroduction into evidence at trial 
of the contents of the intercepted conversations and evidence 
derived therefrom 
§ 2518(9). See n 
~ 
would not be pue~ prohibited 
'~ ' r) infra. 
by 18 u.s .c. 
',+-G.. .......... ...... 
~/ The Government filed e~is ifteerlo~to~appeal from the 
District Court's order g~&8Eifl~uppressing evidence under 
18 U.S.C.~731, ~ and there has as yet been no trial 





See n~ ! supra. 
10. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) provides in pertinent 
part: 
1' (10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceed-
ing in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory 
body, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political 
subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any inter-
-cepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, 
on the grounds that-
'' (i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
'I (ii) the order of authorization or approval under wl1ich it 
was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or 
II (iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the 
order of authorization or approval. " 
lV t -t~~f- ~~ J 
~ Every Court of Appeals to h~·~considered the issue 
~oncluded that an indi~ose conversatipns will~ 
v..-:1/ 
probablylbe intercepted by a wiretap must be identified in 
t~ 1 wiretap application if the law enforcement authorities 
have probable cause to believe ~the individual is 
committing the offense for which the wiretap is sought. 
United States v. Chiarizio, 525 F.2d 2S9, 292 (CA2 1975); 
United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996 (CA4 1975), petition 
for cer~ filed, No. 74-14S6; United States v. Doolittle, 
507 F.2d 136S, aff'd en bane, 51S F.2d 500 (CAS 1975), 
~ 
petitions for certA filed Nos. 75-500, 75-509, 75-513; 
United States v. Kilgore, 51S F.2d 496 (CAS 1975), petition 
for cert. filed, No. 75-963; United States v. Civella, 533 
F.2d 1395 (CAS 1976); United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262 
(CAS 1976); United States v. Russo, 527 F.2d 1150, 1156 
(CAlO 1975), petition for cert. filed No. 75-121S. 
. (J. 
See 
--=< -U.S. , 1 
also, United States v. Moore, 513 F. 2d 4S5, 493-494 (-€~8-
1\ c "( 
1975)(interpreting 23 D.C. Code 547(a)(2), which is almost 
l ~V'_)Vl.. !...J identical to the provision at issue here). · - -
L-~-;:-:-;·;-.,.-~---.J"--~-4'/-o.,....~-----,r-])-o ,_o_"_"'-----..-'-fl.To_~.,..,..";-,· "'-"~' .:---~--~-d-u-z_.,_~_'_ol 
A number of these cour~ave concluded>~at our 
decision in United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974)~ : 
resolved this identification issue. See p nited States v. 
;;ll 
Chairizio, supra; United States v. Moore, supra. 
argues 
it will inte Although there is 
language in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must 
identify all such individuals, the identification question 
presented here was not before us in Kahn. The question in 
Lit..CA. ~ e ~ _.) \.i::) 
~was whetherAwiretap application had to identify a 
known user of the target telephone whose complicity in the 
criminal activity under investigat.ion was not known at 
the time of the application. Kahn is a relevant, though 
not controlling, precedent. 
tJ-/0 
/~. I The United States does not suggest that regardless of 
the factual circumstances a wiretap application must identify only 
a single individual. To the contrary, it concedes that if 
two or more persons are using the &sllt'ft8~ target telephone 
"equally" to commit the offense, and thus are "equally" targets 
of the investigation, "all must be named." Brief for the United 
States, at 18 n.l3. 
(V-I/ 
J3. «. Counsel for the United States explained thi_s 
position ~ui~succinctly at oral argument: "The critical 
distinction • • • is one between the users of the telephone 
that is being monitored on the one hand, and all other 
persons throughout the world who may converse from 
~ 
unmonitored phones on the othetand." Tr~seripti of Oral 
Argt.HBent, at 13. 
(J 
11/. Indeed, the contrary conclusion is suggested 
by the fact that identification of an individual in an 
application for an intercept order triggers other statutory 
j . 
Firs~(l)(e) requires an intercept provisions. 
application to disclose all previous applications "inv~lving 
any of the same persons . specified in the application." 
To the extent that Congress thought it necessary to provide 
~ ·l4-~ 
the issuing judge with such information, we can dtsce~ 
congressional intent to require provision of such 
information only if a suspect operated from one end of a 
~1--· telephone line. Second, 2518(8)(d) mandates that an 
inventory notice be served upon "the persons named in the 
order or the/ application." 
WC)\l IJ ~o.J-
As with§ 2518(1)(e), we fai~ 
(,.~ .s e. 'I v -t 
to se~the congressional purpose serv;5. by limiting that 
notice on the basis of the telephone from which one speaks. 
/$'. ~ At the time of the enactment of Title III, 
Congress 
expressed on this issue in United States v. Kahn, sppr ~ a... 
415 U.S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment requires 
specification of "the place to be searched, and the 
I+ e's ~· ... "'-
cc. A.$~; tv t,· •" u.i_ 
v-e~ui ~ t M fll f-
i\.J o.l.J 1\0J~ 
);~e~ io b-e. 
ov e.v kt~~~.t"d 
ett(t (/() ,.,. 
; 1\ C'i t'M ~~ c(~"':_j 
c.o" v~,.aca.tl~ 
lrt t\G.~• 
persons or things to be seized." In the wiretap context, 
those requirements are satisfied by identification of the 
telephone line to be tapped and the particular conversations 
r conversa 
~ .<Jori-
Specification of tihese l~ely te 'be ovedteard engagin~ 
ia griii!tl.R:Ill cog.urr:r~a•"isaa ).identif[ies] the person whose 
constitutionally protected area is to be invaded rather 
than 'particularly describing' the communications, conversa-
tions, or discussions to be seized." Berger v. New York, 
388 u.s. 41, 59 ( 11,7). 
'' · Ilk That Congress may have so understood the 
constitutional requirement is also suggested by the 
portion of the Senate Report dealing with that provision 
of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify 
"the person, if known, whose conversations are to be 
intercepted." The Senate Report merely cites West v. 
Cabell, 153 U.S. 78 (1894), which concerns the need for 
proper identification of the subject of an arrest warrant. 
\'lot~.. c.AC\.l aJ s ...... '! (c1U). 
S. Rep. No. 1097, s:jra :0, 102 To the extent that 
Congress may have considered West to apply to wiretap 
orders~ we have no reason to believe that Congress 
d 
considered its applicability to exten~ only to those 
suspects using the target telephone. 
17. I At least one Senator read the identification requirement 
in S. 971 to parallel the identification requirement contained 
in the statute at issue in Berger v. New York: "Specificity is 
required as to the person or persons whose communications are 
to be intercepted." 114 Cong. Rec., at 14763 (1968)(remarks of 
Senator Percy). 
N-1~ 
1~. ~ The inventory notice must be served within 
a reasonable time but not later than 90 days after the 
date the application for an intercept order was filed. 
On ~~-a_r~t~e showing of good cause, service of the 
inventory may be postponed. 
l't. 
~ In addition to these provisions for mandatory 
and discretionary inventory notice, Title III prohibits 
the introduction into evidence at trials and certain 
other proceedin~he contents of an intercept and evidence 
derived therefrom unless each party has been furnished 
with copies of the application and order under which the 
interception was authorized. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9). More-
over, at the expiration of any intercept the Government 
is required to supply the issuing judge with recordings 
of the intercepted conversations, which are to be sealed 
according to his directions. f 18 U.S.C. 2518(8)(a). ~ 
£ai 1 'Jre The fa; 1 li f e 
lol?S amons the gri&i.Qi"i:s~eeifiea 'b' the Court with lespe~ 
~ 
~ •k~New York statute held unconstitutional in Berger · 
k 388 .r.e 68 E '!z ·--A c.v;l, .. iu.J. v. New Yor ~ .... l:J. S. , ,, 1 - _., 
'd 1lv.., ~ •• ~-I- ~.,._ ;-f. f,.•/~r._ -1-o ;u/.,k 
ern!> IVM ,; 'tkM -do.t. 3 f' ll (j,A., •• J /,0. 
It is worth noting that shortly before Senator 
Hart proposed this amendment to S. 971, Senator 
read to the Senate 
~~ga' o "'""""~on federal wiretap legislation~H>islo. "g"";}. 
il"QJ.gva:nt: te tk:e lla§t B:!lftefi:EiHl:QR~ That report noted that 
parties to intercepted conversations other than those named 
in the application or order should probably be served with 
inventory notice, but it also recognized that under some 
circumstances the provision of such notice could be harmful 
and gave the following example: 
A' a businessman, talks to his customers, and e latter are served with pape~s showing that is being bu?ged[.] [T]he damage to confidence 
in A and to A s reputation in general may damage 
A unjustly. In this case it would seem that the 
customers should not be served with the inventory." 
114 Gong. Rec. 14476 (1968). 
~1. I The current ~olicy of the Department of Justice is to 
rrovide the issuing judge With the M8M~ name of every person 
who has been overheard as to whom there is any reasonable 
p ossibility of indictment. ~ Brief for the ~~ United 
States, at 39. This policy does not meet the test &pag~ 
L ~J.A; iuAL 1 __./ 
soecified above . Moreover, wher~~he Government ~~~~e~es e~ 
sagplJ e~hoses to supply the issuing judge with 
a list of all identif~able persons rather than a description 
of the classes into which those persons fall, the list must 
be comolete. 
s~ecified i 
ad.. I At oral argument, counse 1 for the United States 
practically conceded tiQa'b 'R kQ,g C:W:U:W G'k'ttft B:f'l'ree:eh ,,aB eesta.,_ 
the merit of the a?proach specified in United Se&s~States v. 
Chun: -
,\ 
Perhaps the approach of the Court of Ap?eals for the 
Ninth Circuit, which suggested that rather than submitting 
specific names we should submit categories of persons who 
had been overheard, is a better policy, ~ would be more 
heloful to the district court in exercising its discretion, 
and we wo~ld have no objection to following any reasonable 
ryolicy that the district courts determine would be useful 
to them in this regard." TrarU!lBPi-l"t of Oral Arg:meM, 
at 6-7. ~ 
~ The availability of the · suppression remedy 
A4. o u eel -h c.ert .s. f,· -1-o.~ +t "fl ~ J I .r' I lf 1 
for these statutCZJ
1
violations, seen~ ~ and ~ 
supra,turns on the provisions of Title III rather than 
the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at 
deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights. United 
States v. Giordano, supra, 416 U.S., at 524. 
~~. ~ There is no suggestion in this case that the 
government agents knowingly failed to identify respondents 
Donovan, Robbins and Buzzaco for the purpose of keeping 
relevant information from the District Court that might 
have prompted the court to conclude that probable cause 
was lacking. If such a showing had been made, we would 
have a different case. Nor is there any suggestion that 
as a result of the failure to name these three respondents 
they were denied the mandatory inventory notice supplied 
to persons named in the application. 
§ 
18 u.s.c. 2518(8)(d). 
No one suggests that the failure to identify 
in a wiret}p application individuals who are "unknown" 
within the meaning of the statute, see Kahn v. United 
1/IS f.l.-1. /'/J ( 117'1), L c.o" v •., .t4.. +.·oM_; 
requires suppression of intercepted ~ States, ~~~ 
V" t. c. o~.-H '-'"!) Tl-.cJ-
to which those individuals were parties. 
o~J. A-o"""iJ; 
a.+ 'lo. A 11\•'d"-
1~ ~ ... rf)t'C. .. _'"+ 
Cff•~tJ.s c~ 
eb'·AM. +A-Iu. 
identify such an "unknown" individual does not make unlawful 
an otherwise valid intercept orderJ ~spondents Donovan, 
Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest ,. 'Re\iell}"e~ that the opposite 
is true with respect to the failure to identify in a wiretap 
application individuals who are "known" within the meaning 
of the statute. Counsel for these respondents suggested 
at oral argument that this difference in result is justified 
AW\ ... l o .fo w~v r~lu., -<'4~"' c.k.tA 0'\. A.V .. ~. T'la~sc. ~.- +-
by eAQ fact tbllt altA9'4el~ft law en:EtH!'~Qmept can gfHrs t , 1 ~ 
L w i"""-ouf- ~ ~ ti-.'1 r~........., 
warl!anl!le~ '). actioUJ\when they have been unable to foresee 
the circumstance t ~ .I f.:/1 ,..,.,,+ o 'f41"\_, 
that eventually confronted them, €4oe! not )elieo~ 
or arrest 
warrant when their prior knowledge is sufficient to establish 
probable cause. The major flaw in that reasoning is that 
this case does not concern warrantless action. Her~ the 
omission on the part. of law enforcement authorities was 
not a failure to seek prior 
make an intercept unlawful has no bearing on the lawfulness 
of an intercept order that fails to identify every target. 
IA.I\~ .J 




Ol&.J Ev~.aaal!HftiRJ, that Congress that a broad 
identification requirement was constitutionally mandated, 
:f\1\ oseJ .s+o.-tv Suf f~~.Jiatl\. ~ !i ~SIS'~ Jrrt(lo) 
it does not follow that Congress ~- ~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
I~~) (i) ~ a. .s~:~ £en.. ~Ol'\ tOM.i:J_J ~ J 
~{£;;~iefl: ae e reaerairrt on anwerrc::.:tea ; af: of tlr,.. 
;~ +e~Gt..f+ 
~€ereepe preeea~r~ In limiting use of the ~i~!t~ 
procedure to "the most precise and discriminate circumstance~ 
s. Re . "No. 107, fO'h.\.. c." . J ~d Sru. /0~ ( I'' 8') J 
enforcement authorities to convince 
a Di~trict Court that probable cause existed to believe 
that a specific person was committing a specific offense 
~a specific telephon~ (~:.:ment uloie) was satisfied 
here when the application set forth sufficient information 
to indicate that the ~imary targets~ere conducting a 
gambling business over four particular telephones. Nothing 
in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended 




; ~ +t.rc."' ri- 0 r J Q t.s, 
~rrt''"~l-,·~ ~ 
~ ~t~ J- ca.JL 
f«f~ . 
Counsel for respondents Merlo and Lauer conceded at 
oral argument that the failure to name those respondents 
in the proposed inventory order was not intentional, 
and we are therefore not called upon to decide whether 
suppression would be an available remedy if the Government 
knowingly sought to prevent the District Court from 
serving inventory notice on particular parties. Nor 
does this case present an opportunity to comment upon the 
suggestion, recognized by the United States, Brief at 
4~ n~40, that suppression might be required if the 
agents knew before the interception that no inventory 
would be served. 
Moreover,~ R&&e eh~respondents Merlo and Lauer 
~o+-
were :i:tt zX Bel'\B ' prejudiced by their failure to receive 
postintercept notice under either of the District Court's 
LA.) ~to4--..c.l ..a.~.·--~ 
inventory orders · I~ "'""~""""~ to P""t"'ial olio•....,•"~ 
Metiel't~ the Government made available to all defendants r ·-i- S"A, ~,.... ~ J4,. J ·-
the ~ft69A68 ef Efte ift teFee~tee QQRVoraat~e~ 
Y'~~ f& ,,...e."'-wo{,Jl_ dt~C!.4Vt~ Mo+,•C)tiVJ, ~ 
li'esul.t, i.ntJ:9QY.etien o£ t:fl:is eviQeR.QQ at tx::i.-~1 w9u l d >-
~ov~..J- fiod.v~ +V'GM-1~ 00 ~ 
Aet 'B e 'Barred by 18 U. S . C. § 2518(9) , see R.9tQ 13.A. supr~ 
'I\ +.e.~ ~+d C.._.,. \lt.V ~Q_ +•·•~~A.,. 
~ ... 
~ Although the possibility of subsequent civil 
suits to redress unwarranted invasions of privacy functions 
in a broad sense to check excessive use of intercepts, that 
role is at best minor and indirect. 
2. 
failure to comply fully with these statutory provisions 
requires suppression of evidence under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a). 
I 
On November 28,1972, a special agent of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation applied to the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order 
authorizing a wiretap interception in accordance with Title 
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520.~ The application requested 
authorization to intercept gambling-related communications 
over two telephones at one address in North Olmstead, Ohio, 
and two other telephones at a home in Canton, Ohio. The 
accompanying affidavit recited that the telephones were 
being used by Albert Kotoch, Joseph Spaganlo, and 
George Florea to conduct an illegal gambling business, and 
that in conducting that business they would place telephone 
calls to and receive telephone calls from various persons, 
2 
three of whom were also named in the wiretap application. 
/ 
N-21 
identify such an "unknown" individual does not make 
unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents 
Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest that the opposite 
is true with respect to the failure to identify in a wiretap 
application individuals who are "known" within the meaning 
of the statute. Counsel for these respondents suggested 
at oral argument that this difference in result is justified 
..4... 
by analogy to warrantless searches or arres~ Trlft88~ipt of 
Oral Arg:ment, at 40. Although law enforcement officials 
can often take action without a warrant when they have 
been unable to foresee the circumstances that eventually 
confronted them, they still must obtain a search or arrest 
warrant when their prior knowledge is sufficient to establish 
probable cause. The major flaw in that reasoning is that 
this case does not concern warrantless action. Here, the 
omission on the part of law enforcement authorities was 
not a failure to seek prior judicial authorization, but 
a failure to identify every individual who could be 
expected to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversa-
tions. That the complete absence of prior judicial 
authorization would make an intercept unlawful has no 
bearing on the lawfulness of an intercept order that fails 




-- Even if we assume that Congress thought that a 
broad identification requirement was constitutionally 
mandated, it does not follow that Congress imposed 
statutory suppression under§§ 2515 and 2518 (lO)(a)(i) 
---~ \ as a sanction for noncompliance. In limiting use of 
the intercept procedure to "the most precise and 
discriminate circumstances," S. Rep. No. 107, 90th Cong., 
2d Sess. , l02 (1968), Congress required law enforcement 
authorities to convince a District Court that probable 
cause existed to believe that a specific person was 
committing a specific offense using a specific telephone. 
This requirement was satisfied here when the application 
set forth sufficient information to indicate that the 
primary targets were conducting a gambling business 
over four particular telephones. Nothing in the 
legislative history indicates that Congress intended 
to declare an otherwise constitutional intercept order 
"unlawful" under§ 2518 (lO)(a)(i) --resulting in 
suppression under § 2515 -- for failure to name 
additional targets. 
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MR. JusTrcEi POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents issues concerning the construction of 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520. Specifically, we must 
decide whether 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (1) (b) (iv), which requires 
the Government to include in its wiretap applications "the 
identity of the person, if known, committing the offense, 
and whose conversations are to be intercepted," is satisfied 
when the Government identifies only the "principal targets" 
of the intercept. Second, we must decide whether the Gov-
ernment has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing 
}udge of the identities of persons whose conversations were 
overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling 
him to decide whether they should be served with notice of 
the interception pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8)(d). 
And finally, we must determine whether failure to comply 
fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of 
evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a). 
I 
On November 28, 1972, a special agent of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation applied to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order 
authorizing a wiretap interception in accordance with Title 
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
' < 
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1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520? The application requested 
authorization to intercept gambling-related communications 
over two telephones at one address in North Olmstead, Ohio, 
1 The wiretap application procedure is set forth at 18 U. S. C. § 2518 
(1), which provides: 
"(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the inter-
~eption of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon 
- oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state 
the applicant's authority to make such application. Each application 
shall include the- following information: 
. "(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making 
the application, and the oflicer authorizing the appliration; 
"(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied 
·upon by the applicant, to just.ify his belief that an order should be issued, 
including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or 
is about to be committed, (ii) a particular desrription of .the nature and 
location of the facilities from which or the place where the communica-
tion is to be intercepted, (iii) a paraticular description of the type of 
communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, 
if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be 
intercepted; 
" (c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other invcsti-
'gative procedurrs have been tried and failed or why they reasonably 
appear to be unlikely 1 o succeed if tried or to be too dangerous; 
" (d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is 
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such 
that the authorization for interception should not automatically termi-
nate when the described type of communication has been first obtained, 
,a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that 
additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter; 
"(e) a full and complete statement of the facts conccming all previous 
a'pplications known to the individual authorizing and making the appli-
cation, made to any judge for authori.zation to intercept, or for approval 
of interceptions of, wire or oral communications involving any of the 
same persons, facilities or places specified in the application, and the 
'action taken by the judge on each such application; and 
ic (f) where the applicati<,Jn is for the extension of an order, a statement 
setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a 
reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results." 
The issuing judge is free to require the applicant to furnish additional 
'information. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (2). 
. ~- .. 
75-212-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. DONOVAN 3 
and two other telephones at a home in Canton, Ohio. The 
accompanying affidavit recited that the telephones were being 
used by Albert Kotoch, Joseph Spaganlo, and George Florea 
to conduct an illegal gambling business, and that in con-
ducting that business they vmuld place telephone calls to 
a:nd receive telephone calls from various persons, three of 
whom were also named in the wiretap applica.tion.2 The 
a:ffiiant a1so stated that the Government's informants would 
refuse to testify against the persons named in the applica-
tion, that telephone records alone would be insufficient to 
support a gambling conviction, and that normal investiga-
tive techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to 
the Government's request, the District Court authorized for 
a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related 
wire communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, three 
named individuals other than the respondents, and "others 
as yet unknown," to and from the four listed telephones..8 
2 The affidavit set forth extensive information indicating that the named 
individuals were conducting a gambling operation. This information was 
derived from physical surveillance by agents of the FBI, an examination 
of telephone company toll records, and the personal observations of six 
informants, whose past reliability also was detailed in the affidavit. 
3 The District Court's order was issued pursuant 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 
(3), ( 4) which provide: 
"(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, 
as · requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire 
dr oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court 
in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the 
:!'acts submitted by the applicant that-
" (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, 
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in 
section 2516 of this chapter; 
"(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications 
Cbncerning that offense will be obtained through such interception; 
"(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed 
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous; 
" (d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, 
or the place where, the wire or oral communications are to be intercepted 
75-212-0PINION 
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During the course of the wiretap, the Government learned 
that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco were dis-
cussing illegal gambling activities with the named subjects. 
On December 26, 1972, the Government applied for an 
.extension of the initial intercept order.4 This time it sought 
authorization to intercept gambling-related conversations of 
·Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, two other named individuals, and 
"others as yet unknown/' but it did not identify respondents 
are being used, ,or are about to"be used, in connection with the commis-
... ,sian of such offense, or are leased to, listed 'in the name of, or commonly 
· used by such person. 
" ( 4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire 
or oral communication shall specify-
" (a) the identity of the person, if ·known, whose communications are 
to be intercepted; 
"(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to 
which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted; 
" (c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to 
be interce11ted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it 
relates; 
" (d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communi-
cations, and of the person authorizing the application; and 
"(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized, 
including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall auto-
matically terminate when the described communication has been first 
obtained." 
4 In addition to the December 26 application requesting an extension 
of the initial intercept ordrr, the Government also filed on that date a 
separate application seeking authorization to monitor a third telephone 
.discovered at the same North Olmstead address. Both applications were 
accompanied by another affidavit setting forth the results of the initial 
monitoring, the manner in which the third phone was discovered, the 
facts indicating that the newly discovered telephone was being used to 
conduct a gambling business, and reasons why continued interception was 
necessary. A copy of the affidavit filed on November 28 was also 
~ttached to the December 26 applications. For the sake of clarity, the 
two applications filed on December 26 will be treated as a single 
application. 
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Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins in this second application.~ 
The District Court again authorized interception of gambling-
related conversations for a maximum of 15 days. 
On February 21, 1973, the Government submitted to the 
District Court a proposed order giving notice of the inter-
ceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Government ap-
parently thought included all individuals who could be iden-
tified as having discussed gambling over the monitored 
telephones.6 The District Court signed the proposed order, 
and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons, 
including respondents Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins. On 
September 11 , 1973, after the Government submitted the 
names of two additional persons whose identities had allegedly 
been inadvertently omitted from the initial list, the District 
Court entered an amended order giving notice to those 
individuals. As a result of what the Government labels 
"administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer 
• 5 The United States conceded in the Court of Appeals that respond-
ents Donovan and Robbins were "known" within the meannig of the 
statute at the time of the December 26 application, but challenged as 
clearly erroneous the District CourVs finding that respondent Buzzaco was 
"known" at that time. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's 
finding, and the United States has not sought. review of that disposition. 
Thus, for our purposes, all three respondents were "known" on Decem-
ber 26. 
6 An inventory notice must be served within a designated period of 
time to "the persons named in the order or the application." 18 U. S. C. 
§ 2518 (8) (d). The inventory must give notice of the entry of the inter-
cept order or application, state the disposition of tho application, and 
indicate whether communirations were or were not intercepted. Ibid. 
-- Upon the filing of a motion , the judge has discretion to make available 
the intercepted communications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid. 
Title III also authorizes the District Court to cause an inventory no-
tice to be served on "other parties to intercepted communications" if the 
judge determines that such notice is in the interest of justice. Ibid. 
Those other parties may also be given access to the intercepted commu-
nications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid. 
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were not included in either list of names and were never 
served with inventory notice.7 
On November 1, 1973, an indictment was returned in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents, and 
10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conduct-
ing a gambling business in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371 
and 1955. The five respondents filed motions to suppress 
evidence derived from the wire interception. After an evi-
dentiary hearing on the motions, the District Court sup-
pressed as to respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
all evidence derived from the December 26 intercept order 
on the ground that failure to identify them by name in the 
application and order of that date violated 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 
(1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a). With respect to Merlo and 
Lauer, who were not known to the Government until after 
the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed 
all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground 
that they had not been served with inventory notice. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 
513 F. 2d 337 (1975).8 On the identification issue, the 
court held that the wiretap application must identify every 
person whose conversations relating to the subject criminal 
activity the Government has probable cause to believe it 
will intercept. Agreeing with the District Court that at the 
time of the December 26 application the Government had 
7 Although respondents Merlo and Lauer were not served with inven-
tory notice pursuant to § 2518 (8) (d), the intercept orders, applications, 
and related papers were made available to all the defendants, including 
Merlo and Lauer, on Novemoer 26, 1973. Thus, the introduction into 
evidence at trial of the contents of the intercepted conversations and 
evidence derived therefrom would not be prohibited by 18 U. S. C. § 2518 
(9). See n. 19, infra. 
8 The Government filed its appeal from the District Court's order sup-
pressing evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 3731, and there has as yet been 
no trial on the charges with respect to the respondents. 
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probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan, 
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from 
the December 26 order. On the notice question, it held 
that the Governmnet has an implied statutory duty to in-
form the issuing judge of the identities of the parties whose 
conversations were overheard so that he can determine 
whether discretionary inventory notice should be required. 9 
Because the Government had failed to perform this duty 
with respect to Merlo and Lauer, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidence ' 
derived from both intercept orders. The court found it un-
necessary to determine whether the failure to identify re- · 
pondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 
26 application and to name respondents Merlo and Lauer 
in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or 
purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to 
require suppression under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10)(a).m 
We granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which concern 
the construction of a major federal statute, 421 U. S. 907, 
and now reverse. 
II 
The United States contends that § 2518 (1)(b) (iv) re-
quires that a wiretap application identify only the principal 
9 See n. 6, supra. 
10 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) provides in pertinent part: 
"(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hea.ring, or proceeding 
in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or 
other authority of the United Sta.tes, a State, or a political subdivision 
thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or 
oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that~ 
"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was inter-
cepted is insufficient on its face; or 
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of 
.authorization or approval." 
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target of the interception, and that § 2518 (8) (d) does not 
require the Government to provide the issuing judge with 
a list of all identifiable persons who were overheard in the 
course of an authorized interception. We think neither con-
(tention is sound. 
A 
We turn first to the identification requirements of § 2518 
( 1) (b) ( iv). That provision requires a wiretap application 
to specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing 
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." 
In construing that language, this Court already has ruled 
that the Government is not required to identify an individual 
· in the application unless it has probable cause to believe 
(i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity 
under investigation and (ii) that the iridividual's conversa-
tions will be intercepted over the target telephone. United 
States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 ( 1974). ·The question at issue 
here is whether the Government is required to name all 
such individuals.11 
The United States argues that the most reasonable m-
11 Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue concluded that 
mi individual whose conversations probably will be intercepted by a. wire-
tap must be identified in the wiretap application if the law enforcement 
authorities have probable cause to "believe the individual is committing 
• the offense for which the wiretap is sought. United States v. Chiarizio, 
525 F. 2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975); IUnited States v. I!lrnstein, 509 F. 2d 
996 (CA4 1975), petition for cert. filed, No. 74-1486; I United States v. 
Doolittle, 507 F. 2d 1368, aff'd en bane, 518 F. 2d 500 (CA5 1975), 
petitions for cert. filed Nos. 75!.500, 75..!'509, 75..!'513; Wnited States v. 
Kilgore, 518 F. 2d 496 (CA5 1975), petition for cert. filed, No. 75!963; 
"United States v. Civella, 533 F. 2d 1395 (CA8 1976); United States v. 
Kirk, 534 F. 2d 1262 (CA8 1976); I United States v. Russo, 527 F. 2d 
1150, 1156 (CAlO 1975), petition for cert. filed, No. 75~1218. See also 
United States v. Moore, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 513 F. 2d 485, 493-
494 ( 1975) (interpreting 23 D. C. Code 547 (a) (2), which is almost 
identical to the provi'3ion at issue here). 
A number of these courts have concluded, and respondents Donovan, 
llobbins, and Buzzaco argue, that our decision in United States v. Kahn, 
:' 
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terpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the 
application must identify only the principal target of the 
investigation, who "will almost always be the individual 
whose phone is monitored.12 Brief for the United States, 
at 18. Under this interpretation, if the Government has 
reason to believe that an individual will use the target 
telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government 
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged 
in the criminal activity under investigation, the individual 
qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the 
wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who 
uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls 
from the target telephone is not a principal target even if 
the Government has probable cause to believe that the 
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under inves-
tigation. In other words, whether one is a principal target 
of the investigation depends on whether one operates the 
target telephone to place or receive calls.13 
415 U. S. 143 (1974), resolved this identification issue. See Unit ed States 
v. Chaffrizio, supra; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there is 
language in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must identify all 
such individuals, the identification question presented here was not before 
us in Kahn. The question in that case was whether a wiretap applica-
tion had to identify a known user of the target telephone whose com-
plicity in the criminal activity under investigation was not known at 
the time of the application. Kahn is a relevant, though not controlling, 
precedent. 
12 The United States does not suggest that regardless of the factual 
circumstances a wiretap application must identify only a single individual. 
To the contrary, it concedes that if two or more persons are using the 
target telephone "equally" to commit the offense, and thus are "equally" 
targets of the investigation, "all must be named." Brief for the United 
States, at 18 n. 13. 
13 Counsel for the United States explained this position succinctly at 
oral argument : "The critical distinction ... is one between the users of 
the telephone that is being monitored on the one hand, and all other per-
sons throughout the world who may converse from unmonitored phones 
on the other hand." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 13. 
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Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we find 
little support for it in the language and structure of Title 
III or in the legislative history. The statutory language 
itself refers only to "the person, if known, committing the 
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." 
That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls 
to the target telephone as it is to a suspect placing calls 
from the target telephone. It is true, as the United States 
suggests, that when read in the context of the other sub-
divisions of § 2518 (1)(b), an argument can be made that 
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user 
of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other 
sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap 
applications would name more than one individual. For 
example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served 
upon "the persons named in the order or the application." 
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) (emphasis added). And § 2518 
(1) (c) requires that an intercept application disclose all 
previous intercept applications "involving any of the same 
persons ... specified in the application" (emphasis added). 
It may well be that Congress anticipated that a given 
· application would cover more than one telephone or that 
several suspects would use one telephone, and that an appli· 
cation for those rrasons alone would require identification 
of more than one individuaL But nothing on the face of 
the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from 
the identification requirement those suspects whose inter-
cepted communications originated on a telephone other than 
that listed in the wiretap application.H 
14 Indeed, the contrary conclusion is suggested by the fact that iden-
tification of an individual in an application, for an intercept order 
triggers other statutory provisions. FirsL § 2518 (1) (c) requires an in-
tercept application to disclose all previous applications "involving any 
of the same persons ... specified in the application." To the extent 
that Congress thought it necessary to provide the issuing judge with 
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Nor can we find support for the "principal target" inter-
pretation in the legislative history. Title III originated as 
a combination of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception 
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several 
months prior to this Court's decision in Berger v. New York, 
388 U. S. 41 ( 1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance 
Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few 
days after the Berger decision. Both bills required that 
wiretap applications include a full and complete statement 
of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant 
and specification of the nature and location of the commu-
nication facilities involved. Although neither bill contained 
an express identification requirement such as that at issue 
here, both bills required the application to include "a full 
and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous 
applications ... involving any person named in the appli-
cation as committing, having committed, or being about to 
commit an offense." Hearings on Controlling Crime Through 
More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcommittee 
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, IJOth Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8 (a) (3) and 
1066, § 2518 (a)(4) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even 
at this early stage, it was recognized that an application 
could identify several individuals, and there is no indication 
that the identification would be limited to principal targets. 
--
......While S. 971~t,he bill tfl:J' .combined the maJ· or provisio_n~s __ . , ' \ · ' " " w \...,. e.. t l: 
of S. 675 and S. 2050~nd ~eventually was enacted, f'as 
pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court de-
such information, there is no indication of congressional intent to require 
provision of such information only if a suspect operated from one end 
of a telephone line. Second, § 2518 (8) (d) mandates than an inven-
tory notice be served upon "the persons named in the order or the 
application." As with § 2518 ( 1) (e), the congressional purpose would 
not be served by limiting that notice on the basis of the telephone from 
which one speaks. 
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cided Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).. S. 971 was 
then redrafted to conform to Katz as well as Berger, and 
the identification provision was added at that time. The 
Senate Report states that the requirements set forth in the 
various subdivisions of §"2518 (1 .)(b), including the identifi-
Cation requirement at issue here, " [were] intended to reflect the 
C<?nstitutional command of particularization." ·s. Rep. No. 
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), citing B erger v. New 
J:qrk, 388 U.S. 41 , 58-60, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 354--356 (1967). ·· The United States now contends that 
although it may be that Congress read Berger and Katz to 
· fequir_e, as a constitutional matter, that the subject of the 
surveillancE) be named if known, Congress "would hardly 
liave read those cases .as requiring ·the naming of all parties 
likely to be overheard .... " 1.5 Brief, at ·25- 26. The diffi-
culty with that argument is that the legislative history fails 
to indicate that Congress was 'thinking in terms of "subjects" 
of surveillance,. or that Congress considered "subjects" of 
surveillance to be the principal users of the target telephone. 
Moreover, to the extent that Congress thought it was 
~neeting the g_onstitutional commands of particularization es-
tablished in ~erger and Katz, Congress may have read those 
cases as mandating a broad identification requirement. The 
statute that we confronted in Berger required identification 
15 N the time of the enactment of Tit le III, Congress did not 
have hefore it ' the view we expressed on this issue in United States 
v. K,ahn, 415 U. S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment requires 
specification of "the place to be seached, and the persons or things to 
be seized." In fhe wiretap context, those requirements are satisfied 
by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular 
conversations to 'be seized. It is not a constitutional requirement that 
All those likely to be overht?ard engaging in incriminating conversations 
be named. Specification of this sort "identif[ies] the person whose con-
~stitl1tional!y protected area is to be invaded rather than 'particularly 
describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized." 
IEJerger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967). 
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of "the person or persons" whose communications were to· 
be overheard. 388 U. S., at 59. And we expressly noted 
that that provision " [did] no more than identify the person 
whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded .... " 
Ibid. Given the statute at issue in Berger and our comment 
upon it, Congress may have concluded that as a constitu-
tional matter a wiretap application would have to name 
all suspects rather than just the primary user.16 
In any event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary 
to speculate as to exactly how Congress interpreted Berger 
and Katz with respect to the· identification issue. It is suf-
fi~ient to note that in response to those decisions Congress 
included an identification requirement which on its face draws 
no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and the 
United States points to no evidence in the legisla.tive history 
that supports such a distinction. Indeed, the legislative ma-
terials apparently contain no use of the term "principal tar-
get" or any discussion of a different treatment based on the 
telephone from which a suspect speaks.17 We therefore con-
clude that a wiretap application must name an individual 
if the Government has probable cause to believe that the 
. 16 That Congress may have so understood the constitutional require-
ment is also suggested by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with 
that provision of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify 
"the person, if known, whose conversations are to be intercepted." The 
Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894), which 
concerns the need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest 
warrant. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968). To the 
extent that Congress may have considered West to apply to wiretap 
orders, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its appli-
cability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone. 
17 At least one Senator read the identification requirement in S. 971 to 
parallel the identifiaction requirement contained in the statute at issue 
in Berger v. New York: "Specificity is required as to the person or 
persons whose communications are to be intercepted." 114 Cong. Rec., 
at 14763 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Percy). 
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individual is engaged in the criminal activity under inves~ 
tigation and expects to intercept the individual's conversa-
tions over the target telephone. 
B 
The other statutory proviSion at issue in this case is 
18 U.S. C. §2518(8)(d), which provides that the judge 
shall cause to be served on the persons named in the order 
or application an inventory, which must give notice of the 
:entry of the order or application, state the disposition of 
the application, and indicate whether communications were 
intercepted.18 Although the st~ute mandates tb8 ~6 oi~mrr 
of tea~ inventory notice only 1!6,;~.persons named in the appli-
cation or the order, the statute also l?rovide that the judge 
maYl.I::}JF8Yible0 similar notice to other parties to intercepted 
communications if he concludes that such action is in the 
interest of justice.10 Observing that this notice '{)rovision 
1 _ does not expressly require law enforcement authorities 
.;v.~f "/ routinely tOll*~ the judge with any specific information 
upon which'\"0 exercise his discretion, the United States con-
tends that it would be inappropriate to read such a require-
18 The inventory notice must be served within a reasonable time but 
not later than 90 days after the date the application for an intercept 
order was filed. On an ex parte showing of ·good cause, service of the 
inventory may be postponei:l. 
19 In addition to these provisions for mandatory an,d discretionary 
•inventory notice, Title III prohibits the introduction into evidence at 
trials and certain other proceedings of the contents of an intercept 
and evidence derived therefrom unless each party has been furnished 
with copies of the application and order under which the interception 
was authorized. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (9). Moreover, at the expiration 
· of any intercept the Government is required to supply the issuing judge 
with recordings of the intercepted conversatiolls, which are to be sealed 
.. according to his directions. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (a). The New York 
statute held unconstitutional in Berger v. New York, was criticized by 
this Court for its failure to include provisions of this sort. 388 U. S., 
-at 60. 
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ment into the statute since the judge has the option of 
asking the law enforcement authorities for whatever infor-
mation he requires. 
Our reading of the legislative history of the discretionary 
notice provision in light of the purposes of Title III leads 
us to reject the Government's interpretation. As reported 
from the Judiciary Committee, section 2518 (8) (d) contained 
only a provision mandating notice to the persons named in 
the application or the order; the discretionary notice provi-
sion was added by amendment on the floor of the Senate. 
In introducing that amendment, Senator Hart explained its 
purpose: 
"The amendment would give the judge who issued the 
order discretion to require notice to be served on other 
parties to intercepted conversations, even though such 
parties are not specifically named in the court order. 
The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice 
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of any 
surveillance statute. It may be that the required no-
tice must be served on all parties to intercepted com-
munications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may 
make such notice to all parties undesirable, the amend-
ment leaves the final determination to the judge." 114 
Cong. Rec. 14485-14486 (1968).20 
20 It is worth noting that shortly before Senator Hart proposed this 
amendment to S. 971, Senator Long had r&'ld to the Senate portions 
of a rep01t preparPd by the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York on federal wiretap legislation . That report noted that parties 
to intercepted conversations other than tho e named in the application 
or order should probably be served with inventory notice, but it also rec-
ognized that under some circumstances the provision of such notice 
could be harmful and pve the following example: 
"A, a businessman, talks to his customers, and the latter are served 
with papers showing that A is being bugged[.] LT]he damage to con-
fidence in A and to A's reputation in general may damage A tmjustly. 
In this ca e it would seem i hat the custom en:; should not be served with 
the inventory." 114 Cong. Rec. 14476 (1968). 
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In deciding whether legitimate privacy interests justify with-
holding inventory notice from parties to intercepted conversa-
tions, a judge is likely to require information and assistance 
beyond that contained in the application papers and the 
recordings of intercepted conversations made available by 
law enforcement authorities. No purpose is served by hold-
ing that those authorities have no routine duty to supply 
the judge with revelant information. The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted this problem of 
dual responsibility, and we adopt the balanced construction 
that court placed on § 2518 (8)(d): 
"To discharge this obligation the judicial officer must 
have, at a minimum, knowledge of the particular cate-
gories into which fall all the individuals whose conver-
sations have been intercepted. ·Thus, w"hile precise iden .. 
tification of each party to an intercepted conversation 
is not required, a description of the general class, or 
classes, which they comprise is essential to enable the 
judge to determine whether additional information is 
necessary for a proper evaluation of the interests of the 
various parties. Furthermore, although the judicial offi-
fcer has the duty to cause the filing of the inventory 
[notice], it is abundantly clear that the prosecution has 
greater access to and familiarity with the intercepted 
communications. Therefore we feel justified in imposing 
upon the latter the duty to classify all those whose 
conversations have been intercepted, and to transmit 
this information to the judge. Should the judge desire 
more information regarding these classes in order to 
exercise his statutory § 2518 (8) (d) discretion, ... the 
'government is also required to furnish such information 
as is available to it." United States v. Chun, 503 F. 
2d 533, 540 (1974).21 
21 The current policy of the Department of .Justice is to provide 
the issuing judge with the name of every person who has been over-
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We agree with the Ninth Circuit that this allocation of 
responsibility best serves the purposes of Title IIL22 
III 
We turn now to the question whether the District Court 
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at 
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement 
authoritis to comply fully with the provisions of §§ 2518 (1) 
(b)(iv) and 2518 (S)(d). Section 2515 expressiy prohibits 
the use at trial, and at certain other proceedings, of the 
contents of any intercepted wire communication or any evi- ..3-
dence derived therefrom "if the di~losure of that informa-
tion would be in violation of this chapter." The circum-
stances that trigger suppression under § 2515 are in turn 
enumerated in § 2518 (10)(a): 
"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
" ( ii) the order of authorization or approval under 
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or 
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity 
with the order of authorization or approval." 
There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that 
heard as to whom there is any reasonable possibility of indictment. 
Brief for the United States, at 39. This policy does not meet i he test 
specified above. Moreover, where, as here, the Government chooses to 
supply the issuing jurlge with a list of all identifiable persons rather 
than a description of the classes into which those persons fall, the list 
must be complete. 
22 At oral argument, counsel for the United States practically conceded 
the merit of the approach sp<>cified in United States v. Chun: 
"Perhaps the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
which suggested that rather than submitting specific names we should 
submit categories of persons who had been overheard, is a better 
policy, would be more helpful to the district court in exercising its 
discretion, and we would have no objection to following any reason-
able policy that the district courts determine would be useful to them 
in this regard." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 6-7. 
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the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the 
interception was not conducted in conformity with the orders. 
Thus, only § 2518 (10) (a) (i) is relevant: were the communi-
cations "unlawfully intercepted" given the violations of 
·§§ 2518 (1)(b) (iv) and 2518 (8) (d) 23 
Resolution of that question must begin with United States 
·v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v. 
Chavez, 416 U. S. 562 (1974). Those cases hold that "[not] 
,every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided 
in Title III would render the interception of wire or ora1 
communications 'unlawful.' " United States v. Chavez, 4~6 
U. S., at 574-575. To the contrary, suppression is rcquirE)d 
only for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory require-
ments that directly and substantially implement the con-
gressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures 
to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this 
extraordinary device." United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S., 
at 527. 
Giordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring 
that an application for an intercept order be approved by 
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General spe-
cially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding that 
Congress intended to condition the usc of wiretap procedures 
~ on the judgment of senior officials in the Department 
of Justice, the Court required suppression for failure to com-
ply with the approval provision. Chavez concerned the stat-
utory requirement that the application for an intercept order 
specify the identity of the official authorizing the applica-
tion. The problem in Chavez was one of misidentification; 
although the application had in fact been authorized by the 
Attorney General, the application erroneously identified an 
23 The availability of the suppression remedy for these statutory, 
as opposed to constitutional, violations, see n. 15 and 19, supra, tums 
on the provisions of Title III rather than the judicially fashioned ex-
clusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment 
rights. United States v. Giordano, supra, 416 U. S., at 524. 
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Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the 
applica,tion. The Court concluded that mere misidentifica-
tion of the official authorizing the application did not make 
the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518 (10) 
(a) (i) since that identification requirement did not play a 
"substantive role" in the regulatory system. 416 U. S., 
·at 578. 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both 
the identification requirement of § 2518 ( 1) (b) (iv) and 
the notice requirement of § 2515 (8) (d) played a "central 
role" in the statutory framework, and for that reason af-
'firmed the District Court's order suppressing relevant 
evidence. Although both statutory requirements are un-
doubtedly important, we do not think that the failure to 
comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an in-
tercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory 
requirements. 
A 
As to § 2518 ( 1) (b) (iv), the issue is whether the identifi-
·cation in an intercept application of all those likely to be 
overheard in incriminating conversations plays a "substan-
tive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept 
''orders and it consequently provides a limitation on the use 
of intercept procedures. The statute provides that the issu-
ing judge may approve an intercept application if he deter-
mines that normal investiga.tive techniques have failed or 
are unlikely to succeed and there is probable cause to believe 
that: (i) an individual is engaged in criminal activity, 
(ii) particular communications concerning the offense will 
be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facili-
ties are being used in connection with the specified criminal 
activity. That determination is based on the "full and com-
plete statement" of relevant facts supplied by law enforce-
ment authorities. If, after evaluating the sta,tutorily 
enumerated fa.ctors in light of the information contained in 
. ' 
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the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order 
should issue, the failure to identify additional persons who 
are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conver-
sations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial 
authorization. The intercept order may issue only if the 
i:ssuing judge determines that the statutory factors are pres-
ent, and the failure to name additional targets in no way 
detracts from the sufficiency of those factors. 
This case is therefore unlike Giordano, where failure to 
satisfy the statutory requirement of prior approval by speci~ 
ned. Justice Department officials bypassed a congressionally 
imposed limitation on the use of the intercept procedure. 
'The Court there noted that it was reasonable to believe 
that requiring prior approval from senior officials in the 
Justice Department "would inevitably foreclose resort to 
wiretapping in various situations where investigative person-
nel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court 
and the court would very likely authorize its use." 416 U. S., 
at 528. Here, however, the statutorily imposed preconditions 
'to judicial authorization were satisfied, and the issuing judge 
was simply unaware that additional persons might be over-
beard engaging in incriminating conversations. In no mean-
'ingful sense can it be said that the presence of that infor-
mation as to additional targets would have precluded judicial 
authorization of the intercept. 24 Rather, this case resembles 
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful sim-
24 There is no suggestion in this ca.se that the Government agents 
knowingly failed to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
for the purpose of keeping relevant information from the District Court 
that might have prompted the court to conclude that probable cause 
was lacking. If such a showing had been made, we would have a 
different case. Nor is there any suggestion that as a resul t of the 
failure to name these three respondents they were denied the ma.ndatory 
inventory not ice supplied to persons named in the application . 18 
U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d). Respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
were among the 37 persons served with the intial inventory. 
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ply because the issuing judge was incorrectly informed as 
to which designated official had authorized the application. 
The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Justice Depart-
ment had performed its task of prior approval, and the 
instant intercept is lawful because the application provided 
sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to deter-
mine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied. 2 ~ 
Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative history 
suggests that Congress intended this broad identification re-
quirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in 
guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic 
surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S., at 578. 
Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971, 
contained an identification provision. See p. 11, supra. The 
only explanation given in the Senate Report for the in-
25 No one suggests that the failure to identify in a wiretap application 
individuals who are "unknown" within the meaning of the statute, see 
Kahn v. United States, 415 U. S. 143 (1974), require·· suppression of 
intercepted conversations to which those individuals were parties. Though 
recognizing that the failure to identify such an "unknown" individual 
does not make unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents 
Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest that the opposite is true 
with respect to the failure to identify in a wiretap application indi-
viduals who arc "known" within the meaning of the statute. Counsel 
for these respondents suggested at oral argument that this difference 
in result is justified by analogy to warrantless searches or arrests. Tr. 
of Oral Arg., at 40. Although law enforcement officials can often take 
action without a warrant when they have been unable to foresee the 
circumstances that event.ually confronted them, they still must obtain a 
search or arrest warrant when t.heir prior knowledge is sufficient to 
establish probable cause. The major flaw in that. rca oning is that this 
case does not concern warrantless action. Here, the omission on the part 
of law enforcement authorities was not a failure to seek prior judicial 
authorization, but a failure to identify every individual who could be 
expected to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations. That 
the complete absence of prior judicial authorization would make an in-
tercept unlawful has no bearing on tho lawfulness of an intercept order 
that fails to identify every target. 
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elusion of the broad identification provision was that it was 
intended to reflect what Congress perceived to be the con-
stitutional command of particularization. This explanation 
was offered with respect to all the information required by 
§ 2518 ( 1) ( 6) to be set out in an intercept application. No 
additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor debates, 
since ·they contain no substantive discussion of the identifi-
··cation provision.26 
B 
We reach the ·same conclusion with respect to the Gov-
. ernment's duty to inform the judge of all identifiable persons 
·whose co~wersations were intercepted. As noted earlier, the 
version of Title III that emerged from the Senate Judiciary 
Committee provided only for mandatory notice to the "per-
sons ~1amed in the order of the application." The Senate 
Report detailed the purpose of that provision: 
"[T]he intent of the provision is that the principle 
of postuse notice will be retained. · This provision alone 
should insure the community that the techniques are 
reasonably employed. Through its operation all author-
ized interceptions must eventually become 'known at least 
2a Even if we assume that Congress thought that a broad identification 
requirem'i19t was constitutionally mandatea, it docs not follow that 
'Congress imposed statutory suppression under §§ 2515 and 2518 (10) (a) 
(i) as a sanction for noncompliance. In limiting use of the intercept pro-
cedure to "the most precise and discriminate circumstances," S. Rep. No. 
T07, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968), Congress required law enforcement 
authorities to convince a District Court that probable cause existed to 
believe that a specific person was committing a specific offense using a 
· specific telephone. This requirement was satisfied here when the applica-
. tion set forth sufficient information to indicate that the primary targets 
were conducting a gambling business over four particular telephones . 
Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to 
· declare an otherwise constitutional intercept order "unlawful" under 
·§ 2518 (10) (a) (i)-resulting in suppression under § 2515-for failure to 
name additional targets. 
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to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil re-
dress, for example, under section 2520 . . . if he feels 
that his privacy has been unlawfully invaded." S. Rep. 
No. 107, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1968). 
The floor discussion concE-rning the amendment adding the 
provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent 
to provide notice to such additional persons as may be 
constitutionally required. 
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative 
history suggests that incriminating conversations are "unlaw-
fully intercepted" whenever parties to those conversations 
do not receive discretionary inventory notice as a result of 
the Government's failure to inform the District Court of their 
identities. At the time inventory notice was served on the 
other identifiable persons, the intercept had been completed 
and the conversations had been "seized" under a valid in-
tercept order. The fact that discretionary notice reached 
39 rather than 41 identifiable persons does not in itself mean 
that the conversations were unlawfully intcrcepted.27 
The legislative history indicates that postintercept notice 
was designed instead to assure the community that the 
wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recog-
27 Counsel for respondents Merlo and Lauer conceded at oral argument 
that the failure to name those respondents in the proposed inventory 
order was not intentional, and we arc then•fore not called upon to decide 
whether suppression would be an available remedy if the Government 
knowingly sought to prevent the District Court from serving inventory 
notice on particular parties. Nor does this case present an opportunity to 
comment upon the suggestion, recognized by the United States, Brief, at 
49 n. 40, that suppre;;sion might be required if the agents knew before 
the interception that no inventory would be served. 
Moreover, respondents Merlo and Lauer were not prejudiced by their 
failure to receive postintercept notice under either of the District Court's 
in,ventory orders. As noted earlier, the Government made available to 
all defendants the intercept orders, applications, and related papers. See 
n·:@, supra. And in response to pretrial discovery motions, the Govern-
J;Uent produced transcripts of the intercepted conversations. 
... 
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nizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that 
aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that 
postintercept notice was intended to serve as an independent 
~estraint on resort to the wiretap procedure. 28 
IV 
Although the Government was required to identify respond-
ents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 26 
application for an extension of the initial intercept, failure 
to do so in the circumstances here presented did not warrant 
suppression under § 2518 (10) (a) (i). Nor was suppression 
j'ustified with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply 
because the Government inadvertently omitted their names 
from the comprehensive list of all id'entifiable persons whose 
conversations had been overheard. We hold that this is the 
correct result under the provisions of Title III, but we re-
emphasize the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez, 
that "strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of 
Title III would nonetheless be more in keeping with the 
responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when au-
thority to engage in wiretapping· or electronic surveillance is 
~ought." 416 U. S., at 580. 
. The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed· and the case 
is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accord 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
zs Although the possibiliW qf subsequent civil suits to redress unwar-
qm1.ed invasions of priyacy ·functions in a broad sense to check excessive 
u;se of intercepts, that role is at best minor and indirect. 
' i 
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This case presents issues concerning the construction of 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Cory rol and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2~10-252Q,( _ S~ifie~~st 
- d~ide-w:llether-l.g...:g. &. C. 1!2518 OJ (5~7requircs 
· the Government to include m its wiretap applications "the 
· identity of the person, if known, committing the offense, 
. and whose conversations are to be intercept~';( is satisfied 
when the Government identifies only the "principal targets" 
of the intercept. Second, we must decide whether the Gov-
ernment has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing 
judge of the identities of persons whose conversations were 
overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling 
him to decide whether they should be served with notice of 
the interception pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8)(d). 
And finally, we must determine whether failure to comply 
fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of 
evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a). 
I 
On November 28, 1972, a special agent of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation applied to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order 
authorizing a wiretap interception in accordance with Title 
III ~f tfie~rl;m -GR.w.~ Gout~l~ti'eet&· A:et-ef~ 
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} 1968, 18 U. 8.- G. §-§-2810 2500. 1 The application requested 
.authorization to intercept gambling-rela.ted communica.tions 
over two telephones at one address in North Olmstead, Ohio, 
1 The wiretap :~pplication procedure is set forth at 18 U. S. C. § 2518 
{ 1), which provides: 
"(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the inter-
ception of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon 
;oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state 
the applicant's authority to make such application. Each application 
shall include the following information: 
"(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making 
<the application, and the ofiicer authorizing the application; 
"(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied 
·upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued, 
including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or 
is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and 
location of the facilities from which or the place where the communica-
tion is to be intercPptcd, (iii) a paraticular description of the type of 
communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, 
if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be 
intercepted; 
" (c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investi-
. gative procedurrs have been tried and failed or why they reasonably 
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous; 
" (d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is 
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such 
1hat the authorization for interception should not automatirally tPrmi-
nate when the described ty])e of communication has been first obtained, 
·a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that 
. additional communications of the same type will occur thrrr.after; 
" (e) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous 
applications known to the individual authorizing and making the appli-
cation, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for approval 
. of interceptions of, wire or oral communications involving any of the 
same persons, facilities or places specifiPd in the application, and the 
.,action taken by the judge on each such application; and 
"(f) where the application is for the extmsion of :~n order, a statement 
setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a 
reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results." 
The issuing judge is free to require the applicant to furnish additional 
information. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (2). 
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and two other telephones at a home in Canton, Ohio. The 
accompanying affidavit recited that the telephones were being 
used by Albert Kotoch, Joseph Spaganlo, and George Florea 
to conduct an illegal gambling business, and that in con- v-
ducting that business they would place ~ calls to 
and receive teie~e calls from various persons, three of 
whom were also named in the wiretap application.2 The 
affiiant also stated that the Government's informants would 
refuse to testify agaihst the persons named in the applica-
tion, that telephone records alone would be insufficient to 
support a gambling conviction, and that normal investiga-
tive techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to 
the Government's request, the District Court authorized for 
a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related 
wire communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, three 
named individuals other than the respondents, and "others 
as yet unknown,"· to and from the four listed telephones. 3 
2 The affidavit set forth extensive information indicating that the named 
individuals were conducting a gambling operation. This information was 
derived from physical surveillance by agents of the FBI, an examination 
of telephone company· toll records, and the personal observations of six 
informants, whose past reliability also was detailed in the affidavit. 
3 The District Court's order was issued pursuant 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 
(3), ( 4) which provide: 
"(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, 
as requested or as modified', authorizing or approving interception of wire 
or oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court 
in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the 
facts submitted by the applicant that-
" (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, 
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in 
section 2516 of this chapter; 
"(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications 
concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception; 
" (c) norma.] investigative procedures have been tried and have failed 
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous; 
" (d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, 
or the place where, the wire or oral communications are to be intercepted 
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During the course of the wiretap, the Government learned 
that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco were dis-
cussing illegal gambling activities with the named subjects. 
On December 26, 1972, the Government applied for an 
extension of the initial intercept order.4 This time it sought 
authorization to intercept gambling-related conversations of 
Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, two other named individuals, and 
"others as yet unknown," but it did not identify respondents 
are being used, or arc a'bout to be used, in connection with the commis-
sion of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly 
used by such person. 
" ( 4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire 
or oral communication shall spec'ify-
" (a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are 
to be intercepted; 
"(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to 
which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted; 
" (c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to 
be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it 
relates; 
" (d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communi-
cations, and of the person authorizing the application; and 
"(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized, 
including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall auto-
matically terminate when the described communication has been first 
obtained." 
4 In addition to the December 26 application requesting an extension 
of the initial intercept order, the Government also filed on that date a 
separate application seeking authorization to monitor a third telephone 
discovered at the same North Olm tead address. Both applications were 
accompanied by another affidavit setting forth the results of the initial 
monitoring, the manner in which the third phone was discovered, the 
facts indicating that the newly discovered telephone was being used to 
conduct a gambling business, and reasons why continued interception was 
necessary. A copy of the affidavit filed on November 28 was also 
attached to the December 26 applications. For the sake of clarity, the 
two applications filed on December 26 will be treated as a single 
application. 
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Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins in this second application.5 
The District Court again authorized interception of gambling-
related conversations for a maximum of 15 days. 
On February 21, 1973, the Government submitted to the 
District Court a proposed order giving notice of the inter-
ceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Government ap-
parently thought included all individuals who could be iden-
tified as having discussed gambling over the monitored 
telephones.6 The District Court signed the proposed order, 
and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons, 
including respondents Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins. ' On 
September 11, 1973, after the Government submitted the 
names of two additional persons whose identities(hadJallegedly J 
been inadvertent y orrutte from the initial list~e District 
Court entere an amended order giving notice to those 
individuals. As a result of what the Government labels 
"administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer 
5 The United' States conceded in the Court of Appeals that respond-
ents Donovan and Robbins were "known" within the mcannig of the 
statute at the time of the December 26 application, but challenged as 
clearly erroneous the District Court's finding that respondent Buzzaco was 
"known" at that time. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's 
finding, and the United States has not sought review of that disposition. 
Thus, for our purposes, all three respondents were "known" on Decem-
ber 26. 
6 An inventory notice must be served within a designated period of 
_,__ _ Jm- tN;o athe persons nan1cd in the order or the application." 18 U. S. C. 
§ 2518 (8) (d). The inventory must give notice of the entry of the inter-
cept order or application, state the disposition of the application, and 
indicate whether communications were or were not intercepted. Ibid. 
Upon the filing of a motion, the judge has discretion to malm available 
the intercepted communications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid. 
Title III also authorizes the District Court to cause an inventory no-
tice to be served on "other parties to intercepted communications" if the 
judge determines that such notice is in the interest of justice. Ibid. 
Those other parties may also be given access to the intercepted commu-
nications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid. 
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included in either list of names and were never 
./2~------~--~~ serve w1t inventory notice.7 
On November 1, 1973, an indictment was returned in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents, and 
10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conduct-
ing a gambling business in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371 
and 1955. The five respondents filed motions to suppress 
evidence derived from the wire interception. After an evi-
dentiary hea.ring on the motions, the District Court sup-
pressed as to respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
all evidence derived from the December 26 intercept order 
on the ground that failure to identify them by name in the 
application and order of that date violated 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 
(1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a). With respect to Merlo and 
Lauer, who were not known to the Government until after 
the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed 
all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground 
that they had not been served with inventory notice. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 
513 F. 2d 337 (1975).8 On the identification issue, the 
court held that the wiretap application must identify every 
person whose conversations relating to the subject criminal 
activity the Government has probable cause to believe it 
will intercept. Agreeing with the District Court that at the 
time of the December 26 application the Government had 
7 Although respondents Merlo and Lauer were not served with inven-
tory notice pursuant to § 2518 (8) (d), the intercept orders, applications, 
and related papers were made available to all the de.fendant.s, including 
Merlo and Lauer, on November 26, 1973. Thus, the introduction into 
evidence at trial of the contents of the intercepted conversations and 
evidence derived therefrom would not be prohibited by 18 U. S. C. § 2518 
' (9). Seen. 19, infra. ~ 
8 The Government filed its appeal from the District Court's order su -
pressing evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 3731, and there has een 
no trial on the charges with respect to the respondents. 
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probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan, 
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from 
the December 26 order. On the notice question, it held 
that the Governm~t has an implied statutory duty to in-
fbrm the issuing j'udge of the identities of the parties whose 
conversations were overheard so that he can determine 
whether discretionary inventory notice should be required.9 
Because the Government had failed to perform this duty 
with respect to Merlo and Lauer, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidence 
derived from both intercept orders. The court found it un-
necessary to determine whether the failure to identify re-
pondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 
26 application and to name respondents Merlo and Lauer 
in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or 
purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to 
require suppression under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a).10 
We granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which concern 
the construction of a major federal statute, 421 U. S. 907, 
and now reverse. 
II 
The United States contends that § 2518 (1)(b)(iv) re-
quires that a wiretap application identify only the principal 
9 Seen. 6, supra. 
10 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) provides in pertinent part: 
"(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding 
in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or 
other authority of the United Sta.tes, a State, or a political subdivision 
thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or 
oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that-
"(i) the communication was unl::twfully intercepted; 
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was inter-
cepted is insufficient on its face; or 
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of 
authorization or approval." 
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target of the interception, and that § 2518 (8) (d) does not 
require the Government to provide the issuing judge with 
a list of all identifiable persons who were overheard in the 
course of an authorized interception. We think neither con-
tention is sound. 
A 
We turn first to the identification requirements of § 2518 
(1)(b) (iv). That provision requires a wiretap application 
to specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing 
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." 
In construing that language, this Court already has ruled 
that the Government is not required to identify an individual 
in the application unless it has probable cause to believe 
(i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity 
under investigation and (ii) that the individual's conversa-
tions will be intercepted over the target telephone. United 
States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974). The question at issue 
here is whether the Government is required to name all 
such individua.ls.11 
The United States argues that the most reasonable m-
11 Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue concluded that 
. t:tn individual whose conversations probably will be intercepted by a wire-
tap must be identified in the wiretap application if the law enforcrment 
:authorities have probable cause to believe the individual is committing 
-the offense for which the wiretap is sought. United States v. Chiarizio, 
525 F. 2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975); United States v. Bernstein, 509 F. 2d 
996 (CA4 1975) , petition for cert. filed, No. 74-1486; United States v. 
Doolittle, 507 F. 2d 1368, aff'd en bane, 518 F. 2d 500 (CA5 1975), 
petitions for cert. filed Nos. 75-500, 75-509, 75-513; United States v. 
Kilgore, 518 F. 2d 496 (CA5 1975), petition for cert. filed, No. 75-963; 
United States v. Civella, 533 F. 2d 1395 (CA8 1976) ; United States v. 
Kir-k, 534 F. 2d 1262 (CA8 1976); United States v. Russo, 527 F. 2d 
1150, 1156 (CAlO 1975), petition for cert. filed, No. 75-1218. See also 
United States v. Moore, - U. S. App. D. C. - , 513 F. 2d 485, 493-
494 (1975) (interpreting 23 D. C. Code 547 (a) (2), which is almost 
identical to the provision at issue here). 
A number of these courts have concluded, and respondents Donovan, 
RoBbins, and Buzzaco argue, that our decision in United States v. Kahn, 
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terpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the 
application must identify only the principal target of the 
investigation, who "will almost always be the individual 
whose phone is monitored.12 Brief for the United States, 
at 18. Under this interpretation, if the Government has 
reason to believe that an individual will use the target 
telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government 
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged 
i:ri the criminal activity under investigation, the individual 
qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the 
wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who 
uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls 
from the target telephone is not a principal target even if 
the Government has probable cause to believe that the 
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under inves-
tigation. In other words, whether one is a principal target 
of the investigation depends on whether one operates the 
target telephone to place or receive calls.13 
415 U. S. 143 (1974), resolved this identification issue. See United States 
v. Chairizio, supra; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there is 
language in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must identify all 
such individuals, the identification question presented here was not before 
us in Kahn. The question in that case was whether a wiretap applica-
--....--"" ..... on-- o identify a known user of the target telephone whose com-
plicity in the criminal activity under investigation was not known at 
the time of the application. Kahn is a relevant, though not controlling, 
precedent. 
12 The United States does not suggest that regardless of the factual 
circumstances a wiretap application must identify only a single individual. 
To the contrary, it concedes that if two or more persons are using the 
target telephone "equally" to commit the o.ffensc, and thus are "equillly" 
targets of the investigation, "all must be named." Brief for the United 
States, at 18 n. 13. 
18 Counsel for the United States explained this position succinctly at 
oral argument: "The critical distinction ... is one between the users of 
the telephone that is being monitored on the one hand, and all other per-
sons throughout the world who may converse from unmonitored phones 
on the other hand." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 13. 
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Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we find 
little support for it in the la.nguage and structure of Title 
III or in the legislative history. The statutory language 
itself refers only to "the person, if known, committing the 
offense and whose communications arc to be intercepted." 
That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls 
to the target telephone as it is to a suspect placing calls 
from ·e-t telephone. It is true, as the United States 
suggests, that when read in the context of the other sub-
divisions of § 2518 ( 1) (b), an argument can be made that 
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user 
of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other 
sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap 
applications would name more than one individual. For 
example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served 
upon "the persons named in the order or the application." 
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) (emphasis added). And § 2518 
( 1) (c) requires that an intercept application disclose all 
previous intercept applications "involving any of the same 
pe1·sons ... specified in the application'; (emphasis added). 
It may well be that Congress anticipated that a given 
application would cover more than one telephone or that 
several suspects would usc one telephone, and that an appli-
cation for those reasons alone would require identification 
of more than one individuaL But nothing on the face of 
the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from 
the identification requirement those suspects whose inter-
cepted communications originated on a telephone other than 
that listed in the wiretap application.14 
14 Indeed, the contrary conclusion is suggested by the fact that iden-
tification of an individual in an application for an intercept order 
'triggers other statutory provisions. First -51 ( 1) (e) reqmres an m-
tercept application to disclose all previous applications "involving any 
of the same persons ... specified in the application." To the extent 
thaL Congress thought it necessary to provide the issuing judge with 
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Nor can we find supE_or for the "principal target" inter-
pretation m the legiSlative istor . Title III originated as 
a combination o ederal Wire Interception 
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several 
months prior to this Court's decision in Berg~r v. New York, 
388 U.S. 41 (1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance 
Control Act of 1967. introduced by Senator Hruska a few 
c;fays after the Berger decision. Both bills required that 
wiretap applications include a full and complete statement 
of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant 
and specification of the nature and location of the commu-
nication facilities involved. Although neither bill contained 
an express identification requirement such as that at issue 
here, both bills required the application to include "a full 
and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous 
applications ... involving any person named in the appli-
cation as committing, having committed, or being about to 
commit an offPnse." Hearings on Controlling Crime Through 
More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcommittee 
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8 (a) (3) and 
1066, § 2518 (a)(4) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even 
at this early stage, it was recognized that an application 
could identify several individuals, and there is no indication 
that the identification would be limited to principal targets. 
While S. 971 , the bill that combined the major provisions 
~f S. 675 and S. 2050. and that eventually was enacted, was 
pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court de-
such information, there is no indication of congressional intent to require 
provision of such information only if a suspect operated from one end 
of a telephone line. Second, § 2518 (8) (d) mandates thai! an mven-
tory notice be served upon "the persons named in the order or the 
application." As with § 2518 (1) (e), the congressional purpose would 
~ot be served by limiting that notice on the basis of the telephone from 
which one speaks. 
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cided Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).. S. 971 was 
then redrafted to conform to Katz as well as Berger, and 
the identification provision was added at that time. The 
Senate Report states that the requirements set forth in the 
various subdivisions of § 2518 (1) (b), including the identifi-
cation requirement at issue here," [were] intended to reflect the __ 
constitutional command of particularization." S. Rep. No. 
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), citing Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 354-356 (1967). The United States now contends that 
although it may be that Congress read Berger and Katz to 
re-quire, as a constitutional · matter, that the su Ject o e 
surveillance be named if known, Congress "would hardly 
have read those cases as requiring the naming of all parties 
likely to be overheard .... " 15 Brief, at 25-26. The diffi-
culty with· that argument is that the legislative hi~ fails 
·to indicate that Congress was thinking in terms of subjects' 
of surveillance, or that Congress considered "S'fibjects of 
surveillance to be the principal users of the target telephone. 
Moreover, to the extent that Congress thought it was 
meeting the constitutional commands of particularization es-
-tablished in B~ger and Katz, Congress may have read those 
cases as manda;ting a broad identification requirement. The 
statute that we confronted ·in Berger required identification 
1 5 At the time of the enactment of Title III, Congress did not 
·have before it the view we· expressed on this issue in United States 
v. Kahn, 415 U. S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment requires 
specification of "the place to be seached, and the persons or things to 
be seized." In the wiretap context, those requirements are satisfied 
by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular 
conversations to be seized. It is not a constitutional requirement that 
all those likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations 
be named. Specification of this sort "identif[ies] the person whose con-
stitutionally protected area is to be invaded rather than 'particularly 
describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized." 
B-erger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967). 
, .. 
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of "the person or persons" whose communic tions were to· 
be overheard. 388 U. S., at 59. And we pressly noted 
..that that provision "[did] no more than iden 'fy the person 
whose constitutionally protected area is to be nvaded .... " 
~-Ibid. Given the statute at issue in Berger an our comment 
"'\. : ~pon, it, Congress may have concluded that -~ 
~:rrra:t-t~l±~~e-.t~ 
. all suspects rather than just the primary user.H' 
In any event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary 
to speculate as to exactly how Congress interpreted Berger 
... and Katz with respect to the identification issue. It is suf-
· . .ficient to note that in response to those decisions Congress 
··included an identification requirement which on its face draws 
no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and the 
· United States points to no evidence in the legislative history 
: ..that supports such a distinction. Indeed, the legislative rna-
. terials apparently contain no use of the term "principal tar-
get" or any discussion of a different treatment based on the 
, telephone from which a suspect speaks.17 We therefore con-
clude that a wiretap application must name an individual 
' if the Government has probable cause to believe that the 
16 That Congress may have so understood the constitutional require-
·.men.t is also suggested by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with 
that provision of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify 
"the person, if known, whose conversations are to be intercepted." The 
Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894), which 
concerns the need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest 
warrant. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968). To the 
extent that Congress may have considered West to a.pply to wiretap 
orders, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its appli-
cability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone. 
17 At least one Senator read the identification, requirement in S. 971 to 
parallel the identi~tion requirement contained in the statute at issue 
in Berger v. New Y orlc: "Specificity is required as to the person or 
persons whose communications are to be intercepted." 114 Cong. Rec., 
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individual is engaged in the criminal activity under inves-
tigation and expects to intercept the individual's conversa-
tions over the target telephone. 
B 
The other statutory prov1s10n at issue in this case is 
18 U. S. C. §.:.2518 (8)(d) , which provides that the judge 
shall cause to be served on the persons named in the order 
or application an inventory, which must give notice of the 
·· entry of the order or appiication, state the disposition of 
· the application, and indicate whether communications were 
intercepted.18 Although the statute mandates the provision 
of that inventory notice only to persons named in the appli-
cation or the order, the statute also provides that the judge 
may provide similar notice to other parties to intercepted 
communications if he concludes that such action is in the 
interest of justice.1 0 Observing that this notice provision 
does not expressly require law · enforcement authorities 
routinely to provide the judge with any specific information 
upon which to exercise his discretion, the United States con-
tends that it would be inappropriate to read such a require-
18 The inventory notice must be served within a reasonable time but 
· not lator than 90 days after the date the application for an intercept 
order was filed. On an ex parte showing of good cause, service of the 
inventory may be postponed. 
1 0 In addition to these provisions for mandatory and discretionary 
inventory notice, Title III prohibits the introduction into evidence at 
trials and certain other proceedin'gs of the contents of an intercept 
and evidence derived therefrom unless each party has been furnished 
.. with copies of the application and order under which the interception 
was authorized. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (9). Moreover, at the expiration 
~. of any intercept the Government is required to supply the issuing judge 
with recordings of the intercepted conversations, which are to be sealed 
'· according to his directions. iS U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (a). The New York 
statute held unconstitutional in Berger v. N ew York, was criticized by 
this Court for its failure to include provisions of this sort. 388 U. S., 
at 60. 
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ment into the statute since the judge has the option of 
asking the law enforcement authorities for whatever infor-
mation he requires. 
Our reading of the legislative history of the discretionary 
notice provision in light of the purposes of Title III leads 
us to reject the Government's interpretation. As reported 
from the Judiciary Committee, section 2518 (8) (d) contained 
only a provision mandating notice to the persons named in 
the application or the order; the discretionary notice provi-
sion was added by amendment on the floor of the Senate. 
In introducing that amendment, Senator Hart explained its 
purpose: 
"The amendment would give the judge who issued the 
order discretion to require notice to be served on other 
parties to intercepted conversations, even though such 
parties are not specifically named in the court order. 
The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice 
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of any 
surveillance statute. It may be that the required no-
tice must be served on all parties to intercepted com-
munications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may 
make such notice to all parties undesirable, the amend-
ment leaves the final determination to the judge." 114 
Cong. Rec. 14485-14486 (1968).20 
20 It is worth noting that shortly before Senator Hart proposed this 
amendment to S. 971, Senator Long had read to the Senate portions 
of a report prepar<>d by ~_!le Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York on federal wiretij) legislation. That report t at parties 
to interce ted conversations other than those named in the application 
or order hould proba y be served with inventory noLice, but it also rec-
ognized t mt under some circumstances the provision of such notice 
could be harmful and gave the following example: 
"A, a business111an, talks to his customers, and the latter are served 
with papers showing that A is being bugged[.] [T]he damage to con-
fidence in A and to A's reputation in general may damage A unjustly. 
In this case it would seem that the customers should not be served with 
the inventory." 114 Cong. Rec. 14476 (1968). 
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In deciding whether legitimate privacy interests justify with-
holding inventory notice from parties to intercepted conversa-
tions, a judge is likely to require information and assistance 
beyond that contained in the application papers and the 
recordings of intercepted conversations made available by 
law enforcement authorities. No purpose is served by hold-
ing that those authorities have no routine duty to supply 
the judge with revelant information. The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted this problem of 
dual responsibility, and we adopt the balanced construction 
that court placed on § 2518 (8)(d): 
"To discharge this obligation the judicial officer must 
have, at a minimum, knowledge of the particular cate-
gories into which fall all the individuals whose conver-
sations have been intercepted. Thus, while precise iden-
tification of each party to an intercepted conversation 
is not required, a description of the general class, or 
.ciasses, which they comprise is essential to enable the 
judge to determine whether additional information is 
necessary for a proper evaluation of the interests of the 
various parties. Furthermore, although the judicial offi-
cer has the duty to cause the filing of the inventory 
[notice], it is abundantly clear that the prosecution has 
greater access to and familiarity with the intercepted 
communications. Therefore we feel justified in imposing 
upon the latter the duty to classify all those whose 
conversations have been intercepted, and to transmit 
this information to the judge. Should the judge desire 
more information regarding these classes in order to 
exercise his statutory § 2518 (8)(d) discretion, ... the 
government is also required to furnish such informa.tion 
as is available to it." United States v. Chun, 503 F. 
2d 533, 540 (1974).21 
·21 The current policy of the Department of Justice is to provide 
the issuing judge with the name of every person who has been over-
75-212-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. DONOVAN 11 
We agree with the Ninth Circuit that this allocation of 
:r:esponsibility best serves the purposes of Title II!.22 
III 
We turn now to the question whether the District Court 
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at 
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement 
authoritis to comply fully with the provisions of §§ 2518 (1) 
(b)(iv) and 2518 (8) (d). Section 2515 expressly prohibits 
the use at trial, and at certain other proceedings, of the 
contents of any intercepted wire communication or any evi-
dence derived therefrom "if the disy'closure of that informa-
tion would be in violation of this chapter." The circum-
stances that trigger suppression under § 2515 are in turn 
enumerated in § 2518 (10) (a): 
"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval under 
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or 
" (iii) the interception was not made in conformity 
with the order of authorization or approval." 
There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that 
heard as to whom there is any reasonable possibility of indictment. 
Brief for the United States, at 39. This policy docs not meet the test 
specified above. Moreover, where, as here, the Gov'ernment chooses to 
supply the issuing judge with a list of all identifiable. p0rsons rather 
than a description of the classes into which those persons fall, the list ________..., 
must be complete. ~~ J. 
22 At oral argument, counsel for the United States p..x:ac+i~nlcy cancedea--zr- ( ~r~r-'"'-
the merit of the approach specified in United States v. Chun: l...__ -----
'·'Perlmps the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
which suggested that rather than submitting specific names we should 
submit categories of persons who had been overheard, is a better 
policy, would be more helpful to the district court in exercising its 
discretion, and we would have no objection to following any rt>ason-
able policy that the district courts determine would be useful to them 
in this regard." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 6-7. 
f 
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the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the 
interception was not conducted in conformity with the orders. 
Thus, only § 2518 (10) (a) (i) is relevant: were the communi-
cations "unlawfully intercepted" given the violations of 
§§ 2518 (1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (8)(d).23 
Resolution of that question must begin with United States 
v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v. 
'Chavez, 416 U. S. 562 (1974). Those cases hold that "[not] 
every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided 
in Title III would render the interception of wire or oral 
communications 'unlawful.) " United States v. Chavez, 416 
U. S., at 574- 575. To the contrary, suppress1oi1 is required 
only for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory require-
ments that directly and substantially 'implement the con-
gressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures 
to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this 
extraordinary device." 'United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S., 
at 527. 
Giordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring 
that an application for an intercept order be approved by 
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General spe-
cially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding that 
~ ?ong,ress intended to condition the use of wiretap procedures 
on the judgment of senior officials in the Department 
of Justice, the Court required suppression for failure to com-
ply with the approval provision. Chavez concerned the stat-
utory requirement that the application for an intercept order 
specify the identity of the official authorizing the applica-
tion. The problem in Chavez was one of misidentification; 
although the application had in fact been authorized by the 
Attorney General, the a.pplication erroneously identified an 
23 The availabili1Jy of the suppression remedy for these statutory, 
: as opposed to constitutional, violations, see n. 15 and 19, supra, turns 
· on the provisions of Title III rather than the judicially fashioned ex-
clusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment 
~rights. United States v. Giordano, supra, 416 U. S., at 524. 
'·. 
75-212-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. DONOVAN 19 
Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the 
application. The Court concluded that mere misidentifica-
tion of the official authorizing the application did not make 
the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518 (10) 
(a) (i) since that identification requirement did not play a 
usubstantive role" in the regulatory system. 4 16 U. S., 
at 578. 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both 
the identification requirement of § 2518 (1)(b)(iv) and 
the notice requirement of § 2515 (8)(d) played a "central 
role" in the statutory framework, and for that reason af-
firmed the District Court's order suppressing relevant 
evidence. Although both statutory requirements are un-
doubtedly important, we do not think that the failure to 
comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an in-
tercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory 
requirements. 
A 
As to § 2518 ( 1) (b) (iv), the issue is whether the identifi-
cation in an intercept application of all those likely to be 
overheard in incriminating conversations plays a "substan- ~,~ 
tive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept/
~<Wfs ana@) consequently )3i"e'~ a limitation on the use 
· of intercept procedures. The statute provides that the issu-
ing judge may approve an intercept application if he deter-
mines that normal investigative techniques have failed or 
are unlikely to succeed and there is probable cause to believe 
that: (i) an individual is engaged in criminal activity, 
(ii) particular communications concerning the offense will 
be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facili-
ties are being used in connection with the specified criminal 
activity. That determination is based on the "full and com-
plete statement" of relevant facts supplied by law enforce-
ment authorities. If, after evaluating the statutorily 
enumerated factors in light of the information contained in 
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the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order 
should issue, the failure to identify additional persons who 
are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conver-
sations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial 
authorization. The intercept order may issue only if the 
issuing judge determines that the statutory factors are pres-
ent, and the failure to name additional targets in no way 
detracts from the sufficiency of those factors. 
This case @ ~f.ef>etunlike Giordano, where failure to 
satisfy the statutory requirement of prior approval by speci-
fied Justice Department officials bypassed a congressionally 
imposed limitation on the use of the intercept procedure. 
The Court there noted that it was reasonable to believe 
that requiring prior approval from senior officials in the 
Justice Department "would inevitably foreclose resort to 
wiretapping in various situations where investigative person-
nel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court 
·and the court would very likely authorize its use.'' 416 U. S., 
at 528. Here, however, the statutoriiy imposed preconditions 
to judicial authorization were satisfied, and the issuing judge 
was simply una.wa.re that additional persons might be over-
-heard engaging in incriminating conversations. In no mean-
ingful sense can it be said that the presence of that infor-
mation as to additionai targets would have precluded judicial 
authorization of the 1ntercept.24 Rather, this case resembles 
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful sim-
24 There is no suggestion in this case that the Government agents 
Rnowingly failed to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
for the purpose of keeping relevant information from the District Court 
that might have prompted the court to conclude that probable cause 
was lacking. If such a showing had been made, we would have a 
d'ifTerent case. Nor is there any suggestion that. as a result of the 
failure to name these three respondents they were denied the mandatory 
inventory notice supplied to persons named in the application. 18 
U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d). Respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
were among the 37 persons served with the intial inventory. 
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ply because the issuing judge was incorrectly informed as 
to which designated official had authorized the application. 
The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Justice Depart-
ment had performed its task of prior approval, and the 
instant intercept is lawful because the application provided 
sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to deter-
mine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied.:!5 
Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative histol'y 
suggests that Congress intended this broad identification re-
quirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in 
guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic 
surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S., at 578. 
Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971, 
contained an identification provision. See p. 11, supra. The 
oniy explanation given in the Senate Report for the in-
25 No one suggests that the failure to identify in a wiretap application 
individuals who are "unknown" within the meaning of the statute, see 
Kahn v. United States, 415 U. S. 143 (1974), requires suppression of 
intercepted conversations to which those individuals were parties. Though 
recognizing that the failure to identify such an "unknown" individual 
does not make unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents 
Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest that the opposite is true 
with respect to the failure to identify in a wiretap application indi-
viduals who are "!mown" within the meaning of the statute. Counsel 
for these respondents suggested at oral argument that this difference 
in result is justified by analogy to warrantless searches or arrests. Tr. 
of Oral Arg., at 40. Although law enforcement officials can often take 
action without a warrant when they have been unable to foresee the 
circumstances that eventually confronted them, they still must obtain a 
search or arrest warrant when their prior knowledge is sufficient to 
establish probable cause. The major flaw in that reasoning is that this 
case docs not concern warrantless action. Here, the omission on the part 
of law enforcement authorities was not a failure to seek prior judicial 
authorization, but a failure to identify every individual who could be 
expected to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations. That 
the complete absence of prior judicial authorization would make an in-
tercept unlawful has no bearing on the lawfulness of an intercept order 
that fails to identify every target. 
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elusion of the broad identification provision was that it was 
intended to reflect what Congress perceived to be the con-
stitutional command of particularization. This explanation: 
was offered with respect to all the information required by 
§ 2518 (1) (6) to be set out in an intercept application. N~ 
additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor ·debates, 
since they contain no substantive discussion of the identifi-
cation provision.26 
B 
We reach the same conclusion with respect to . the Gov,-
·ernment's duty to inform the judge of all identifiable persons 
·whose conversations were intercepted. As noted earlier, the 
version of Title III that emerged from the Senate Judiciary 
Committee provided only for mandatory notice to the "per-
·~ sons named in the order of" the ap·pliGation." The Senate 
Report detailed the purpose of that provision: 
"[T] he intei1t of the provision is that the principle 
of postuse notice will be retained. This provision alone 
should insure the community that the techniques are 
reasonably employed.' Through its operation all author-
ized interceptions must eventually become known at least 
26 Even if we assume that Congress thought that a. broad identification 
r~quiremnet was constitutionally mandated, it docs not follow that 
Congress imposed statutory suppression under §§ 2515 and 2518 ( 10) (a) 
(i) as a sanction for noncompliance. In limiting use of the intercept pro-
cedure to "the most precise and discriminate circumstances," S. Rep. No. 
107, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968), Congress required law enforcement 
authorities to convince a District Court that probable cause existed to 
believe that a sprcific person was committing a specific offense using a 
specific telephone. This requirement was satisfied here when the applica-
. tion set forth sufficient information to indicate that the primary targets 
were conducting a gambling business over four particular telephones. 
Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to 
declare an otherwise constitutional intercept order "unlawful" under 
§ 2518 (10) (a) (i)-resulting in suppression under § 2515-for failure to 
name additional targets. 
4 
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to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil re-
dress, for example, under section 2520 . . . if he feels 
that his privacy has been unlawfully invaded." S. Rep. 
No. 107, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,, 105 (1968). 
The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding the 
provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent 
to provide notice to such additional persons as may be 
ponstitutionally required. 
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative 
history suggests that incriminating conversations are "unlaw-
fully intercepted" whenever parties to those conversations 
do not receive discretionary inventory notice as a result of 
the Government's failure to inform the District Court of their 
identities. At the time inventory notice was served on the 
other identifiable persons, the intercept had been completed 
and the conversations had been "seized" under a valid in-
tercept order. The fact that discretionary notice reached 
39 rather than 41 identifiable persons docs not in itself mean 
that the conversations were unlawfully intercepted.27 
The legislative history indicates that postintercept notice 
was designed instead to assure the community that the 
wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recog-
27 Counsel for respondents Merlo and Lauer conceded at oral argument 
that the failure to name those respondents in the proposed inventory 
order was not intentional, and we are therc'fore not called upon to decide 
whether suppression would be an available remedy if the Government 
knowingly sought to prevent the District Court from serving inventory 
notice on particular parties. Nor docs this case present an opportunity to 
comment upon the suggestion, recognized by the United States, Brief, at 
49 n. 40, that suppression might be required if the agents knew before 
the interception that no inventory would be served. 
Moreover, respondents Merlo and Lauer were not prejudiced by their 
failure to receive postintercept notice under either of the District Court's 
inventory orders. As noted earlier, the Government made available to 
all defendants the intercept orders, applications, and related papers. See 
n. 5A, supra. And in response to pretrial discovery motions, the Govern-
ment produced transcripts of the intercepted conversations. 
75-212-0PINION 
24 UNITED STATES v. DONOVAN 
nizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that 
aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that 
postintercept notice was intended to serve as an independent 
restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure.28 
IV 
Although the Government was required to identify respond-
ents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 26 
application for an extension of the initial intercept, failure 
to do so in the circumstances here presented did not warrant 
suppression under § 2518 (10)(a) (i). Nor was suppression 
justified with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply 
because the Government inadvertently omitted their names 
from the comprehensive list of all identifiable persons whose 
conversations had been overheard. We hold that this is the 
correct result under the provisions of Title III, but we re-
emphasize the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez, 
that "strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of 
'Title III would nonetheless be more in keeping with the 
responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when au-
thority to engage in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is 
sought." 416 U. S., at 580. 
'The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case 
is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accord 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
28 Although the possibility of subsequent civil suits to redress unwar} t( ~ 
ljanted invasions of privacy functions in a broad sense to check excessive " .-rf f0~ 
ase of intercepts, that role is at best minor and indirect. ~-
~ 
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This case, presents issues concerning the construction of 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520. Specifically, we must 
decide whether 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (1) (b)(iv) , which requires 
the Government to include in its wiretap applications "the 
identity of the person, if known, committing the offense, 
and whose conversations are to be intercepted," is satisfied 
when the Government identifies only the "principal targets" 
of the intercept. Second, we must decide whether the Gov-
ernment has a sta.tutory responsibility to inform the issuing 
judge of the identities of persons whose conversations were 
overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling 
him to decide whether they should be served with notice of 
the interception pursuant to 18 U.S. C. §2518(8)(d) . 
And finally, we must determine whether failure to comply 
fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of 
evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a). 
I 
On November 28, 1972, a specia.l agent of the Federal / 
Bureau of Investigation applied to the United States Dis-/, 
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order 
j JJ 1-----~a~u,thorizing a w~retap i~1terception in accordance withA Title / j 1 
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4968, 18 U. 8. 0. §§ 2510=252~ The application requested 
authorization to intercept gambling-related communications 
over two telephones at one address in North Olmstead, Ohio 
1 The wiretap application procedure is set forth at 18 U. S. C. § 2518 
(1), which provides: 
"(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the inter-
ception of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon 
oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state 
the a.pplicant's authority to make such application. Each application 
shall include thE' following information: 
"(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making 
the application, and the oflicer authorizing the application; 
"(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied 
upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued, 
including (i) deta,ils as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or 
is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and 
location of the faciliti"s from which or the place where the communica- ~~~ 
tion is to be intercepted, (iii) a pa~icular description of the type of )/ 
communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, 
if known, committing the offense and whose · communications are to be 
intercepted; 
"(c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investi-
gative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably 
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous; 
"(d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is 
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such 
that the authorization for interception should not automatically termi-
nate when the described type of communication has been first obtained, 
a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that 
additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter; 
" (c) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous 
applications known to the individual authorizing and making the appli-
cation, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for approval 
of interceptions of, wire or oral communications involving any of the 
same persons, facilities or places specified in the application, and the 
action taken by the judge on each such application; and 
"(f) where the applicrrtion is for 1 he extension of an order, a statement 
setting forth the re,;ults thus far obtained from the interception, or a 
reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results." 
The issuing judge is free to require the applicant to furnish additional 
information. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (2). 
~ re.''"tU1.4V\ ~ 
ro.V'+: 
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and two other telephones/ at a home in Canton, Ohio. The 
11ccompanying a.ffidavit rec\ted that the telephones were being 
used by Albert Kotoch, Joseph Spaganlo, and George Florea 
to conduct an illegal gambling business, and that in con- ¥ 
ducting that business they would place ~le]9fiB~ calls to ~ 
and receive ~e15h""'&. calls from various persons, three of / 
whom were also named in the wiretap application. 2 The 
affilant also stated that the Government's informants would 
refuse to testify against the persons named in the applica-
' tion, that telephone records alone would be insufficient to 
support a gambling conviction, and that normal investiga-
tive techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to 
the Government's request, the District Court authorized for 
a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related 
wire communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, three 
named individuals other than the respondents, and "other~ / 
as yet unknown," to and from the four listed telephones./ 
2 The affidavit set forth extensive information indicating that the named 
individuals were conducting a gambling operation. This information was 
derived from physical surveillance by :tgents of the FBI, an examination 
·of telephone company toll records, and the personal observations of six 
informants, whose past reliability also was detailed in the affidavit. 
3 The District Court's order was issued pursuant 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 
,(3), (4) which provide 
"(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, 
· .as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire 
or oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court 
in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the 
facts submitted by the applicant that-
" (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, 
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in 
section 2516 of this chapter; 
"(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications 
concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception; 
" (c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed 
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous; 
" (d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, 
()I' the place where, the wire or oral communications are to be intercepted 
75-212-0PINION 
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During the course of the wiretap, the Government learned 
that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco were dis-
cussing illegal gambling activities with the named subjects. 
On December 26, 1972, the Government applied for an 
extension of the initial intercept order.4 This time it sought 
authorization to intercept gambling-related conversations of 
Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, two other named individuals, and 
"others as yet unknown,'} but it did not identify respondents 
are being used, ·or arc about to be used, in connection with the commis-
sion of such offense, 0r are leased to, Ii,<;tetl in the name of, or commonly 
used oy such person. 
" ( 4) Each order attthoriZing or approving the interception of any wire 
or oral communication shall specify-
" (a) the identity of tbe person, if 'known, whose communications are 
to be intercepted; 
"(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to 
which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted; 
" (c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to 
be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it 
relates; 
" (d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communi-
cations, and of the person authorizing the application; and 
" (e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized, 
including a statement as to whether or not the ·interception shall auto-
matically terminate when the described communication has been first 
obtained." 
4 In addition to the December 26 application requesting an extension 
of the initial intercept order, the Government also filed on that date a 
separate application seeking authorization to monitor a third telephone 
'discovered at the same North Olmstead address. Both applications were 
accompanied by another affidavit setting forth the results of the initial 
monitoring, the manner in which the third phone was discovered, the 
facts indicating that the newly discovered telephone was being used to 
conduct a gambling business, and reasons why continued interception was 
necessary. A copy of the affidavit filed on November 28 was also 
attached to the December 26 applications. For the sake of clarity, the 
two applications filed on December 26 will be treated as a single 
application. 
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Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins in this second application.5 
The District Court again authorized interception of gambling-
related conversations for a maximum of 15 days. 
On February 21, 1973, the Government submitted to the 
District Court a proposed order giving notice of the inter-
ceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Government ap-
parently thought included all individuals who could be iden-
tified as having discussed gambling over the monitored 
telcphones.6 The District Court signed the proposed order, 
and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons, 
including respondents Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins. On 
September 11 , 1973, after the Government submitted the 
names of two additional persons whose identitiestfuillJallegedlyl 
been ma vertent y om1 te from the initial list, the District 
Court entere an amended order giving notice to those 
individuals. As a result of what the Government labels / 
"adTinistrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer/ 
1/The United States conceded in the Court of Appeals that respond-
ents Donovan and Robbins were "known" within the meannig of the 
statute at the time of the December 26 application, but challenged as 
clearly erroneous the District Court's finding that respondent Buzzaco was 
"known" at that time. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's 
finding, and 1he United States has not sought review of that disposition. 
Thus, for our purposes, all three respondents were "known" on Decem-
ber 26. 
I (-----6- A:!:n inventory notice must be served within a designated period of (A..flYVV tim~the persons named in the order or the application." 18 U.S.~ 
§ 2518 (8) (d). The inventory must give notice of the entry of the inter-
cept order or application, state lhe disposition of the applica.tion, and 
- indicate whether communications were or were not intercepted. Ibid. 
(~~ «--:=> \~Upon the filing of a motion, the judge has discretion to make available 
the intercepted communications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid. 
Title III also authorizes the District Court to cause an inventory no-
tice to be served on "other parties to intercepted communications" if the 
judge determines that such notice is in the interest of justice. Ibid. 
Those other parties may also be given access to the intercepted commu-
nications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid. 
/rj 
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were not included in either list of names and were never 
served with inventory notice.7 
On November 1, 1973, an indictment was returned in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents, and 
10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conduct-
ing a gambling business in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371 
and 1955. The five respondents filed motions to sup:rr_ess 
evidence derived from the wire interception. After an evi-
dentiary hearing on the motions, the District Court ~up­
pressed as to respondents Donovan, -Robbins, and Buzzaco 
all evidence derived from the December 26 intercept order 
on the ground that failure to identify them by name in the 
application and order of that date violated 18 U.S. C. §§ 2518 
(1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a). With respect to Merlo and 
Lauer, who were not known to the Government until after 
the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed 
all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground 
that they had not been served with inventory notice. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 
· 513 F. 2d 337 (1975).8 On the identification issue, the 
court held that the wiretap application must identify every 
person whose conversations relating to the subject criminal 
activity the Government has probable cause to believe it 
will intercept. Agreeing with the District Court that at the 
time of the December 26 application the Government had 
7 Although respondents Merlo and Lauer were not served with inven-
·tory notice pursuant to § 2518 (8) (d), the intercept orders, applications, 
and related papers were made availn ble to all the defendants, including 
Merlo and Lauer, on November 26, 1973. Thus, the introduction into 
evidence ftt trial of the contents of the intercepted conversations and 
evidence derived therefrom would not be prohibited by 18 U. S. C. § 251J 
(9). ·-Been. 19, i9ef9~ 
8 The Government filed its appeal from the District Court's order sup-
pressing evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 3731, and there has ~beeri} 
no trial on the charges with respect to the respondents. ...J 
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probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan, 
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from 
the December 26 order. On the notice question, it held 
that the Govern~ has an implied statutory duty to in-
form the issuing judge of the identities of the parties whose 
conversations were overheard so that he can determine 
whether discretionary inventory notice should be required.9 
Because the Government had failed to perform this duty 
with respect to Merlo and· Lauer, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidence 
derived from both intercept orders. The court found it un-
necessary to determine whether the failure to identify re-
pondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 
2B application and to name respondents Merlo and Lauer 
in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or 
purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to 
require suppression under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10)(a).m 
We granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which concern 
the construction of a major federal statute, 421 U. S. 907, 
and now reverse. 
II 
The United' States contends that § 2518 (1)(b)(iv) re-
quires that a wiretap application identify only the principal 
9 Seen. 6, supra. 
-ro 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) provides in pertinent part: 
"(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding 
in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or 
other authority of the United Sta.tes, a State, or a, political subdivision 
thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or 
oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that-
" (i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was inter-
cepted is insufficient on its face; or 
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of 
,authorization or approval." 
) re.t:+:oN' foV"' 
c.t.~t. ~ '.ed J NOl· 
7~-lf/3.) ,,_,,,j 
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target of the interception, and that § 2518 (8) (d) does not 
require the Government to provide the issuing judge with 
a list of all identifiable persons who were overheard in the 
course of an authorized interception. We think neither con-
tention is sound. 
A 
We turn first to the identification requirements of § 2518 
(1)(b)(iv). That provision requires a wiretap application 
to specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing 
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." 
In construing that language, this Court already has ruled 
that the Government is not rrquired· to identify an individual 
in the application unless it has probable cause to believe 
(i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity 
under investigation and (ii) that the individual's conversa-
tions will be intercepted over the target telephone. United 
~tates v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 ( 1974). The question at issue IJ 7 
here is whether the Government is required to name -a:;;l ~ :0 · 
such individuals.11 -
The United States argues that the most reasonable in- I 
11 Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issueJ\?onrluded ~\ j;,~ 
an individual whose conversations probably will be intercepted by a wire-
tap must be identified in the wiretap application if the law enforcement 
authorities have probable cause to believe the individual is committing 
the offense for which the wiretap is sought. United States v. Chiarizio, 
525 F. 2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975); United States v. Bernstein, 509 F. 2d 
996 (CA4 1975), petition for cert. filed, No. 74-1486; United States v. 
Doolittle, .507 F. 2d 1368, aff'd en bane, 518 F. 2d 500 (CA5 1975), 
petitions for cert. filed Nos. 75-500, 75-509, 75-513; &Jtibtei 8tatervo-
Kil611~; 81 S F :ld. 4Q9 (G 6 8 1 07S), F8ti~i6ll fm ceJ t. filed , No . 7:3-!1tl~ 
nited States v. Civella, 533 F. 2d 1395 (CAS 1976) '"""'h1itQ!il ~tgtg~ 11 "D 
,. . United States v. Russo, 527 F. 2d 
1150, 1156 (CAIO 1975), petition for cert. filed, No. 75-1218. See also 
United States v. Moore, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 513 F. 2d 485, 493-
494 (1975) (interpreting 23 D. C. Code 547 (a) (2), which is almost 
identical to the provision at issue here). 
A number of these courts have concluded, and respondents Donovan, 
Robbins, and Buzzaco argue, that our decision in United States v. Kahn, 
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terpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the 
application must identify only the principal target of the 
investigation, who "will almost always be the individual 
whose phone is monitored~ Brief for the United States, 
at 18. Under this interpretation, if the Government has 
reason to believe that an individual will use the target 
telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government 
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged 
ih the criminal activity under investigation, the individual 
qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the 
wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who 
uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls 
from the target telephone is not a principal ta.rget even if 
the Government ha.s probable cause to believe that the 
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under inves-
tiga.tion. In other words, whether one is a principal target 
of the investigation depends on whether one operates the 
target telephone to place or receive calls.13 
415 U. S. 143 (1974), resolved this identification issue. See United States 
v. Clfoti'izio, supra; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there is 
language in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must identify all 
such individuals, the identification question presented here was not before 
us in Kahn. The question in that case was whether a wiretap applica-
tion identify a known user of the target telephone whose com-
plicity m the criminal activity under investigation was not known at 
the time of the application. Kahn is a relevant, though not controlling, 
precedent. 
12 The United States does not suggest that regardless of the factual 
circumstances a wiretap application must identify only a single individual. 
To the contrary, it concedes that if two or more persons are using the 
target telephone "equally" to commit the offense, and thus are "equally" 
targets of the investigation, "all must be named." Brief for the United 
States, at 18 n. 13. 
13 Counsel for the United States explained this position succinctly at 
oral argument: "The critical distinction ... is one between the users of 
the telephone that is being monitored on the one hand, and all other per-
sons throughout the world who may converse from unmonitored phones 
on the other hand." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 13. 
........ 
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Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we find 
little support for it in the language and structure of Title 
III or in the legislative history. The statutory language 
itself refers only to "the person , if known, committing the 
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." 
That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls 
to the target telephone as it is to a suspec.t placing calls 
from ilil: t~:tf'g~ telephone. It is true, as the United States 
suggests, that when read in the context of the other sub-
divisions of § 2518 (1) (b), an argument can be made that 
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user 
of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other 
sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap 
applications would name more than one individual. For 
example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served 
upon "the persons named in the order or the application." 
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) (emphasis added). And § 2518 
( 1) (e) requires that an intercept application disclose all 
previous intercept applications "involving any of the same 
persons ... specified in the application" (emphasis added). 
It may well be that Congress anticipa.ted that a given 
application would cover more than one telephone or that 
several suspects would use one telephone, and that an appli-
cation for those reasons alone would require identification 
of more than one individuaL But nothing on the face of 
the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from 
the identification requirement those suspects whose inter-
cepted communications originated on a telephone other than 
that listed in the wiretap application.14 
14 Indeed, the contrary conclusion is suggested by the fact that iden-
tification of an individual in an application for an intercept order / / 
triggers other statutory provi~ions. First!§ 2518 (1) (e) requires an in- ) 
tercept application to disclose' all previous applications "involving any 
of the same persons ... specified in the application." To the extent 
that Congress thought it necessary to provide the issuing judge with 
S. ~~f· No. 
10,7, f/0'""'-
Co" ~. ~ e1.J 
~A44 . ) bb 
(t1,8') . 
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Nor can we find support for the "principal target" inter- /t)..-/ 
Q---p-r-et~a~t":""io.;.;;~ m e e 1s at1ve histor ~Title III originated as /.JJ 
a combmation of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception -
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several 
months prior to this Court's decision in Bergvr v. New York, 
388 U. S. 41 (1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance 
Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few 
days after the Berger decisionl Both bills required that 
wiretap applications include a full and complete stakment 
of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant 
and specification of the nature and location of the commu-
nication facilities involved. Although neither bill contain~-­
an express identification requirement such as that at issue 
here, both bills required the application to include "a full 
and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous 
applications ... involving any person named in the appli-
cation as committing, having committed, or being about to 
commit an offense." Hearings on Controlling Crime Through 
More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcommittee 
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8 (a) (3) and 
/
,. O"J-t----'liion1!).6, § 2518 (a)(4) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even 
/ at this early stage, it was recognized that an application 
could identify several individuals, and there is no indication 
that the identification would be limited to principal targets. 
~S. 971~ombincd the major provis~·ons 
of S. 675 and S. 2050/and ~eventually was enacte~ as wh.: 1~ 
pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court e 
such information, there is no indication of congressional intent to require 
provision of such information only if a suspect operated from one end 
of a telephone line. Second, § 2518 (8) (d) mandates tha.{ an mven-
' tory notice be served upon "the persons named in the order or the 
application." As with § 2518 (1) (e), the congressional purpose would 
not be served by limiting that notice on the basis of the telephone from 
which one speaks. 
:+-
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,.....-~------ fcided Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).. S. 971 was 
then redrafted to conform to Katz as well as Berger, and 
the identification provision was added at that time. The 
Senate Report states that the requirements set forth in the 
various subdivisions of § 2518 ( 1) (b), including the identifi-
cation requirement at issue here, " [were] intended to reflect the 
constitutional command of particularization." S. Rep. No. 
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), citing Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 354-356 ( 1967). The United States now contends that 
although it may be that Congress read Berger and Katz to 
- require, as a constitutional matter, that the subject of the q..---
surveillance be named if known, Congress ~uld hardly / 
1~/ h1ikav1e retadbthose chasesd~{~ingB ~hfe n.am2i5ng26of ::til par~i :s / / e y o e over ear . ne , at - . -
M ll1.lFV9illtHl.Ci , OF tblilt QQJ:l~fQilll Q9}:.}!li~9F9S 118HBjeets" vf tr 
Stlt oeiHa:nee ta l3e t.bs f.lFi}:.}siplill ' liiQri of tho tlilr~ot t9l9ph.eR~ 
~{are_ave~to the extent that Congress thought i.t was 
meeting the constitutional commands of particularization es-
-tablished in Berger and Katz, Congress may have read those 
cases as mandating a broad identification req~irement. The 
statute that we confronted in Berger required identification . 
15 At the time of the enactment of Title III, Congress did not 
have before it the view we expressed on thi. issue in United States 
v. Kahn, 415 U. S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment requires 
specification of "the place to be sec'tched, and the persons or things to 
be seized." In the wiretap context, those requirements are satisfied 
by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular 
conversations to be seized, It is not a constitutional requirement that 
all those likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations 
):>e named. Specification of this sort "identiffies] t.he person whose con-
. stitutionally protected area is to be invaded rather than 'particularly 
describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions t.o be seized." 
~1Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967). 
I 
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of "the person or persons" whose communications were to 
be overheard. 388 U. S., at 59. And we expressly noted 
that that provision " [did] no more than identify the person 
whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded .... ': ~ 
!bid. Given the statute at issue in Berger and our commen"V" 
t----...;;;u;£;p..:.;on it, Congress may have concluded that as 9s QQ~ititY 2r 
/-t-v-/ 
a:ll suspects rather than just the primary user.16 
In any event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary 
to speculate as to exactly how Congress interpreted Berger 
and Katz with respect to the identification issue. It is suf-
ficient to note that in response to those decisions Congress 
·included an identification requirement which on its face draws 
no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and the 
United States points to no evidence in the legislative history 
that supports such a distinction. Indeed, the legislative ma-
terials apparently contain no use of the term "principal tar-
get" or any discussion of a different treatment based on the 
telephone from which a suspect speaks.17 We therefore con-
clude that a wiretap application must name an individual 
if the Government has probable cause to believe that the 
16 That Congress may have so understood the constitutional require-
ment is also suggested by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with 
that provision of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify 
. "the person, if known, whose conversations are to be intercepted." The 
Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894), which 
concerns the need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest 
warrant. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968). To the 
extent that Congress may have considered West to apply to wiretap 
orders, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its appli-
cability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone. 
17 At least one Senator read the identification requirement in S. 971 to 
parallel the identityltfion requirement contained in the statute at issue 
in Berger v. New York: "Specificity is required as to the person or 
persons whose communications are to be intercepted." 114 Cong. Rec., 
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individual is engaged in the criminal activity under inves-
tigation and expects to intercept the individual's conversa-
:tions over the target telephone. 
'The other statutory prov!ion at issue in this ca.e i~ 
\1.8 U. S. C. § 2518 (8)(d), which provides that the judge 
shall cause to be served on the persons named in the order 
or application an inventory, which must give notice of the 
entry of the order or application, state the disposition of 
the application, and indicate whether communications were 1c 
1 intercepted.18 Although the statute mandates tl:J.e pron:isioJl :r-~ / 
1Yj of tha.h, inventory notice only persons named in the appli- f'oY" 
) cation or the order, the statute also ))".rovides that the judge 
of" de""' maY}..J3Pe"Vid~ similar notice to other parties to intercepted 
communications if he concludes that such action is in the 
interest of justice.10 Observing that this notice provision 
does not expressly require law enforcement authorities 
routinely to ~Yid~the judge with a.a{SpeCifiC mformation 
upon which to exercise his discretion , the United States con-
t ends that it would be inappropriate to read such a require-
These notice and return provisions satisfy constitutional 
~e4ait~ requirements . 
l ~s- J~-6 .~ r1 . t l. ) 
347 ,(~,_ 1967); Berger 
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
v. Ne:?J York, 388 U.S . 41, 60 -
/ 
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ment into the statute since the judge has the option of 
asking the law enforcement authorities for whatever infor-
mation he requires. 
Our reading of the legislative history of the discretionary 
notice provision in light of the purposes of Title III leads 
us to reject the Government's interpretation. As reported 
from the Judiciary Committee, section 2518 (8) (d) contained 
only a provision mandating notice to the persons named in 
the application or the order; the discretionary notice provi-
sion was added by amendment on the floor of the Senate~ 
In introducing that amendment, Senator Hart explained its 
purpose: 
"The amendment would give the judge who issued the 
order discretion to require notice to be served on other 
parties to intercepted conversations, even though such 
parties are not specifically named in the court order. 
The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice 
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of any 
surveillance statute. It may be that the required no-
tice must be served on all parties to intercepted com-
munications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may 
make such notice to all parties undesirable, the amend-
ment leaves the final determination to the judge." 114 
Cong. Rec. 14485-14486 (1968).20 
20 It is worth noting that shortly before Senator Hart proposed this 
amendment to S. 971, Senator Long had r&'ld to the Sena.te portions 
. of a report prcparrd by the Association of the Bar of the Cit of 
New York on federal wiretap legislation. That report t at parties 
to intercepted conversations other than those named in the application 
or order @iciili!lprooa bl~e served with inventory notice, but it also rec-
, ognized that under some circumstances the provision of such notice 
· could be harmful and gave the following example: 
"A, a businessman, talks to his customers, and the latter are served 
with papers showing that A is being bugged[.] LT]he damage to con-
' fidence in A and to A's reputation in general may damage A unjustly. 
In this case it would seem that the customers should not be served with 
, the ·inventory." 114 Cong. Rec. 14476 (1968). 
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Jln deciding whether legitimate privacy interests justify with-
holding inventory notice from parties to intercepted conversa- 1 
tions, a judge is likely to require information and assistance 
beyond that contained in the application papers and the 
recordings of intercepted conversations made available by 
law enforcement authorities. No purpose is sPrved by hold-
ing that those authorities have no routine duty to supply 
the judge with revelant information. "The Court of Appeals· ~ 
for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted this problem· o~ 
· dual responsibility, and we adopt the balanced construction 
that court placed on § 2518 (8) (d): 
t'To ·discharge this obligation the judicial officer must 
have, at a minimum, knowledge of the particular cate.., 
gories· into which fall all the individuals whose conver .. 
sations have been intercepted. Thus, while precise iden· 
tification of each party to an intercepted conversation 
is not required , a description of the general class, or 
classes, which they comprise is essential to enable the 
judge to determine whether additional information is 
necessary for a proper evaluation of the interests of the 
various parties. Furthermore, although the judicial offi-
cer has the duty to cause the filing of the inventory 
[notice], it is abundantly clear that the prosecution has 
greater access to and familiarity with the intercepted 
communications. Therefore we feel justified in imposing 
upon the latter the duty to classify all those whose 
conversations have been intercPpted, and to transmit 
this information to the judge. Should the judge desire 
more information regarding these classes in order to 
exercise his statutory ~ 2518 (8) (d) discretion .... the 
government is also required to furnish such information 
as is available to it." United State; v .. Chun, 503 F. 
2d 533, 540 (1974).21 
21 The current policy of the Department of .Justice is to provide 
the issuing judge with the name of every person who has been over-
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We agree with the Ninth Circuit that this allocation of ~ 
responsibility best serves the purposes of Title III.22 ~ 
III 
We turn now to the question whether the District Court 
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at 
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement 
authorit~ to comply fully with the provisions of §§ 2518 (1) 
(b)(iv) and 2518 (8)(d). Section 2515 expressly prohibits 
the use at trial, and at certain other proceedings, of the 
contents of any intercepted wire c~munication or any evi- //::)/ 
dence derived therefrom "if the dis1closure of that informa- './ 
tion would be in violation of this chapter." The circum-
·stances that trigger suppression under § 2515 are in turn 
enumerated in § 2518 (10) (a): 
"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
" ( ii) the order of authorization or approval under 
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or 
" (iii) the interception was not made in conformity 
with the order of authoriza.tion or approval" 
There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that 
heard as to whom there is any reasonable possibility of indictment. 
Brief for the United States, at 39. This policy does not meet the test 
specified above. Moreover, where, as here, the GO\·ernment chooses to 
supply the issuing judge with a list of all identifiable per ons rather 
than a description of the classes into which those persons fall, the list . 
must be complete. 1 'I 
J"22At oral argument, cotmsel for the United States :ruae!ietdl' e*eel'l:e~7rec.09tflqe.d 
~e merit of the approach specified in United States v. Chun: O d 
''Perhaps the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circui~ 
which suggested that rather than submitting specific names we should 
submit categories of persons who had been overheard, is a better 
policy, would be morr helpful to the district court in exercising its 
discretion, and we would have no objection to following any reason-
able policy that the district courts determine would be useful to them 
in this regard." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 6-7. 
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the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the 
interception was not conducted in conformity with the orders. 
Thus, only § 2518 (10) (a) (i) is relevant: were the communi-
cations "unlawfully intercepted" given the violations of ?/ 
§§ 2518 (1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (8)(d) 23 
Resolution of that question must begin with United State~ 
v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v. 
"·Chavez, 416 U. S. 562 (1974). Those cases hold that "[not] 
· every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided 
in Title III would render the interception of wire or oral 
communications 'unlawful.' " United States v. Chavez, 416 
U. S., at 574- 575. To the contrary, suppression is required 
only for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory require-
ments that directly and substantially implement the con-
~ gressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures 
to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this 
extraordinary device." United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S., 
at 527. 
Giordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring 
that an application for an intercept order be approved by 
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General spe-
cially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding that 
!, tJ..'/ . Congress intended to condition the usc of wiretap procedures /j ~on the judgment of senior officials In the Department 
of Justice, the Court required suppression for failure to com-
ply with the approval provision. Chavez concerned the stat-
utory requirement that the application for an intercept order 
specify the identity of the official authorizing the applica-
tion. The problem in Chavez was one of misidentification; 
although the application had in fact been authorized by the 
Attorney General, the application erroneously identified an 
remedy for thE'se statutory, 
\.-------;a;-;:s-;::op::p~o:::::ser7:to~c~on~s:;;ti:;:-:t u-:t'i:lo::n~al~, '7v:fio:-i'la:';t'fio::n::=;:s,~se:;;e-=; 15 and 19, supra, turns 
n rl. on the provisions of Title III rather than the judicially fashioned ex-
clusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment 
' rights. United States v. Giordano, supra, 416 U. S., at 524. 
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Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the 
application. The Court concluded that mere misidentifica-
tion of the official authorizing the application did not make 
the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518 (10) 
(a) (i} since that identification requirement did not play a 
"substantive role?.' · in the regulatory system. 416 U. S., /:; / 
at '578. v 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both 
the ide.ntificati~n . requirement of § 2518 (1)(b)(iv) and ~ 
the notice reqmrement of § 25h5 (8)(d) played a "centra~ 
role" in the statutory framework, and for that reason af-
fi'rrhed the District Court's·· order suppressing relevant 
evidence. Although both statutory requirements are un-
doubtedly important, we do · not think that the failure to 
comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an in-
tercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory 
requirements. 
A 
As· to § 2518 (1) (b)(iv) , the issue is whether the identifi-
cation in an intercept application of all those likely to be 4t/ 
overheard in incriminating conversations plays a tsubstan- ( "Y 
I 
"'/ tive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept 
J! orders and ~onsequently 191e£~ a limitation on the use 
· of intercept procedures. The statue provides that the issu-
ing judge may approve an intercept application if he deter-
mines that normal investigative techniques have failed or 
are unlikely to succeed and there is probable cause to believe 
that: (i) an individual is engaged in criminal activity, 
(ii) particular communications concerning the offense will 
be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facili-
ties are being used in connection with the specified criminal 
activity. That determination is based on the "full and com-
plete statement" of relevant facts supplied by law enforce-
ment authorities. If, after evaluating the statutorily 
enumerated factors in light of the information contained in 
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the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order 
:should issue, the failure to identify additional persons who 
are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conver-
sations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial 
authorization. The intercept order may issue only if the 
issuing judge determines that the statutory factors are pres-
ent, and the failure to name additional targets in no way 
detracts from the sufficiency of those factors. ___..,-
This case is 1ifleref6P'"-unlike Giordano, where failure to 
satisfy the statutory requirement of prior approval by speci-
fied Justice Department officials bypassed a congressiona~ 
imposed limitation on the use of the intercept procedure. 
The Court there noted that it was reasonable to believe 
that requiring prior approval from senior officials in the 
Justice Department "would inevitably foreclose resort to 
wiretapping in various situations where investigative person-
nel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court 
and the court would very likely authorize its use." 416 U. S., 
at 528. Here, however, the statutorily imposed preconditions 
to judicial authorization were satisfied, and the issuing judge 
was simply unaware that additional persons might be over-
heard engaging in incriminating conversations. In no mean-
ingful sense can it be said that the presence of that infor-
. mation as to additional targets would have precluded judicial 
authorization of the intercept.24 Rather, this case resembles 
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful sim-
24 There is no suggestion in this case that the Government ngents 
knowingly failed to identify re::.pondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
for the purpose of keeping relevant information from the District Court 
that might have prompted the court to conclude that probable cause 
was lacking. If such a showing lmd been made, we would have a 
different case. Nor is there any suggestion that as a result of the 
failure to name these three respondents they were denied the mandatory 
mventory notice supplied to persons named in the applicntion. 18 
U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d). Respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
were among the 37 persons served with the intial inventory. 
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ply because the issuing judge was incorrectly informed as 
to which designated official had authorized the application. 
The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Justice Depart-
ment had performed its task of prior approval, and the 
instant intercept is lawful because the application providyd 
sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to deter-
mine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied.25 
Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative history 
suggests that Congress intended this broad identification re-
quirement to play "a central, or even functional , role in 
guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic 
surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S., at 578. 
Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971, 
contained an identification provision. See p. 11, supra. The 
only explanation given in the Senate Report for the in-
25 No one suggests that the failure to identify in a wiretap application 
individuals who a,re "unknown" within the meaning of the statute, see 
X:flhn ~United tates 415 U. S. 143 (1974), requires suppression o~ 
intercepted conversations to which those individuals were parties. Though 
recognizing that the failure to identify such an "unknown" individua 
does not make unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents 
·Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest that the opposite is true 
with respect to thE' failure to identify in a wiretap application indi-
viduals who are "known" within the meaning of the statute. Counsel 
for these respondents suggested at oral argument that this difference 
in result is justifiE'd by analogy to warrantless searches or arrests. Tr. 
of Oral Arg., at 40. Although law enforcemE'nt officials can often take 
.action without a warrant when they have been unable to foresee the 
circumstances that eventually confronted them, they still must obtain a 
§C_ECh or arrest warrant when their prior knowledge is sufficient to 
establish probable causeJ) The major flaw in that reasoning is that t IS 
case does not concern war~antless action. Here, the omission on the part 
of law enforcement authorities was not a failure to seek prior judicial 
authorization, but a failure to identify every individual who could be 
expected to be overheard engaging in incriminating com·ersations. That 
the complete absence of prior judicial authorization would make an in-
tercept unlawful has no bearing on the lawfulness of an intercept order 
that fails to identify every target. 
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elusion of the broad identification provision was that it was 
intended to reflect what Congress perceived to be the con-
stitutional command of particularization. This explanation 
was offered with respect to all the information required by 
~ 2518 (1)(6) to be set out in an intercept application. No 
additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor debates, 
since they contain no substantive discussion of the identifi/ 
cation provision,26 
:a 
We reach the saine conclusion with respect to the Gov-
ernment's duty to inform the judge of all identifiable persons 
whose conversations were intercepted. As noted earlier, the 
version of Title III that emerged from the Senate Judiciary 
Committee provided only for mandatory notice to the "per-
~ons named in the order h the application." The Senate 
Report detailed the purpose of that provision: 
"[T] he intent of the provision is that the principle 
of postuse notice will be retained. This provision alone 
should insure the community that the techniques are 
reasonably employed. Through its operation all author-
ized interceptions must eventually become known at least 
2a Even if we assume that Congress thought that a broad idcntificationv 
t,equirernf\9£ was constitutionally mandated, it does not follow that 
Congress imposed statutory suppression under §§ 2515 and 2518 ( 10) (a 
(i) as a sanction for noncompliance. In limiting use of the intNcept pro-
c;,edure to "the most precise and discriminate circumstances," S. Rep. No. 
107, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968), Congress required law enforcement 
~uthorities to convince a District Court that probable cause existed to 
believe that a specific person was committing a specific offense using a 
Jpecific telephone. This requirement was satisfied here when the applica-
tion set forth sufficient information to indicate that the primary targets 
were conducting a gambling business over four particular telephones. 
:tj othing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to 
declare an otherwise constitutional intercept order "unlawful" under 
§ 2518 (10) (a) (i)-resulting in suppression under § 2515-for failure to 
name additional targets. 
' ' 
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to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil re-
dress, for example, under section 2520 . . . if he feels 
I ~~----~th;;a;:.;t:...:his privacy has been unlawfully invaded." S. Rep. /() 1?( No. ~90th Cong., 2d Sess.,, 105 (1968). 
The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding the 
provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent 
to provide notice to such additional persons as may be 
constitutionally required. 
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative ,... 
history suggests that incriminating conversations are "unla~ 
fully intercepted" whenever parties to those conversations 
do not receive discretionary inventory notice as a result of 
the Government's failure to inform the District Court of their 
identities. At the time inventory notice was served on the 
other identifiable persons, the intercept had been completed 
and the conversations had been "seized" under a valid in-
tercept order. The fact that discretionary notice reached 
39 rather than 41 identifiable persons does not in itself mean 
that the conversations were unlawfully intercepted.27 
The legislative history indicates that postintercept notice 
was designed instead to assure the community that the 
wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recog-
27 Counsel for respondents Merlo and Lauer conceded at oral argument 
that the failure to name those respondents in the proposed inventory 
order was not intentional,}and we are therefore not called upon to deci .e 
whether suppression woufcl be an available remedy if the Government 
knowingly sought to prevent the District Court from serving inventory 
notice on particular parties. Nor does this case present an opportunity to 
comment upon the suggestion, recognized by the United States, Brief, at 
49 n. 40, that suppression might be required if the agents knew before 
the interception that no inventory would be served. ....., 
Moreover, respondents Merlo and Lauer were not prejudiced by their 
failure to receive postintercept notice under either of the District Court's 
inventory orders. As noted earlier, the Government made available to 
all defendants the intercept orders, applications, and related papers. See / 
n. ~~ supra. And in response to pretrial discovery motions, the Govern-
ment produced transcripts of the intercepted conversations. 
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nizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that 
aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that 
postintercept notice was intended to serve as an independent 
Festraint on resort to the wiretap procedure.~ 
IV 
Although the Government was required to identify respond-
ents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 26 
application for an extension of the initial intercept, failure ~ 
to do so in the circumstances here presented did not warrant 
suppression under § 2518 (10)(a) (i). Nor was suppression 
justified with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply 
because the Government inadvertently omitted their names 
from the comprehensive list of all identifiable persons whose 
conversations had been overheard. We hold that this is the 
correct result under the provisions of Title III, but we re-
emphasize the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez, 
that "strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of 
Title III would nonetheless be more in keE'ping with the 
responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when au-
thority to engage in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is 
sought." 416 U. S., at 580. 
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case 
is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accord 
with this opinion. 
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This case presents issues concerning the construction of 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520. Specifically, we must 
decide whether 18 U.S. C.§ 2518 (1)(b)(iv), which requires 
the Government to include in its wiretap applications "the 
identity of the person, if known, committing the offense, 
and whose convers~tions are to be intercepted," is satisfied 
when the Government identifies only the "principal targets" 
of the intercept. Second, we must decide whether the Gov-
ernment has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing 
judge of the identities of pers0)1S whose conversations were 
overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling 
him to decide whether they should be served with notice of 
the interception pursu~tnt to 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) . 
And finally, we must determine whether failure to comply 
fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of 
evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) . 
I 
On November 28, 1972, a special agent of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation applied to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order 
authorizing a wiretap interception in accordance with Title 
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IIP The application requested authorization to iutercept 
gambling-related communications over two telephones at one 
address in North Olmstead, Ohio, and two other telephones 
1 The wiretap application procedure is s~>t forth at 18 U. S. C. § 2518 
(1), which provides: 
"(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approvmg the inter-
ception of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon 
oath or affirmation to a judge of competent junsdiction and shall state 
the applicant's authority to make such application. Each application 
shall include the following information: 
"(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making 
the applicat,ion, and the officer authorizing the application ; 
"(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied 
upon by the a.pplicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued, 
including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or 
is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and 
location of the facilities from which or the place where the communica-
tion is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular descripton of the type of 
communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, 
if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be 
intercepted; 
" (c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investi-
gative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably 
appear to be unlikely to succeed 1f tried or to be too dangerous; 
'' (d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is: 
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation IS such 
that the authorization for interception should not automatically termi-
nate when the described type of communication has been first obtained ,. 
a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that 
additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter, 
"(e) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all prevwu:;;· 
:,tpplications known to the individual authorizing and making the appli-
cation, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for approval 
of interceptions of, wir~> or oral communicat10m; ·inv<llving any of the. 
same persons, facilities or places specified in the application , and the· 
action taken by the judge on each such application; and 
"(f) where the application is fQr the extension of an order, a statement 
setting forth the results thus far obtamed from the interception, or a 
reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain :such results ." 
The issuing judge is free to require the apphcant to furnish additional 
information 18 U S. (' § 25JR (2) , 
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at a home in Canton, Ohio. The accompanying affidavit 
recited that the telephones were being used by Albert Kotoch, 
Joseph Spaganlo, and George Florea to conduct an illegal 
gambling business, and that in conducting that business they 
would place calls to and receive calls from various persons, 
three of whom were also named in the wiretap application.2 
The affiant also stated that the Government's informants 
would refuse to testify against the persons named in the appli-
cation, that telephone records alone would be insufficient to 
support a gambling conviction, and that normal investiga-
tive techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to 
the Government's request, the District Court authorized for 
a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related 
wire communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, three 
named individuals other than the respondents, and "others 
as yet unknown," to and from the four listed . telephones.8 
2 The affidavit set forth extensive information indicating that the named 
individuals were conducting a gambling operation. This information was 
derived from physical :,urveillance by agents of the FBI, an examination 
of telephone company toll records, and the personal observations of six 
informants, whose past reliability also was detailed in the affidavit . 
8 The District Court's order was issued pursuant 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 
(3), (4) which provide in pertinent pa.rt: 
"(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, 
as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire 
or oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court 
in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the 
facts submitted by the applicant that-
" (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, 
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in 
section 2516 of this chapter ; 
"(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications 
.concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception ; 
"(c) normal investigative procPdures have been tried and have failed 
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous ; 
"(d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, 
<Or the place where, the wire or oral communicatiOns are to be intercepted 
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During the course of the wiretap, the Government 1earnecf 
that respondents Donova-n, Robbins, and Buzzaco were dis-
cussing illegal gambling a.ctivities with the named subjects. 
On December 26, 1972, the Government applied for an 
extension of the initial interc~pt order.4 This time it sought 
authorization to intercept gambling"rel~ted conversations of 
Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, two other n~ed individu~ls, and 
uothers as yet unknown," but it did not identify respondents 
are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commis-
sion of such offense, or are lea.~~ed to, listed in the name of, or commonly 
used by such person. 
" ( 4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire 
or oral communication shall specify-
" (a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are 
to be intercepted ; 
"(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to 
which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted; 
" (c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to 
be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it 
relates; 
"(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communi-
cations, and of the person authorizing the application; and 
"(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized, 
including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall auto-
matically terminate when the deswbed communication has been first 
obtained." 
4 In addition to the Decemuer 26 application requ{'l)ting an extension 
of the initial intercept order, the Government also filed on that date a 
separate application ~:>eeking authorization to monitor a third telephone 
discovered at the same North Olmstead address. Both applications were 
accompanied by another affidavit ~:>etting forth the results of the imtial 
monitoring, the manner in which the third phone was discovered, the 
facts indiCating that the newly discovered telephone was being used to 
conduct a gambling business, and reasons why continued interception was 
necessary. A copy of the affidavit filed on November 28 was also 
attached to the December 26 applications. For the sake of clarity, th~ 
two applications filrd on Drcember .2Q will be treated as a sing!~ 
~ppl~cat~Qn. 
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Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins in this second application.~ 
The District Court again authorized interception of gambling. 
related conversations for a maximum of 15 days. 
On February 21, 1973, the Government submitted to the 
District Court a proposed order giving notice of the inter-
ceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Government ap-
parently thought included all individuals who could be iden-
tified as having discussed gambling over the monitored 
telephones.6 The District Court signed the proposed order, 
and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons, 
including respondents Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins. On 
September 11, 1973, after the Government submitted the 
names of two additional persons whose identities allegedly had 
been omitted inadvertently from the initial list, the District 
Court entered an amended order giving notice to those 
individuals. As a result of what the Government labels 
"administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer 
6 The United States conceded in the Court of Appeals that respond-
ents Donovan and Robbins were "known" within the meannig of the 
statute at the time of the December 26 application, but challenged m; 
clearly erroneous the District Court's finding that respondent Buzzaco was 
"known" at that time. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's 
finding, and the United States has not sought. review of that disposition. 
Thus, for our purposes, all three rel:lpondents were "known" on Decem-
ber 26. 
6 An inventory notice must be served within a designated period of 
time upon "the persons named in the ordt>r or the application" 18 
U. S. C. § 2518 (8){ d) . Tht> Inventory must give notice of the ent.ry of 
the intercept order or application, state the disposition of the application, 
and indicate whether communicatiOns were or were not intercepted. Ibid . 
Upon the filing of a motion, the judgt> has diScretiOn to make available 
the intercepted communications, the applications , and the orders. Ibid. 
Title III also authonzes the District Court to cause an mventory no-
tice to be servt>d on "other parties to intercepted communications" if the 
judge determines that such notice i!; m the interest of justice. Ibid. 
Those other parties may also be gtven access to the mtercepted commu-
llications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid. • 
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were not included in either list of names and were never 
served with inventory notice.7 
On November 1, 1973, an indictment was returned in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents, and 
10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conduct-
ing a gambling business in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371 
and 1955. The five respondents filed motions to suppress 
evidence derived from the wire interception. After an evi-
dentiary hearing on the motions, the District Court sup-
pressed as to respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
all evidence derived from the December 26 intercept order 
on the ground that fa.ilure to identify them by name in the 
application and order of that date violated 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 
(l)(b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a). With respect to Merlo and 
Lauer, who were not known to the Government until after 
the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed 
all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground 
that they had not been served with inventory notice. 
The Court of Appea.ls for the Sixth Circuit a.ffirmed. 
513 F. 2d 337 (1975).8 On the identification issue, the 
court held that the wiretap application must identify every 
person whose conversations relating to the subject criminal 
activity the Government has probable cause to believe it 
will intercept. Agreeing with the District Court that at the 
time of the December 26 application the Government had 
7 Although respondents Merlo and Lauer were not served with inven-
tory notice pursuant. to § 2518 (8) (d), the intercept orders, applications, 
and related papers were made available to all the defendants, including 
Merlo and Lauer, on November 26, 1973. Thus, the introduction into 
evidence at trw! of the contents of the mtercepted conversations and 
evidence denved therefrom would not. he prohibited by 18 U. S. C. 
§2518 (9) . . 
s The GovernmE>nt filed its appe,al from the District Court's order sup-
pressing evidencr under lH U. S. C. § 3731, and there has bern no trial 
Qn t.he <'har~es with respect to t h~-1 roopond.ents, 
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probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan, 
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from 
the December 26 order. On the notice question, it held 
that the Government has an implied statutory duty to in-
form the issuing judge of the identities of the parties whose 
conversations were overheard so that he can determine 
whether discretionary inventory notice should be required.9 
Because the Government had failed to perform this duty 
with respect to Merlo and Lauer, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidence 
derived from both intercept orders. The court found it un-
necessary to determine whether the failure to identify re-
pondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 
26 application and to name respondents Merlo and Lauer 
in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or 
purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to 
require suppression under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a).11> 
We granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which concern 
the construction of a major federal statute1 421 U. S. 907, 
and now reverse. 
II 
The United States contends that § 2518 (1)(b)(iv) re-
quires that a wiretap application identify only the principal 
11 Seen. 6, supra. 
1o 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) provides in pertinent part : 
"(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding 
in. or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or 
other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision 
thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or 
oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that-
"(i) t.he communicatiOn was unlawfully intercepted; 
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was inter-
cepted is insufficient on its face ; or 
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of 
authorization or approval.." 
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target of the interception, and that § 2518 (8) (d) does not 
require the Government to 'provide the issuing judge with 
a list of all identifiable persons who were overheard in the 
course of an authorized interception. We think neither con-
tention is sound. 
A 
We turn first to the identification requirements of § 2518 
(l)(b)(iv) . . That provision requires a wiretap application 
to specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing 
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." 
In construing that language, this Court already has ruled 
that the Government is not required to identify an individu{tl 
in the application unless it has probable cause to believe 
(i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity 
under investigation and (ii) that the individual's conversa-
tions will be intercepted over the target telephone. United 
States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974). The question at issue 
here is whether the Government is required to name all 
such individuals.11 
The United States argues that the most reasonable m-
11 Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has concluded 
tl1at an individual whose conversations probably will be intercepted by a 
wiretap must be identified in the wiretap application if the law enforce-
ment authorities have probable cause to believe the individual is commit-
ting the offense for which the wiretap is sought. United States v. 
Chianzio, 525 F. 2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975); United States v. Bernstein, 
509 F. 2d 996 (CA4 1975), petition for cert. nled, No. 74-1486; United 
States v. Doolittle, 507 F . 2d 1368, aff'd en bane, 518 F. 2d 500 (CA5 
1975), petitions for cert. liled Nos. 75-500, 75-509, 75-513; United States 
v. Civella, 533 F . 2d 1395 (CA8 197o), petitions for cert. filed, Nos. 
· 75-1813, 76-169; United States v. Russo, 527 F . 2d 1150, 1156 (CAlO 
1975), petition for cert. filed , No. 75-1218. See also United States v. 
Moore, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 513 F. 2d 485, 493-494 (1975) (inter-. 
preting 23 D. C. Code 547 (a) (2), wh1ch is almost identical to the provi-
sion at issue here) . 
A number of these courts have concluded, and respondents Donovan, 
Rol;!bins, and Buzzaco argue, that ·oQr gecisio~ in United States v. Kahn~ 
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terpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the 
application must identify only the principal target of the 
investigation, who "will almost always be the individual 
whose phone is monitored~2 Brief for the United States, 
at 18. Under this interpr~tation, if the Government has 
reason to believe that an individual will use the target 
telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government 
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged 
in the criminal activity under investigation, the individual 
qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the 
wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who 
uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls 
from the target telephone is not a principal target even if 
the Government has probable cause to believe that the 
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under inves-
tigation. In other words, whether one is a principal target 
of the investigation depends on whether one operates the 
target telephone to place or receive calls.13 
415 U. S. 143 (1974), resolved this identification issue. See United States 
v. Chiarizio, supra; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there is 
language in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must identify all 
such individuals, the identification question presented here was not before 
us in Kahn. The question in that case was whether a wiretap applica-
tion must identify a known user of the target telephone whose com-
plicity in the criminal activity under investigation was not. known at 
the time of the application. Kahn is a r!'levant, though not controlling, 
precedent. 
12 The Unit!'d States does not suggest that regardless of the factual 
circumstances a wiretap application must identify only a single individual. 
To the contrary, it concedes that if two or more persons are using the 
target telephone "equally" to commit the o.ffense, and thus are "equally" 
targets of the investigation, ·'all must be named." Brief for the United 
.States, at 18 n. 13. 
1a Counsel for the United States explained this position succinctly at 
oral argument : "The critical distinction . . is one between the users of 
the telephone that is being monitored on the one hand, and all other per-
fSOns throughout the world who may converse from unmonitored phones: 
'Qn ~hEl other ]:land/ ' Tr. of 0"Cal Arg., nt 13. 
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Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we find 
little support for it in the language and structure of Title 
III or in the legislative history. The statutory language 
itself refers only to "the person, if known, committing the 
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." 
That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls 
to the target telephone as it is to a suspect placing calls 
from that telephone. It is true, as the United States sug-
gests, that when read in the context of the other sub-
divisions of § 2518 ( 1) (b), an argument can be made that 
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user 
of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other 
sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap 
applications would name more than one individual. For 
example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served 
upon "the persons named in the order or the applicatioil." 
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) (emphasis added). And § 2518 
( 1 )(e) requires that an intercept application disclose all 
previous intercept applications "involving any of the same 
persons ... specified in the application" (emphasis added). 
It may well be that Congress anticipated that a given 
application would cover more than one telephone or that 
several suspects would use one telephone, and that an appli-
cation for those reasons alone would require identification 
of more than one individual. But nothing on the face of 
the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from 
the identification requirement those suspects whose inter-
cepted communications originated on a telephone other than 
that listed in the wiretap application.14 
H Indeed, the contrary conclusion is suggested by the fact that iden-
tification of an individual in an application for an intercept order 
triggrrs other statutory provisions. First, § 2518 (1) (e) requires an in-
tercept application to disclose all previous applications "involving any 
of the same persons ... specified in the application ." To the extent 
that Congress thou~ht it necessary to provide the issuing jndge with 
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Nor can we find support in the legislative history for the 
"principal target" interpretation. Title III originated as 
a combination of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception 
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several 
months prior to this Court's decision in Berg:;r v. New York, 
388 U. S. 41 ( 1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance 
Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few 
days after the Berger decision. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 
2d Sess., 66 (1968). Both bills required that wiretap ap .. 
plications include a full and complete statement of the 
facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant and 
specification of the nature and location of the commu-
nication facilities involved. Although neither bill contained 
an express identification requirement such as that at issue 
here, both bills required the application to include "a full 
and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous 
applications ... involving any person named in the appli-
cation as committing, having committed, or being about to 
commit an offense." Hearings on Controlling Crime Through 
More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcommittee 
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8 (a) (3) and 
1006, §2518(a)(4) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even 
at this eMlY stage, it was recognized that an application 
could identify several individuals, and there is no indication 
that the identification would be limited to principal targets. 
S. 971 combined the major provisions of S. 675 1:1-11d S. 2050 
and eventually was enacted. While it was pending before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court decided Katz 
such information, there Is no indication of congressional intent to require 
provision of such information only if a suspect operated from one end 
of a telephone line. Second, § 2518 (8) (d) mandates that an inven-
tory notice be served upon "the persons named in the order or the 
application." As with §2518 (l)(e) , the congressional purpose would 
not be served by limiting that OQtice Qn the basis of the telephone from. 
wh.~ch one svea~. 
T5-%1~NfOM 
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v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). S. 971 was then 
redra-fted to confrom to Katz as well as Berger, and 
the identification provision was added at that time. The 
Senate Report states th&t the requirements set forth in the 
various subdivisions of § 2518 ( 1) (b), including the identifi-
c&tion requirement at issue here, " [were] intended to reflect the 
constitutional comm&I!d of particularization." S. Rep. No. 
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), citing Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41,58-60, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 354-356 (1967). The United States now contends that 
although it may be that Congress rea,d Berger and Katz to 
require, as a constitutional matter, that the subject of the 
surveillance be named if known, Congress would hardly 
have read those cases as requiring the naming of all parties 
likely tQ be overheard.15 Brief, at 25-26. But to the ex-
tent that Congress thought it was meeting the constitutional 
1
. ,/ 
comma-nds of particularization established J... Berger and v.-.J/ 
Katz, Congress may have read those cases as mandating 
a broad identification requirement. The stf\.tute that we 
confronted in Berger required identification of "the person 
or persons" whose communications were to be overheard. 
388 U. S., at 59. And we expressly noted that that provi-
sion "[did] no more than identify the person whose constitu~ 
tionally protected area is to be invaded .. .. . " Ibid. Given 
the statute at issue in Berger and our comment upon it, 
15 At the time of the enactment of Title III, Congress did not, 
have before it the view we expressed on this issue in United States 
v. Kahn, 41S U. S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment. requires 
specification of "the place to be seached, and the persons or things to 
be seized." In the wiretap context, those requirements are satisfied 
by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular 
conversations to be seized. It is not a constitutional requirement that 
all those likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversation~ 
be named. Specification of this sort "identif[ies] the person whose con-
stitutionally protected area is to be invaded rather than 'pa,rticularly 
describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seizeq!• 
perqer v. New York, 388 t], S. 41, 59 (1967) . 
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Congress mtty have concluded that the Constitution required 
the naming, in a wiretap application, of all suspects rather 
than just the primary user.'6 
In any event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary 
to speculate as to exactly how Congress interpreted Berger 
and Katz with respect to the identification issue. It is suf-
ficient to note that in response to those decisions Congress 
inclqded an identification requirement which on its face draws 
no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and the 
United States points to no evidence in the legislative history 
that supports such a distinction. Indeed, the legislative ma-
terials apparently contain no use of the term "principal tar-
get" or any discussion of a different treatment based on the 
telephone from which a suspect speaks.17 We therefore con-
clude that a wiretap application must name an individual 
if the Government has probable cause to believe that the 
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under inves-
tigation wd expects to intercept the individual's conversa-
tions over the target telephone. 
B 
The other statutory provision at issue in this case is 
16 Thftt Congress may have so understood the constitutionaJ require-
ment is also suggested by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with 
that provision of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify 
"the person, if known, whose conversations are to be intercepted." The 
Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 ( 1894), which 
concerns the need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest 
warrant. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968) . To the 
extent that Congress may have considered West to apply to wiretap 
orders, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its appli· 
cability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone. 
17 At least one Senator read the identification requirement in S. 971 to 
parallel the identification requirement contamed in the statute at issue 
in Berger v. New York: "Specificity is required as to the person or 
persons whose communications are to be intercepted." 114 Cong. Rec,, 
at 14763 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Percy). 
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18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8)( d), which provides that the judge 
shall cause to be served on the persons named in the order 
or applicfl,tion an inventory, which must give notice of the 
entry of the order or application, ·state the disposition of 
the application, and indicate whether communications were 
intercepted.111 Although the statute mandates inventory no-
tice only for persons named in the application or the order, 
the statute also provides that the judge may order similar 
notice to other parties to intercepted communications if he 
concludes that such action is in the interest of justice.l0 
Observing that this notice provision does not expressly re-
quire law enforcement authorities routinely to supply the 
judge with specific information upon which to exercise his 
discretion, the United States contends that it would be in-
appropriate to read such a requirement into the statute since 
the judge has the option of asking the law enforcement 
authorities for whatever information he requires. 
Our reading of the legislative history of the discretionary 
noti~e provision in light of the purposes of Title III leads 
us to reject the Government's interpretation. As reported 
from the Judiciary Committee, section 2518 (8) (d) contained 
only a provision mandating notice to the pe111ons named in 
the application or the order; the discretionary notice provi-
sion wa.s added by amendment on the floor of the Senate. 
u The inventory notice must be served within a reasonable time but 
· uot later than 90 days after the date the application for an intercept 
order was filed . On an ex parte showing of good cause, service of the 
inventory may be postponed. 
19 In addition to these provis10ns for mandatory and discretionary 
inventory notice, the Government. 1s required to supply the issuing judge 
with recordings of the intercepted conversations, which are to be sealed 
·according to his directions. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (a). These notice 
:and return provisions satisfy constitutional requirements. See Katz v. 
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 355-35(), and n. 16 (1967); Berger v. Nelt'' 
York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967) . 
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In introducing that amendment, Senator Hart explained its 
purpose: 
"The amendment would give the judge who issued the 
order discretion to require notice to be served on other 
parties to intercepted conversations, even though such 
parties are not specifically named in the court order. 
The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice 
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of any 
surveillance statute. It may be that the required no-
tice must be served on all parties to intercepted com-
munications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may 
make such notice to all parties undesirable, the amend-
ment leaves the final determination to the judge." 114 
Cong. Rec. 14485-14486 (1968).20 
Iu deciding whether legitimate privacy interests justify 
withholding inventory notice from parties to intercepted con-
versations, a judge is likely to require information and assist-
ance beyond that contained in the application papers and the 
recordings of intercepted conversations made available by 
law enforcement at.Jthorities. No purpose is served by hold-
ing that those authorities have no routine duty to supply 
the judge with revelant information. The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted this problem of 
20 It is worth noting that shortly before Senator Hart proposed this 
amendment to S. 971, Senator Long had re.ad to the Senate portions 
of a report prepared by the Allsociation of the Bar of the City of 
New York on fed!'ral wiretap legislation . That report commented that 
parties to intercepted conversations other than those named in the appli-
cation or order probably "hould be served with inventory notice, but it 
also recognized that under some circumstances the provision of such notice 
could be harmful and ga-ve the following example : 
"A, a businessman, talks to his customers, and the latter are served 
with papers showing that A is being bugged[ .] LT]he damage to con-
fidence in A and to A's reputation in general may damage A unjustly. 
In this case it would seem that the customers should not be served with 
the inventory." 114 Cong. Rec. 14476 (1968) . 
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dual responsibility, and we adopt the balanced construction 
that court placed on § 2518 (8) (d): 
"To discharge this obligation the judicial officer must 
have, at a minimum, knowledge of the particular cate-
gories into which fl'tll all the individuals whose conver-
sations have been intercepted. Thus, while precise iden· 
tification of each party to an intercepted conversation 
is not required, a description of the general class, or 
cl~ses, which they comprise is essential to enable the 
judge to determine whether adqitional information is 
necessary for a proper evaluation of the interests of the 
various parties. Furthermore, although the judicial offi-
cer has the duty to cause the filing of the inventory 
[notice], it is abundantly clear that the prosecution has 
greater access to and familiarity with the intercepted 
communications. Therefore we feel justified in imposing 
upon the latter the duty to classify all those whose 
conversations have been intercepted, and to transmit 
this information to the judge. Should the judge desire 
more information regarding these classes in order to 
exercise his statutory § 2518 (8) (d) discretion, ... the 
government is also reqt.Jired to ft.Jrnish such information 
as is available to it." United States v. Chun, 503 F, 
2d 533, 540 (1974).21 
We agree with the Ninth Circuit that' this allocation or 
responsibility best serves the purposes of Title IIV2 
n The current policy of the Department of Justice is to provide 
~he issuing judge with the name of every person who has been over-. 
heard as to whom there is any reasonable possibility of indictment. 
Brief for the United States, at 39. This policy does not meet the test 
specified above. Moreover, where, as here, t.he Government chooses to-
supply the issuing juclge with a list of all identifiable persons rather· 
than a description of the classes into which those persons fall, the list-
must be complete. 
22 At oral argume11t, counsel for the United States recognized the merit 
of the approach specified in United States v. Chun . 
''ferha:ps the approach qf th{l Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
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III 
We turn now to the question whether the District Court 
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at 
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement 
authorities to comply fully with the provisions of § § 2518 ( 1) 
(b)(iv) and 2518 (S)(d). Section 2515 expressly prohibits 
the use at trial, and at certain other proceedings, of the 
contents of any intercepted wire communication or any evi~ 
dence derived therefrom "if the disclosure of that informa~ 
tion would be in violation of this chapter." The circum-
stances that trigger suppression under § 2515 are in turn 
enumerated in § 2518 (10) (a): 
"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
11 (ii) the order of authorization or approval under 
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or 
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity 
with the order of authorization or approval." 
There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that 
the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the 
interception was not conducted in conformity with the orders. 
Thus, only § 2518 (10) (a) (i) is relevant: were the communi-
cations '~unlawfully intercepted'' given the violations of 
§§ 2518 (1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (8)(d)?~3 
Resolutio~ of that question must begin with United States 
which sugge:;ted that rather than submitting specific name:; we should 
submit categorie:; of persons who had been overheard, is a better 
policy, would be more helpful to the district court in exercising its 
discretion, and we would have no objection to following any reason-
able policy that the district . courts determine would be useful to therq 
in this regard." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 6-7. 
28 The availability of the suppression remedy for these statutory, 
as opposed to constitutional, violations, see nn. 15 and 19, supra, turns 
on the provisions of Title III rather than the judicia.lly fashioned ex.,. 
clusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment 
fights . United States v. Giordano, supra, 416 U. S., at 524. 
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v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v. 
Chavez, 416 U. S. 562 (1974). Those cases hold that "[not] 
every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided 
in Title III would render the interception of wire or oral 
communications 'unlawful.' " United States v. Chavez, 416 
U. S., at 574-575. To the contrary, suppression is required 
only for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory require-
ments that directly and substantially implement the con-
gressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures 
to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this 
extraordinary device." United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S., 
at 527. 
Giordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring 
that an application for an intercept order be approved by 
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General spe-
cially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding that 
Congress intended to condition the use of wiretap procedures 
on the judgment of senior officials in the Department of 
Justice, the Court required suppression for failure to com-
ply with the approval provision. Chavez concerned the stat-
utory requirement that the application for an intercept order 
specify the identity of the official authorizing the applica-
tion. The prob1em in Chavez was one of misidentification ; 
although the application had in fact been authorized by the 
Attorney General, tbe application erroneously identified an 
Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the 
application. The Court concluded that mere misidentifica-
tion of the official authorizing the application did not make 
the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518 (10) 
(a)(i) since that identification requirement did not play a 
"substantive role' ' in the regulatory system. 416 u. s.} 
at 578. 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both 
the identification requirement of § 2518 (1) (b) (iv.) and 
the notice requirem~nt of § 2515 (8) (d) played a "centr.l!-1 
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role" in the statutory framework, and for that reason af-
firmed the District Court's order suppressing relevant 
evidence. Although both statutory requirements are un-
doubtedly important, we do not think that the failure to 
comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an in-
tercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory 
requirements. 
A 
As to § 2518 (1) (b) (iv), the issue is whether the identifi-
cation in an intercept application of all those likely to be 
overheard in incriminating conversations plays a "substan-
tive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept 
orders and consequently imposes a limitation on the use 
of intercept procedures. The statute provides that the issu-
ing judge may approve an intercept application if he deter-
mines that normal investigative techniques have failed or 
are unlikely to succeed and there is probable cause to believe 
that : (i ) an individual is engaged in criminal activity, 
(ii) particular communications concerning the offense will 
be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facili-
ties are being used in connection with the specified criminal 
activity. That determination is based on the "full and com-
plete statement" of relevant facts supplied by law enforce-
ment authorities. If, after evaluating the statutorily 
enumerated factors in light of the information contained in 
the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order 
should issue, the failure to identify addition~ persons who 
are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conver-
sations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial 
authorization. The intercept order may issue only if the 
issuing judge determines th11t the statutory factors are pres-
ent, and the failure to name additional targets in no way 
detracts from the sufficiency of those factors. 
This case is unlike Giordano, where failure to satisfy 
the statutory requirement of prior approval by specified 
I • 
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Justice Department officials bypassed a congressionally 
imposed limitation on the use of the intercept procedure. 
The Court there noted that it was reasonable to believe 
that requiring prior approval from sep.ior officials in the 
Justice Department "would inevitably foreclose resort to 
wiretapping in various situations where investigative person-
nel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court 
ancl the court would very likely authorize its use." 416 U. S., 
at 528. Here, however, the sta,tutorily imposed preconditions 
to judicial atfthoriza,tion were satisfied, and the issuing judge 
wa.S sifUply una.ware that additional persons might be over-
heard enga,ging in incriminating conversations. In no rnean-
ingfu.l seqse can it be said that the presence of that infor .. 
mation as to additional targets would have precludecl judicial 
authorization of the interoept.24 Rather, this case resembles 
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful sim .. 
ply because the issuing judge was incorrectly informecl as 
to which qesignated official had authorized the applica,tion, 
The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Just,ice Depart-
ment haq performed its task of prior approval, and the 
instant intercept is lawful because the application provided 
sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to deter-
mine that the sta.tutory preconditions were satisfied.25 
24 There is no suggestion in this case that the Government agents 
knowingly failed to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
for the purpose of kt>eping relevant informatio11 from the District Court 
that might have prompted the court to conclude that probable cause 
was lacking. If such a showing had been made, we would have a 
different case. Nor is there any suggestion ·that as a result of the 
failure to name these three respondents they wE-re denied the mandatory 
inventory notice supplied to persontS named in the application. 18 
U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d). Respondent Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
were among the 37 per~;ons served with the intial inventory. 
25 No one suggel:its that the failure to identify in a wiretap application 
individuals who are "unknown" within the meaning of thr statute, see 
United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974), requires suppression of 
iPtercepted convertSati<>ns to which thost> ~nd_ividuals were parties. Though 
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Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative history 
suggests that Congress intended this broad identification re-
quirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in 
guarding figainst unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic 
surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S., at 578. 
Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971, 
contained an identification provision. See p. 11, supra. The 
only explanation given in the Senate Report for the in-
clusion of the broad identification provision was that it was 
intended to reflect what Congress perceived to be the con-
stitutional command of particularization. This explanation 
was offered with respect to all the information required by 
§ 2518 (l) (6) to be set out in an intercept application. No 
additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor debates, 
since they contain no substantive discussion of the identifi-
cation provision.26 
recognizing' that tre failqre to identify such an "unknown" individual 
does not make unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents 
Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest that the opposite is true 
with respect to th~ failure to identify in a wiretap application indi-
viduals who are "known" within the meaning of the statute. Counsel 
for these respondents suggested at oral argument that this difference 
in result is justified by analogy to warrantless searches or arrests. Tr. 
of Oral Arg., at 40. Although law ~forcement officials can often take 
action without a warrant when they have been unable to foresee the 
circumstances that eventually confronted them, they still must obtain a 
search or arrest ~arrant when tl1eir prior knowledge is sufficient to 
establish probable cause, and it. is S\lggested that the same principle 
applies here. The major flaw in that reasoning is that this case does 
not concern warrantless action. Here, the omission on the part of law 
enforcement authorities was not a failure to seek prior juclicial authori-
zation, but a failure to identify every individual who could be expected 
to be overheard engaging In incriminating COllVersations. That the com-
plete absence of prior judicial a1.1thorization would make an intercept 
unlawful has no bearing on the lawfulness of an intercept order that 
fails to identify every target. 
26 Ever if we assume that Congress thought that a broad identifica.tioll 
Teqlliremcnt was constitutionally mandated, 1t does not follow th!\t 
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We reach the same conclusion with respect to the Gov-
ernment's duty to inform the judge of all identifiable persons 
whose conversations were intercepted. As noted earlier, the 
version of Title III that emerged from the Senate Judiciary 
Committee provided only fpr mandatory notice to the "per-
sons named in the order or the application." The Senate 
Report detailed the purpose of that provision: 
"[T]he intent of the provision is that the principle 
of postuse notice will be retained. This provision alone 
should insure the community that the techniques are 
rf,')asanably employed. Through its operation all author-
ized interceptions must eventually become known at least 
to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil re-
dress, for example, under section 2520 . . . if he feels 
that his privacy has been unlawfully invaded." S. Rep. 
No. l097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1968). 
The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding the 
provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent 
to provide notice to such additional persons as may be 
constitutipnally required. 
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative 
histor:y suggests that incriminating conversations are "unlaw-
Congress imposed statutory suppression under §§ 2515 and 2518 (10) (a) 
(i) as a sanction for noncompliance. In limiting use of the intercept pr0oo 
cedure to "the most precise 11nd discriminate circumstances," S. Rep. No. 
107, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968), Congress required law enforcemept 
authorities to convince a District Court tpat probable cause existed to 
believe that a specific person was committing a specific offe11se using a 
specific telephone. This requirement was satisfied here when the applica-
tion set forth sufficient information to indicate tl)at the primary targets 
were conducting a gambling business over four particular telephones. 
Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to 
declare an otherwise constitutional intercept order "unlawful" under· 
§ 2518 (10) (a) (i)-resulting in suppression under § 2515-for failure t<t 
:pame additional targets . 
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fully intercepted" whenever parties to those conversations 
do not receive discretionary inventory notice as a result of 
the Government's failure to inform the District Court of their 
identities. Ap the time inventory notice was served on the 
other identifiq,ble persons, the intercept had been completed 
and the convj:lrsations had been "seized" under a valid in-
tercept order. The fact that discretionary notice reached 
39 rather th~p 41 identifiable persons does not in itself mean 
that the convf:)rsations were unlawfully intercepted.27 
·The legislative history indicates that postinterdept notice 
was designed instead to assure the community that the 
wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recog-
nizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that 
aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that 
postintercept notice was intended to serve as an independent 
restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure. 
IV 
Although the Government was required to identify respond-
ents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 26 
application for an extension of the initial intercept, failure 
27 Counsel for ff!Spondents Merlo and Lauer concecJed at oral argument 
that the failure to name those respondents in the proposed mventory 
order was not. intentional, Tr. of Oral Arg. , at. 32, and we are therefore 
not called upon to decide whether suppre.ssion would be an available 
remedy if the Government knowingly sought to prevent the Distriet 
Court from servi~~ inventory notice on particular parties. Nor doC~> this 
case present an opportunity to comment upon the suggestion, recognized 
by the Unitecj St~tes, Brief, at 49 n. 40, that suppresswn might b~ required 
if the agents krjf:l)V before the interceptiOn that no inventory would be 
served. 
Moreover, resmndents Merlo and Lauer were not prejudiced by their 
failure to receive postintercept notice under e1ther of the District Court's 
inventory orders. As noted earlier, the Government made available to 
all defendants tqe intercept orders, applications, and related papers. See 
n. 7, supra. And in respon~e to pretnal discovery motions, the Govern-
ment produced transcripts of the intArceptPd convPrsations. 
.. 
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to do so in the circumstances here presented did not warrant 
suppression under § 2518 (10)(a)(i). Nor was suppression 
justified with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply 
because the Government inadvertently omitted their names 
from the comprehensive list of all identifiable persons whose 
conversations had been overheard. We hold that this is the 
correct result under the provisions of Title III, but we re-
emphasize the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez, 
that "strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of 
Title III would nonetheless be more in keeping with the 
responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when au-
thority to enga.ge in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is 
sought." 416 U. S., at 580. 
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case 
is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accord 
with this opinion. 
It is 80 order eel. 
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This case presents issues concerning the construction of 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520. Specifically, we must 
decide whether 18 U. S. C. § 2518 ( 1) (b )(iv), which requires 
the Government to include in its wiretap applications "the 
identity of the person, if known, committing the offense, 
and whose conversations are to be intercepted,'' is satisfied 
when the Government identifies only the "principal targets" 
of the intercept. Second, we must decide whether the Gov-
ernment has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing 
judge of the identities of perso~1s whose conversations were 
overhea.rd in the course of the interception, thus enabling 
him to decide whether they should be served with notice of 
the interception pursu11nt to 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) . 
And finally, we must determine whether failure to comply 
fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of 
evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) . 
I 
On November 28, 1972, a special agent of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation applied to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order 
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UP The application requested authorization to intercept 
gambling-related communications over two telephones at one 
address in North Olmstead, Ohio, and two other telephones 
1 The wiretap application procedure is set forth at 18 U. S. C. § 2518 
(1), which provides: 
" ( 1) Each application for an order authorizing or approvmg the inter-
ception of a wire or oral commumcntion shall be- made in writing upon 
oath or affirmation to a judge of competent junsdiction and shall state 
the applicant's authority to make such application. Each applicatiOn 
shall include the following infonnation: 
"(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making 
the application, and the officer authorizing the application ; 
"(b) a full and complete state-ment of the facts and circumstances relied 
upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued, 
including (i) details as to the particular offe-nse that has been, is being, or 
is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and 
locat.ion of the facilities from which or the place where the communica-
tion is to be mtercepted, (iii) a particular descripton of the type of 
communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, 
if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be 
intercepted; 
" (c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investi-
gative procedure-s have been tried and failed or why they reasonably 
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous ; 
'·' (d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is: 
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation IS such. 
that the authorization for interception s·hould not automatically termi-
nate when the described type of communication has been first obtained,. 
a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that 
~;~.dditional communications of the same type will occur thereafter ; 
"(e) a full and complete state-ment of the facts .conceming all previous· 
t;tpplications known to the mdividual authorizing and making the appli-
cation, made to any judge for authorizatiOn to intercept, or for approval 
of interceptions of, wire or oral communications ·inv<>lving any of the-
same persons, fa.cilitie.s or places specified in the application, and the· 
action taken by the judge on each ~uch application ; and 
"(f) where the application is f<>r the rxtension of an order, a statement 
setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interreption , or a 
reasonable explanation of the fa1lure to obtain such results." 
The issuing judge IS free to requm' the applicant to furnish additional 
information. 18 lT S. C' §251R (2) , 
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at a home in Canton, Ohio. The accompanying affidavit 
recited that the telephones were being used by Albert Kotoch, 
Joseph Spa.ganlo, and George Florea to conduct an illegal 
gambling business, and that in conducting that business they 
would place calls to and receive calls from various persons, 
three of whom were also named in the wiretap application.2 
The affiant also sta.ted that the Government's informants 
would refuse to testify against the persons named in the appli-
cation, that telephone records alone would be insufficient to 
support a gambling conviction, and that normal investiga-
tive techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to 
the Government's request, the District Court authorized for 
a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related 
wire communications of Kotoch, Spa.ganlo, Florea, three 
named individuals other than the respondents, and "others 
as yet unknown," to and from the four listed telephones.8 
2 The affidavit set forth extensive information indicating that the named 
individuals were conducting a gambling operation. This information was 
derived from physical surveillance by agents of the FBI, an examination 
of telephone company toll records, and the personal observations of six 
informants, whose past reliability also was detailed in the affidavit . 
8 The District Court's order was issued pursuant 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 
(3), ( 4) which provide in pertinent part: 
"(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, 
as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire 
or oral communication:; within the territorial jurisdiction of the court 
in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the 
facts submitted by the applicant that-
" (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, 
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in 
section 2516 of this chapter ; 
"(b) there is probable cause for behef that particular communications 
.concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception ; 
" (c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed 
or reasonably appror to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous; 
"(d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, 
or the place where, the wire or oral communications are to be mtercepted 
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During the course of the wiretap, the Government 1earnecl 
that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco were dis-
cussing illegal gambling activities with the named subjects. 
On December 26, 1972, the Government applied for an 
extension of the initial intercflpt order.4 . This time it sought 
authorization to intercept gambling~related conversations of 
Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, tw~ other n~ed individuals, and 
11others as yet unknown," but it did not identify respondents 
are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commis-
sion of such offense, or are lea.1!ed to, listed in the name of, or commonly 
used by such person. 
" ( 4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire 
or oral communication shall specify-
" (a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are 
to be interceptro; 
"(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to 
which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted; 
" (c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to 
be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it 
relates; 
" (d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communi-
cations, and of the person authoming the application; and 
"(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized, 
including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall auto-
matically terminate when the described communication has been first 
obtained." 
4 In addition to the December 26 application requesting an extension 
of the initial intercept order, the Government also filed on that date a 
separate application seeking authorization to monitor a third telephone 
discovered at the same North Olmstead address. Both applications were 
accompanied by another affidavit setting forth the results of the initial 
monitoring, the manner in which the third phone was discovered, the 
facts indicatmg that the newly discovered telephone was being used to 
conduct a gambling business, and reasons why continued interception was 
necessary. A copy of the affidavit filed on November 28 was also 
attached to the December 26 applications. For the sake of clarity, the 
two applications filed on Peceml}er 2G will be t reated as a sing!~ 
appHcat~Qll, 
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Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins in this second application.~ 
The District Court again authorized interception of gambling· 
related conversations for a maximum of 15 days. 
On February 21, 1973, the Government submitted to the 
District Court a proposed order giving notice of the inter-
ceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Government ap-
parently thought included all individuals who could be iden-
tified as having discussed gambling over the monitored 
telephones.6 The District Court signed the proposed order, 
and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons, 
including respondents Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins. On 
September 11, 1973, after the Government submitted the 
names of two additional persons whose identities allegedly had 
been omitted inadvertently from the initial list, the District 
Court entered an amended order giving notice to those 
individuals. As a result of what the Government labels 
"administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer 
6 The United States conceded in the Court of Appeals that respond-
ents Donovan and Robbins were "known" within the meannig of the 
statute at the time of the December 26 application, but challenged as 
clearly erroneous the District Court's finding that rE'Spondent Buzzaco wall 
"known" at that time. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's 
finding, and the United State!:! has not sought review of that disposition. 
Thus, for our purposes, all three respondents were "known" on Decem-
ber 26. 
0 An inventory notice must be served within a designated period of 
time upon "the perl:!ons named in the order or the application.'' 18 
U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d). The inventory mnst give notice of the entry of 
the intercept order or application, state th(' disposition of the application, 
and indicate whether communications were or were not intercepted. Ibid . 
Upon the filing of a motion, the judge has dtscretion to make availablt> 
the intercepted communications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid. 
Title III also authomes the District Court to cause an inventory no-
tice to be served on "other parties to intercepted communications" if the 
judge determines that such notice is m the interest of justice. Ibid. 
Those other parties may also be given a.cceBs to the intercepted commu-
llications, the applications, and the orqers. lbi~. • · 
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were not included in either list of names and were never 
served with inventory notice.7 
On November 1, 1973, an indictment was returned in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents, and 
10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conduct-
ing a gambling business in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371 
and 1955. The five respondents filed motions to suppress 
evidence derived from the wire interception. After an evi-
dentiary hearing on the motions, the District Court sup-
pressed as to respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
all evidence derived from the December 26 intercept order 
on the ground that failure to identify them by name in the 
application and order of that date violated 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 
(1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a). With respect to Merlo and 
Lauer, who were not known to the Government until after 
the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed 
all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground 
that they had not been served with inventory notice. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 
513 F. 2d 337 (1975) .8 On the identification issue, the 
court held that the wiretap application must identify every 
person whose conversations relating to the subject criminal 
activity the Government has probable cause to believe it 
will intercept. Agreeing with the District Court that at the 
time of the December 26 application the Government had 
7 Although respondents Merlo and Lauer were not served with inven-
tory notice pursuant. to § 2518 (8) (d), the mtercept orders, applications, 
and related papers were made avmla ole to all the defendants, including 
Merlo and Laurr, on November 26, 1973. Thus, the introduction into 
evidence a.t tnal of the contents of the mtercepted conversations and 
evidence denved therefrom would not. he prohibited by 18 U. S C. 
§2518 (9) 
8 The Government fil ed m, appe.al from the Du;trict Court's order sup-
pressing ev1dence under Ul U. S C. § :37:31, and th«:>re hru:; be«:>n no trial 
Qn Uw charges with resp«:>ct to the r"*'ponqpnrs, 
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probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan, 
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from 
the December 26 order. On the notice question, it held 
tha.t the Government has an implied statutory duty to in-
form the issuing judge of the identities of the parties whose 
conversations were overheard so that he can determine 
whether discretionary inventory notice should be required.9 
Because the Government had failed to perform this duty 
with respect to Merlo and Lauer, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidence 
derived from both intercept orders. The court found it un-
necessary to determine whether the failure to identify re-
pondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 
26 application and to 11ame respondents Merlo and Lauer 
in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or 
purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to 
require suppression under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a).10 
We granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which concern 
the construction of a major federal statute, 421 U. S. 907, 
and now reverse. 
II 
The United States contends that § 2518 (1)(b)(iv) re-
quires that a wiretap application identify only the principal 
9 See n. 6, supra. 
1o 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) provides in pertinent part : 
"(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding 
in or before any court., department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or 
other authority of the United States, a State, or a, political ~ubdivision 
thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or 
oral commurucation, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that-
" (i) the communicatwn was unlawfully intercepted ; 
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was inter-
cepted is insufficient on 1ts face, or 
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of 
authorization or approval." 
C~'t'+. 
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target of the interception, and that § 2518 (8) (d) does not 
require the Government to 'provide the issuing judge with 
a list of all identifiable persons who were overheard in the 
course of an authorized interception. We think neither con-
tention is sound. 
A 
We turn first to the identification requirements of § 2518 
(1)(b)(iv). That provision requires a wiretap application 
to specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing 
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." 
In construing that language, this Court already has ruled 
that the Government is not required to identify an individul:Ll 
in the application unless it has probable cause to believe 
(i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity 
under investigation and (ii) that the individual's conversa-
tions will .be intercepted over the target telephone. United 
States v. Ka'hn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974). The question at issue 
here is whether the Government is required to name all 
such individuals.11 
The United States argues that the most reasonable m-
11 Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has concluded 
that an individual whose conversations probably will be mtercepted by a 
wiretap must be identified in the wiretap application if the law enforce-
ment authorities have probable cause to believe the individual is commit-
ting the offense for which the wiretap is sought. United States v. 
Chiarizio, 525 F. 2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975); United States v. Bernstein, 
509 F . 2d 996 (CA4 1975) , petition for cert. filed, No. 74-1486; United 
States v. Doolittle, 507 F. 2d 1368, aff'd en bane, 518 F. 2d 500 (CA5 
1975) , petitions for cert. 'filed Nos. 75-500,75-509, 75-513; United States 
v. Civella, 533 :F. 2d 1395 (CA8 1976), petitions for cert. filed, Nos. 
75-1813, 76-169; United States v. Russo. 527 F . 2d 1150, 1156 (CAIO--; 
1975) , · · . , See also United States v. 
Moore, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 513 F. 2d 485, 493-494 (1975) (inter-. 
preting 23 D . C. Code 547 (a) (2), wh1ch is almost identical to the provi-
sion at issue here) . 
A number of these courts have concluded, and respondents Donovan, 
Rogbins, and Buzzaco argue, that ·ol.\r decjsion in United States v. Kahn~ 
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terpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the 
application must identify only the principal target of the 
investigation, who "will almost always be the individual 
whose phone is monitored~ Brief for the United States, 
at 18. Under this interpretation, if the Government has 
reason to believe that an individual will use the target 
telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government 
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged 
in the criminal activity under investigation, the individual 
qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the 
wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who 
uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls 
from the target telephone is not a principal target even if 
the Government has probable cause to believe that the 
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under inves-
tigation. In other words, whether one is a principal target 
of the investigation depends on whether one operates the 
target telephone to place or receive calls.u 
415 U. S. 143 (1974), resolved this identification issue. See United States 
v. Chiarizio, supra; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there is 
language in Kahn suggesting that. wiretap applications must identify all 
such individuals, the identification question presented here was not before 
us in Kahn. The question in that case was whether a wiretap applica-
tion must identify a known user of the target telephone whose com-
M plicity in the criminal activity under investigation was not known at 
the time of the application. Kahn is a relevant, though not controlling, 
precedent. 
12 The United States does not suggest that regardless of the factual 
circumstances a wiretap application must identify only a single individual. 
To the contrary, it concedes that if two or more persons are using the 
target telephone "equally" to commit the offense, and thus are "equally" 
targets of the investigation, "all must be named." Brief for the United 
.States, at 18 n. 13. 
13 Counsel for the United States explained this position succinctly at 
oral argument: "The critical distinction . .. is one between the users of 
the telephone that is being monitored on the one hand, and all other per-
~ns throughout the world who may converse from unmonitored phones: 
'Qn the Qthe,r h_and .. " T.t. of Ol:al Arg., at 13. 
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Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we find 
little support for it in the language and structure of Title 
III or in the legislative history. The statutory language 
itself refers only to "the person, if known, committing the 
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." 
That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls 
to the target telephone as it is to a suspect placing calls 
from that telephone. It is true, as the United States sug-
gests, that when read in the context of the other sub-
divisions of § 2518 (1)(b) , an argument can be made that 
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user 
of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other 
sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap 
applications would name more than one individual. For 
example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served 
upon "the persons named in the order or the applicatioh." 
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) (emphasis added). And § 2518 
( 1 )(e) requires that an intercept application disclose all 
previous intercept applications "involving any of the sarne 
persons ... specified in the application" (emphasis added). 
It may well be that Congress anticipated that a given 
application would cover more than one telephone or that 
several suspects would use one telephone, and that an appli-
cation for those reasons alone would require identification 
of more than one individual. But nothing on the face of 
the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from 
the identification requirement those suspects whose inter-
cepted communications originated on a telephone other than 
that listed in the wiretap application.14 
14 Indeed, the contrary conclusion is suggested by the fact that iden-
tification of an individual in an application for an intercept order 
triggers other statutory provisions. First, § 2518 (1) (e) requires an in-
tercept application to disclose all prev-ious applicatiOns "involving any 
of the same persons ... specified in the application." To the extent 
that Congress thought it nece::;sary to provide the issuing judge with 
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Nor can we find support in the legislative history for the 
"principal target" interpretation . Title III originated as 
a combination of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception 
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several 
months prior to this Court's decision in Berg:;r v. New York , 
388 U. S. 41 (1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance 
Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few 
days after the Berger decision. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 
2d Sess., 66 (1968). Both bills required that wiretap ap .. 
plications include a full and complete statement of the 
facts and circumstances relied upon by the applica.nt and 
specification of the nature and location of the commu-
nication facilities involved. Although neither bill contained 
an express identification requirement such as that at issue 
here, both bills required the application to include "a full 
and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous 
applications . . . involving any person named in the appli-
cation as committing, having committed, or being about to 
commit an offense." Hearings on Controlling Crime Through 
More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcommittee 
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8 (a) (3) and 
1006, §2518(a)(4) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even 
at this early sta.ge, it was recognized that an application 
could identify several individuals, and there is no indication 
that the identification would be limited to principal targets. 
S. 971 combined the major provisions of S. 675 a11d S. 2050 
and eventually was enacted. While it was pending before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court decided Katz 
such information , there is no indication of congressional intent to require 
provision of such information only if a suspect operated from one end 
of a telephone line. Second, § 2518 (8) (d) mandates that an inven-
tory notice be served upon "the persons named in the order or the 
application." As with § 2518 (1) (e) , the congressional purpose would 
not be served by limiting th~t notice on the basis of the telephone from 
'YhJch one SJ;Jeak~J, 
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v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). S. 971 was then 
redrafted to confrom to Katz as well as Berger, and 
the identification provision was added at that time. The 
Senate Report states that the requirements set forth in the 
various subdivisions of § 2518 ( 1) (b), including the identifi-
cation requirement at issue here, " [were] intended to reflect the 
constitutional comma~d of particulaPization." S. Rep. No. 
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), citing Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41,58-60, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 354-356 (1967). The U:pited States now contends that 
although it may be that Congress read Berger and Katz to 
require, as a constitutional matter, that the subject of the 
surveillan~e be named if known , Congress would hardly 
have read those cases as requiring the naming of all parties 
likely tQ be overheard.15 Brief, at 25-26. But to the ex-
tent that Congress thought it was meeting the constitutional 
commands of particularization established J... Berger and ~ 
Katz, Congress may have read those cases as mandating 
a broad identification requirement. The statute that we 
confronted in Berger required identification of "the person 
or persons" whose communications were to be overheard. 
388 U. S., at 59. And we expressly noted that that provi-
sion "[did] no more than identify the person whose constitu~ 
tionally protected area is to be invaded .... . " Ibid. Given 
the statute at issue in Berger and our comment upon it, 
15 At the time of the enactment of Title III, Congress did not 
have before it the view we expressed on this issue in United States 
v. Kahn, 415 D. S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment requires 
specification of "the place to be seached, and the persons or things to 
be seized." In the wiretap context, those requirements are satisfied 
by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular 
conversations to be seized. It. is not a constitutional requirement that 
all those likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations; 
be named. Specification of this sort "identif[ies] the person whose con-
stitutionally protected area is to be invaded rather than 'particularly 
describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seize<{!~ 
f}erqer v. Ne7p York, 388 t}, S. 41 , 59 (1967) . 
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Congress mf.l,y have concluded that the Constitution required 
the naming, in a wiretap application, of all suspects rather 
than just the primary user.1il 
In any event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary 
to specula.te as to exactly how Congress interpreted Berger 
and Katz with respect to the identification issue. It is suf-
ficient to note that in response to those decisions Congress 
included an identification requirement which on its face draws 
no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and the 
United States points to no evidence in the legislative history 
that supports such a distinction. Indeed, the legislative ma-
terials apparently C()nta.in no use of the term "principal tar-
get" or any discussion of a different treatment based on the 
telephone from which a suspect speaks.17 We therefore con-
clude that a wiretap application must name an individual 
if the Gbvernment ha.s probable cause to believe that the 
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under inves-
tigation wd expects to intercept the individual's conversa-
tions over the target telephone.J. 
B 
The other statutory provision at issue in this case is 
16 That Congress may have so understood the constitutional require.. 
ment is also suggested by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with 
that provision of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify 
"the person, if known, whose conversations are to be intercepted." The 
Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894), which 
concerns the need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest 
warrant. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968). To the 
extent that Congress may have considered West to apply to wiretap 
orders, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its appli~ 
cability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone. 
17 At least. one Senator read the identification requirement in S. 971 to 
parallel the identification requirement contamed in the statute at issue 
in Berger v. N flW York : "Specificity is required as to the person or 
persons whose communications are to be intercepted." 114 Cong. Rec,, 
at 14763 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Percy). 
f II d .l 
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18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8)(d), which provides that the judge 
shall cause to be served on the persons named in the order 
or applic~ttion an inventory, which must give notice of the 
entry of the order or application, state the disposition of 
the application, and indicate whether communications were 
intercepted.18 Although the statute mandates inventory no-
tice only for persons named in the application or the order, 
the statute also provides that the judge may order simiTar 
notice to other parties to intercepted communications if he 
concludes that such a.ction is in the interest of justice.10 
Observing that this notice provision does not expressly re-
quire law enforcement authorities routinely to supply the 
judge with specific information upon which to exercise his 
discretion, the United States contends that it would be in-
appropriate to read such a requirement into the statute since 
the judge has the option of asking the la.w enforcement 
authorities for whatever information he requires. 
Our reading of the legislative history of the discretionary 
noti~e provision in light of the purposes of Title III leads 
us to reject the Government's interpretation. As reported 
from the Judiciary Committee, section 2518 (8) (d) contained 
only a provision mandating notice to the pensons named in 
the application or the order; the discretionary notice provi-
sion was added by amendment on the floor of the Senate. 
u The inventory notice must be served within a reasonable time but 
not later than 90 days after the date thE' application for an intercept 
order was filed . On an ex parte showing of good cause, service of the 
inventory may be postponed. 
19 In addition to these provisions for mandatory and discretionary 
inventory notice, the Governml'nt. is required to supply the issuing judge 
with recordings of the intercepted conversations, which are to be sealed 
·according to his direct ions. 18 U. S. C. §2518 (8)(a). These notice 
:and return provi~ions satisfy constitutional requirements. See Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355-356, and 11. 16 (1967); Berger v. Ne·w: 
York, 388 U. S. 41, 60 (1967) . 
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In introducing that amendment, Senator Hart explained its 
purpose: 
11The amendment would give the judge who issued the 
order discretion to require notice to be served on other 
parties to intercepted conversations, even though such 
parties are not specifically named in the court order. 
The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice 
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of any 
surveillance statute. It may be that the required no-
tice must be served on all parties to intercepted com-
munications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may 
make such notice to all parties undesirable, the amend-
ment leaves the final determination to the judge." 114 
Cong. Rec. 14485-14486 (1968).~0 
In deciding whether legitimate privacy interests justify 
withholding inventory notice from parties to intercepted con-
versations, a judge is likely to require information and assist-
ance beyond that contained in the application papers and the 
recordings of intercepted conversations made available by 
law enforcement a4thorities. No purpose is served by hold-
ing that those authorities have no routine duty to supply 
the judge with revelant information. The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted this problem of 
20 It is worth noting that shortly before Senator Hart proposed this 
amendment to S. 971, Senator Long had read to the Senate portions 
of a report preparf>d by the AssociatiOn of the Bar of the City of 
New York on federal wiretap legislation. That report commented that 
parties to intercepted conversations other than those named in the appli-
cation or order probably should be ~erved with inventory notice, but it 
also recognized that under some circumstanc~ the proviSion of such notice 
could be harmful and gave the following example : 
"A, a businessman, talks to his customers, and the latter are served 
with papers showing that A is being bugged[.] [_T]he damage to con-
fidence in A and to A's reputation in general may damage A unjustly. 
In this case it would seem that the customers ~hould not be served with 
the inventory." 114 Cong. Rec. 14476 (1968) . 
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dual responsibility, and we adopt the balanced construction 
that court placed on § 2518 (8)(d): 
"To discharge this obligation the judicial officer must 
have, at a minimum, knowledge of the particular cate-
gories into which faJl all the individua.ls whose conver-
sations have been intercepted. Thus, while precise iden-
tification of each party to an intercepted conversation 
is not required, a description of the general class, or 
classes, which they comprise is essential to enable the 
judge to determine whether adqitional information is 
necessary for a proper evaluation of the interests of the 
various parties. Furthermore, although the judicial offi-
cer has the duty to cause the filing of the inventory 
[notice], it is abundantly clear that the prosecution hf.I.S 
greater access to ,and familiarity with the intercepted 
communications. Therefore we feel justified in imposing 
upon the latter the duty to classify all those whose 
conversations have been intercepted, and to transmit 
this information to the judge. Should the judge desire 
more information regarding these classes in order to 
exercise his statutory § 2518 (8) (d) discretion, .. . the 
government is also required to furnish such informa.tion 
as is available to it." United States v. Chun, 503 F j yj 
2d 533, 540 (1974)~ 
We agree with the Ninth Circuit that' this allocation of __./(;~.I 
responsibility best serves the purposes of Title III.{ 
2 1 The current poli~y of the Department of Justice is to provide 
the issuing judge with the name of every person who has been over-. 
heard as t<1 whom there is any reasonable possibility of indictment. 
Brief for the United States, at 39. This policy does not meet the test 
specified above. Moreover, where, as here, the Government. chooses to. 
supply the issuing jnrl.gc with a list of all identifiable persons rather· 
than a description of the classes into which those persons fall, the list 
must be com )ete. 
a~~ At oral argument, counsel for the United States. recognized the merit 
) ~ the approach specified m United States v. Chun : 





Currently, the policy of the Justice Department 
is to provide the issuing judge with the name of every 
person who has been overheard as to whom there is any 
reasonable possibility of indictment. Brief for the 
United States, at 39. Because it fails to assure that 
the necessary range of information will be before the 
issuing judge, this policy does not meet the test set out 
in Chun. Moreover, where, as here, the Government chooses 
to supply the issuing judge with a list of all identifiable 
persons rather than a description of the classes into which 
those persons fall, the list must be complete. Applying 
these principles, we find that the Government did not 
comply adequately with§ 2518(8)(d), since the names of 
respondents Merlo and Lauer were not included on the 
purportedly complete list of identifiable persons submitted 
to the issuing judge. .fFeotuute &l!l&ttt 5hc il!'l!'ele can a a 1iJ-
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v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v. 
Chavez, 416 U. S. 562 (1974). Those cases hold that "[not] 
every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided 
in Title III would render the interception of wire ot oral 
communications 'unlawful.' " United States v. Chavez, 416 
U. S., at 574-575. To the contrary, suppression is required 
only for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory require-
ments that directly and substantially implement the con-
gressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures 
to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this 
extraordinary device." United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S., 
at 527. 
Giordano concerned the provision in Title I'II requiring 
that an application for an intercept order be approved by 
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General spe-
cially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding that 
Congress intended to condition tbe use of wiretap procedures 
on the judgment of senior officials in the Department of 
Justice, the Court required suppression for failure to com-
ply with the approval provision. Chavez concerned the stat-
utory requirement that the application for an intercept order 
specify the identity of the official authorizing the applica-
tion. The problem in Chavez was one of misidentificationv, 
although the applica.tion had in fact been authorized by the 
Attorney General, tbe application erroneously identified an 
Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the 
application. The Court concluded that mere misidentifica-
tion of the official authorizing the application did not make 
the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518 (10)1 
(a) (i) since that identification requirement did not play a 
"substantive role'' in the regulatory system. 416 U. S., 
at 578. 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both 
the identification requirement of § 2518 ( 1) (b )(iv.) and 
the notice requirem~nt of § ~515 (8) (d) played a "centr11.-l 
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role" in the statutory framework, and for that reason af-
firmed the District Court's order suppressing relevant 
evidence. Although both statutory requirements are un-
doubtedly important, we do not think that the failure to 
comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an in-
tercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory 
requirements. 
A 
A~ to § 2518 (l)(b)(iv), the issue is whether the identifi-
cation in an intercept application of all those likely to be 
overheard in incriminating conversations plays a "substan-
tive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept 
orders and consequently imposes a limitation on the use 
of intercept procedures. The statute provides that the issu-
ing judge may approve an intercept application if he deter-
mines that normal investigative techniques have failed or 
are unlikely to succeed and there is probable cause to believe 
that : (i) an individual is engaged in criminal activity, 
(ii) particular communications concerning the offense will 
be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facili-
ties are being used in connection with the specified criminal 
activity. That determination is based on the "full and com-
plete statement" of relevant facts supplied by law enforce/ 
ment authorities. If, after evaluating the statutorily 
enumerated factors in light of the information contained i 
the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order 
should issue, the failure to identify additional persons who 
are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conver-
sations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial 
authorization. The intercept order may issue only if the 
issuing judge determines that the statutory factors are pres-
ent, and the failure to name additional targets in no way 
detracts from the sufficiency of those factors. 
This case is unlike Giordano, where failure to satisfy 
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Justice Department officials bypassed a congressionally 
imposed limitation on the use of the intercept procedure. 
The Court there noted that it was reasonable to believe 
that requiring prior approval from senior officials in the 
Justice Department "would inevitably foreclose resort to 
wiretappin~ in various situations where investigative person-
nel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court 
and the court would very likely authorize its use." 416 U. S., 
at 528. Here, however, the statutorily imposed preconditions 
to judicial authorization were satisfied, and the issuing jqdge 
was si)llply unaware that additional persons might be over-
heard engaging in incriminating conversations. In no mertn-
ingful sense can it be said that the presence of that infor .. 
mation as }() additional targets would have precluded judicial Ol.3 
authorization of the intercept. Rather, t IS case resembles ~..J ~ 
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful sim .. 
ply because the issuing judge was incorrectly_ informed as 
to which cJesignated official had authorized the, application, 
The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Just~ce Depart-
ment hacJ performed its task of prior approval, and the 
instant intercept is lawful because the application provided 
sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to ~cit 'I 
mine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied.~ \..:' 
a~)'"--""lC There is no suggestion in this case that the Government agents 
knowingly failed to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
for the purpose of kt'eping relevant information from the District Court 
that might have prompted the court to conclude that probable cause 
was lacking. If snch a showing had been made, we would have a 
different case. Nor is there any suggestion ·that. as a result of the 
failure to name these three respondents they were denied the mandatory 
inventory notice supplied to per;,;ons named in the application. 18 
U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) . Respondt'nts Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
were among the 37 persons served with the intial inventory. 
~ 'f h<!! No one suggests that the failure to identify in a wiretap application 
in~ividuals who are ·'unknown" within the meaning of the statute, see 
United States v. Kahn , 415 U. S. 143 (1974) , requires suppression of 
ip.tercepted conver::;ations to whlrh those individuaL<~ were parties. Though 
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Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative history 
suggests that Congress intended this broad identifica-tion re-
quirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in 
guarding p.gainst unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic 
surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S., at 578. 
Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971, 
contained an identification provision. See p. 11, supra. Th 
only explanation given in the Senate Report for the in-
clusion of the broad identification provision was that it was 
intended to ref!ect what Congress perceived to be the con-
stitutional command of particularization. This explanation 
was offered with respect to all the information required by 
§ 2518 (l)(6) to be set out in an intercept application. No 
additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor debates, 
since they contain no substantive discussion of the identifi-{c .!" 
cation provision.:cs= a 
recognizing ' that the failqre to identify such an "unknown" individu~l 
does not make unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents 
Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest that the opposite is true 
with respect to the failure to identify in a wiretap application indi-
viduals who are "known" within the meaning of the statute. Counsel 
for these respondents suggested at oral ar~ument that this difference 
in result is justified by analogy to warrantless searches or arrests. Tr. 
of Oral Arg., at 40. Although law enforcement officials can often take 
actioij without a warrant when they l11we been unable to foresee the 
circumstances that eventually confronted them, they still must obtain a 
search or arrest ~arrant when their prior knowledge is sufficient to 
establish rrobable cause, and it is suggested that the same principle 
applies here. The major flaw in that reao;oning is that this case does 
not concern warrantlesi; action. Here, the omission on the part of law 
enforcement. authorities was not a failure to seek prior judicial authori-
zation, but a failu~e to identify every individual who could be expected 
to be overheard engaging in incriminating COllversations. That the comv 
plete absence of prior judicial authorization would make an intercept 
unlawful has no bearing on the lawfulness of an intercept order that 
fails to identify every target. 
~S~ Ever if we assume th11t Congress thought that a broad identificatioJJ 
requirement was coustitutionally mandated, 1t does not follow that 
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B 
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the Gov-
ernment's duty to inform the judge of all identifiable persons 
whose conversations were intercepted. As noted earlier, the 
version of Title III that emerged from the Senate Judiciary 
Committee provided only for mandatory notice to the "per-
sons named in the order or the application." The Senate 
Report detailed the purpose of that provision: 
"[T]he intent of the provision is that the principle 
of postuse notice will be retained. This provision alone *.--- should insure the community that the techniques are .~ 
(_\: reasonably employed. Through its operation all author~ 
ized interceptions must eventually become known at least · 
to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil re-
dress, for example, under section 2520 ... if he feels 
that his privacy has been unlawfully invaded." S. Rep. 
No. ~097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1968). 
The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding the 
provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent 
to provide notice to such additional persons as may be 
co:nstitu ti(}nally required. 
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative 
history suggests that incriminating conversations are "unlaw-
Congress imposed statutor'Y suppression under §§ 2515 and 2518 (10) (a) 
(i) as a sai)ction for noncompliance. In limiting use of the intercept pro-
cedure to "the most precise Rnd discriminate circumstances," S. Rep. No. 
107, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. , 102 (1968), Congress required law enforcement 
authorities to convince a District Court tjlat probable cause existed to 
believe that, a specific person was committing a specific offe11se using a. 
specific telephone. This requirement was satisfied here when the applica-
tion set forth sufficient information to indicate that the primary targets 
were conducting a gambling business ovor four particular telephones. 
Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to 
declare an otherwise c. onstitutional intercept order "unlawful" unver· 
§ 2518 (10) (a) (i)-resulting in suppression under § 2515-for failure t<L 
:name additional ta.rgets. 
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fully intercepted" whenever parties to those conversations 
do not receive discretionary inventory notice as a result of 
the Government's failure to inform the District Court of their 
identities. At the ti:rne inventory notice was served on the 
other identififj.ble persons, the intercept had been completed 
and the oonv~rsations had been "seized" under a valid in-
tercept order. The fact that discretionary notice reaohed 
39 rather thap 41 identiflable persons does not in itself :mean 
that the convf)rsations were unlawfully intercepted.lf= 
The legisla~ive history indicates that postintercept notice 
was designed instead to assure the community that the 
wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recog-
nizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that 
aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that 
postintercept notice was intended to serve as an independent 
restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure. 
IV 
Although the Government was required to identify respond-
ents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 26 
application for an extension of the initial intercept, failure 
Ol'h~ Counsel for respondents Merlo and Lauer conceded at oral argument 
that, the f11-ilure to name those respondents in the proposed inventory 
order was not. ii)tentional , Tr. of Oral Arg ., at 32, and we are therefore 
not called upon to decide whether suppression would be an available 
remedy if the Government knowingly sought to prevent the District 
Court from ~ervi~~ inventory notice on particular parties. Nor dors this 
case present an opportunity to comment, upon the suggestion, recognized 
by the United StlJrte:;, Brief, at 49 n. 40, that. suppression might be required 
if the agents krjf'lW before the interrept10n that no inventory would be 
served. 
Moreover. respqndents Merlo and Lauer were not prejudiced by their 
failure to receive post.intercept notice under either of the District Court's 
inventory orders. ' As noted earlier, the Government made available to 
all defendants tl1e intercept orders, applications, and related papers. See 
n. 7, supra. And in response to pre1rml discovery motions, the Govern- / 
ment prodnced tr!lnscripts of the intercepted conversations. / 
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to do so in the circumstances here presented did not warrant 
suppression under § 2518 (10)(a) (i) . Nor was suppression 
justified with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply 
because the Government inadvertently omitted their names 
from the comprehensive list of an identifiable persons whose 
conversations had been overheard. We hold that this is the 
correct result under the provisions of Title III, but we re-
emphasize the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez, 
that "strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of 
Title III would nonetheless be more in keeping with the 
responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when au-
thority to engage in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is 
sought." 416 U. S., at 580. 
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case 
is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accord 
with this opinion. 
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III 
We turn now to the question whether the District Court 
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at 
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement 
authorities to comply fully with the provisions of § § 2518 ( 1) 
(b) (iv) and 2518 (8) (d). Section 2515 expressly prohibits 
the use at trial, and at certain other proceedings, of the 
contents of any intercepted wire communication or any evi~ 
dence derived therefrom "if the disclosure of that informa~ 
tion would be in violation of this chapter." The circum-
stances that trigger suppression under § 2515 are in turn 
enumerated in § 2518 (10) (a): 
11 (i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
11 (ii) the order of authorization or approval under 
which · it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or 
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity 
with the order of authorization or approval." 
There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that 
the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the 
interception was not conducted in conformity with the order . 
Thus, only § 2518 (10) (a) (i) is relevant: were the communi-
cations 11unlawfully intercepted" given the violations of _., ,_A 
§§ 2518 (1) (b) (iv) and 2518 (8) (d)? 7:!" 
Resolution of that question must begin with United States 
which sugge:~ted that rather than submitting specific name> we should 
submit categorie:; of persons who had been overheard, is a better 
policy, would be more helpful to the district court in exercising its 
discretion, and we would have no objection to following any reason~ 
able policy that the district courts determine would be useful to them . 
~this regard." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 6-7. 
a~) J.,f; The availability of the suppression remedy for these statutory, 
as opposed to constitutional, violation,;, see nn. 15 and 19 , supra, turns 
on the provisions of Title III rather than the judicially fashioned ex.,. 
clusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment 
rights. United States v. Giordano, supr·a, 416 U. 8., at 524. / 
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This case presents issues concerning the construction of 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520. Specifically, we must 
decide whether 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (1)(b) (iv), which requires 
the Government to include in its wiretap applications "the 
identity of the person, if known, committing the offense, 
and whose conversations are to be intercepted," is. satisfied 
when the Government identifies only the "principal targets" 
of the intercept. Second, we must decide whether the Gov-
ernment has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing 
judge of the identities of persons whose conversations were 
overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling 
him to decide whether they should be served with notice of 
the interception pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8)(d). 
And finally, we must determine whether failure to comply 
fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of 
evidence under 18 e. s. c. § 2518 (10) (a). 
I 
On November 28, 1972, a special agent of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation applied to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order 
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IIV The application requested authorization to intercept 
gambling-related communications over two telephones at one 
address in North Olmstead, Ohio, and two other telephones 
1· The wiretap application procedure is set forth at 18 U. S. C. § 2518 
( 1), which provides: 
"(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the inter-
ception of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon 
oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction a.nd shall state 
the applicant's authority to make such application. Each u,pplicatjon 
shall include the following information: 
"(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making 
the application, and t.he officer authorizing the application; 
"(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied 
upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued, 
including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or 
is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and 
location of the facilities from which or the place where the communica-
tion is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular descripton of the type of 
communicu,tions sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, 
if known, committing the offense and whose communications· are to be 
intercepted; 
" (c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investi-
gative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably 
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous; 
"(d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is: 
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such 
that, the authorization for interception should not autom~~tically termi-
nate when the dPscribed type of communication has been first obtained , 
a particular description of facts establishing probable causP to believe that 
additional communications of tl1e same type will occur thereafter; 
" (e) a. full and complete statement of the facts concerning alL previous . 
applications known to the mdividual authorizing and making the appli-
cation, made to any judge for at1thorization to intercPpt, or for approval 
'Of interceptions of, wire or oral communications involving any of the 
same persons, facilities or placPs specified in thl' application, and the 
action taken by the j11dge on each such application; and 
"(f) where the applic11tion is for the extension of an order, a statement 
setting forth thP results thus far obtained from thP int{:rception, or a 
rea<;onable explanation of the failure to obtain such results ." 
The issuing judge is free to require the applicant to f1J.rnish additional 
information. 18 U. $ . C . ~2518 (2) . · 
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at a home in Canton, Ohio. The accompanying affidavit 
recited that the telephones were being used by Albert Kotoch, 
Joseph Spaganlo, and George Florea to conduct an illegal 
gambling business, and that in conducting that business they 
would place calls to and receive calls from va.rious persons, 
three of whom were also named in the wiretap a,pplication.2 
The affiant also stated that the Government's informants 
would refuse to testify against the persons named in the appli-
cation, that telephone records alone would be insufficient to 
support a gambling conviction, and that norma,l investiga-
tive techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to 
the Government's request, the District Court fl.Uthorized for 
a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related 
wire communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, three 
named individuals other than the respondents, and "others 
as yet unknown," to and from the four listed telephones.3 
2 The affidavit set forth extensivr information indicating that the namrd 
individuals were conducting a gambling opemtion. This information was 
drrived from physical surveillance by agents of the FBI, an examination 
of telephone company toll records, and the personal observations of six 
informa.nts, whose past reliability als~ was detailed in the affidavit. 
8 The District Court's order was issued pursuant 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 
(3), ( 4) which provide in pertinent part: 
"(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, 
as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire 
or oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court 
in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the 
facts submitted by the applicant that-
" (a) thrre is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing. 
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in 
section 2516 of this chapter ; 
"(b) there is probable cause for belief tl1at. particular communications 
.concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception; 
" (c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed 
or reasonably apprltr to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
.dangerous ; 
·' (d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, 
<()r the place whrre, the wire or or11l communications are to be intercepted 
71),-212-0PINION 
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During the course of the wiretap, the Government learned 
that respondents Donovan, Robbins. and Buzzaco were dis .. 
cussing illegal gambling activities with the named subjects. 
On December 26, 1972. the Government applied for an 
extension of the initial intercept order.'1 This time it sought 
authorization to intercept gambling-related conversations of 
Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, two other named individuals, and 
"others as yet unknown," but it did not identify respondents 
are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commis-
. sian of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly 
used by such person. 
" ( 4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire 
or oral communication shall spE-cify-
" (a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are 
to be intercepted; 
"(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to 
which, or the place where, authority to intt>rcept is granted; 
" (c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to 
be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it 
relates; 
"(d) the identity · of the agency authorized to intercept the communi-
cations, and of the person authorizing the application; and 
"(e) the period ' of time during which such interception is authorized, 
including a statement. as to whether or not the interception shall auto-
matically terminate when the described communication has been first 
obtained." 
4 In addition to the December 26 application requesting an extension 
of the initial intercl'pt order, the Government also filed on that date a 
separate application seeking authorization to monitor a third telephone 
discovered · at the &'tmc North Olm~tead address. Both applications were 
accompanied by another affidavit Hf'tting forth tlw results of the initial 
monitoring , the mannl'r in which the third phone was discovered, the 
facts indicating tl!at the newly discovered telephone was being used to 
conduct a gambling business, and reasons why continued interception was 
necessary. A copy of the affidavit filed on November 28 was also 
attached to th<' December 26 applications. For the sake of clarity, the. 
two applications filed on :Pecember 26 wi)l be· treated' as a sing.le-
a:pplicatiQP..·. 
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Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins in this second application.G 
·The District Court again authorized interception of gambling· 
related conversations for a maximum of 15 days. 
On February 21, 1973, the Government submitted to the 
District Court a proposed order giving notice of the inter-
ceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Government ap-
parently thought included all individuals who could be iden-
tified as having discussed gambling over the monitored 
telephones.6 The District Court signed the proposed order, 
and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons) 
including respondents Donovan , Buzzaco, and Robbins. On 
September 11, 1973, after the Government submitted the 
names of two additional persons whose identities allegedly haq 
been omitted inadvertently from the initial list, the District 
Court entered an amended order giving notice to those 
individuals. As a result of what the Government labels 
11administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer 
5 The United States conceded in the Court. of Appeals that respond-
ents Donovan and Robbins were "known'' within the meannig of the 
statute at the time of the DecembeP 26 application, but challenged a~ 
clearly erroneous the District Court'o; finding that respondent Buzzaco was 
"known" at that time. The Court of Appea.ls upheld the District Court's 
finding, and the United State;; has not sought review of that disposition . 
Tim·, for our purposes, all three re:;pondents were "known" on Decem-
·bt>r 26. 
6 An inventory notice must be served• within a designated period of 
time upon "the persons named in the order or the a,pplication." 18 , 
U. S. C. § 2518 (S){d). Tlre inventory mui:if · give notice of the entry of 
the intrrcept order or application, :;tate the disposition of the application , 
and ·mdicatr whether communications werr or were not intrrcepted. Ibid. 
UIJon tlw fiiing of a. motion , the jndgr hao; discrf'tion to makr available 
the intf'rcrpted communications, the a1Jplications, and the orders. Ibid. 
Title III also authonzes thr District Court to cause an inventory no-· 
tice to be served on "other parties to intercPptrd communications" if the 
j~tdge determines that ;;uch notice t:> in the interest of justice. Ibid. 
Those other parties may also be given acc<'S<> to the intercepted commu-
ni<:ations, the applications, and the order. . lbtd. 
1 
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were not included in either list of names and were never 
served with inventory notice.7 
On November 1, 1973; ~tn indictment was returned in the 
United States District Court for the . Northern District of 
Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the fiv~ respondents, and 
10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conduct-
ing a gamb·l'ing ·business in. violation. of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371 
and 1955. The five respondents filed ' motions to suppress 
evidence derived from the ' wire interception. After an evi-
dentiary hearing on the motions, the District Court sup-
pressed as to respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
all evidence derived from the December 26 intercept order 
on the ground that failure to identify. them by name in the 
application and order of that date violated 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 
(1)(b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a). With respect to Merlo and 
Lauer, w.ho were not known to the Government until after 
the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed 
all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground 
th~tt they had not been served ' with inventory notice. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 
513 F. 2d 337 (1975).8 On the identification issue, the 
court held that the wiretap application must identify every 
person whose conversations relating to the subject criminal 
· activity the Government has probable cause to believe it 
will intercept. Agreeing with the Pistrict Court that at the 
time of the December 26 application the Government had 
7 Although respondents Merlo and Lauer were not served with inven-
. tory notice pursuant. to § 2518 (8) (d), the interc<'pt orders, applications, 
and related papers were mad<" available to all tlw defendants, including 
Merlo and L~mcr, on November 26, 1973. Thus, the introduction into 
evidence nt trial of tlw contents of the intercepted conversations and 
evid<'nce denved tlwrefrom would not be prohibited by 18 U. S. C. 
§ 2518 (9). 
8 The Government filed its appeal from the Di1>trict Court's order sup-
pressing evidencr under 1~ 11. S. C. § :mn, and thE-re has bet>n no trial 
<>n the charge< with respect to tlw re1>pondents. 
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probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan, 
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from 
the December 26 order. On the notice question , it held 
that the Government has an implied statutory duty to in-
form the issuing judge of the identities of the parties whose 
conversations were overheard so that he can determine 
whether discretionary inventory notice should be required.9 
Because the Government had failed to perform this duty 
with respect to Merlo and Lauer, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidence 
derived from both intercept orders. The court found it un-
necessary to determine whether the failure to identify re-
pondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 
26 application and to name respondents Merlo and Lauer 
in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or 
purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to 
require suppression under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a).10 
We granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which concern 
the construction of a major federal statute, 421 U. S. 907, 
and now reverse. 
II 
The United States contends that §2518(1)(b)(iv) re-
quires that a wiretap application identify only the principal 
9 See n. 6, supm. 
1o 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) provide'S in pertinent part: 
" (10) (a ) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hea ring, or proceeding 
in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or 
other authority of the United States, a Sta tr, or n. politica l subdivision 
thereof, may move to suppress the content~ of any intercepted wire or 
oral commun ica tion, or evidence derived thrrrfrom, on the grounds that-
" (i) the communiration was unlawfully mt N<:rpted : 
" (ii) thr order of authori zation or approval under wh ich it was intr r-
ce-pted is insuffi cir nt on its face; or 
" (iii) the mterception was not made in conformity with the order of 
authorization or Rpproval." 
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target of the interc~ption, and that § 2518 (8) (d) does not 
require the Government to provide the issuing judge with 
a list of all identifiable persons who were overheard in tho 
course of an authorized interception. We think neither con-
tention is sound. 
A 
We turn first to the identification requirements of § 2518 
(l)(b)(iv). That provision requires a wiretap application 
to specify "the identity of the person, if known, co1nmitting 
the offense and whose comp1Unications are to be intercepted." 
In construing that langua.ge, this Court already has ruled 
that the Government is uot required to identify an individual 
in the application unless it has probable cause to believe 
(i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity 
under investigation and (ii) that the individ"!lal's conversa-
tions will be intercepted over the target telephone. United 
States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974). The question at issue 
here is whether the Government is required to name all 
such individuals.11 
The United States argues that the most reasonable m-
11 Every Court of Appeals that has considered t.he issue has concludrd 
that an individual who~e conversations probably will be intercepted by a 
wiretap must be identified in the wiretap application if the law enforce-
ment authorities have probable cause to believe the individual is commit-
ting the offense for which t.hc wiretap is sought. United States v. 
Chiarizio, 525 F . 2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975) ; United States v. Bernstein, 
509 F . 2d 996 (CA4 1975), petition for cert. filed , No. 7.J.-1486; United 
States v. Doolittle, 507 F. 2d 1368, aff'd en bane, 518 F. 2d 500 (CA5 
1975), petitions for cert. filed Nos. 75-500, 75-509, 75-513; United States 
v. Civella, 533 F . 2d 1395 (CAS 1976) , petitions for cert. filed, Nos. 
75-1813, 76-169; United States "· ausso, 527 F . 2d 1150, 1156 (CAlO} 
1975), cert. denied, - U . S. - (1970). See al~o United States v. 
Moore, - U. S. App. D. C. - ' . 513 F. 2d 485 , 493-494 (1975) (intrr-
preting 23 D. C. Code 547 (a) (2) , which is alm~t idrntical to the provi-
sion at issue here). 
A number of these courts have concluded , and respondents Donovan, 
Robbins, and Buzzaco argue, that our decision in United States v. Kahn, 
\ ' 
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terpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the 
application must identify only the principal target of the 
investigation, who "will almost always be the individual 
whose phone is monitored." ' 2 Brief for the United States, 
at l8. Under this interpretation, if the Government has 
reason to believe that an individual will use the target 
telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government 
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged 
in the criminal activity under investigation, the individual 
qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the 
wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who 
uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls 
from the target telephone is not a principal target even if 
the Go'vernment has probable cause to believe thf.l,t the 
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under inves-
tigation. In other words. whether one is a principal target 
of the investigation depends on whether one operates the 
target telephone to place or receive calls.13 
415 U. S. 143 ( 1974) , resolved this identification issue. See United States 
v. Chiarizio, supra; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there ts 
language in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must identify all 
such individuals, tht> idE.>ntificiltion quE.>stion presE.>nted here was not before 
us in Kahn. The question in that CiiSe was wht>ther a wiretap applica-
tion must identify a known usE>r of the t11rget telephone whose com-
plicity in the criminal activity under investigation was not. known at 
the time of the application. Kahn is a relevant, though not controlling, 
precedent. 
12 The United States does not suggest that regardless of the factual 
circumstances a wirE>tap application must idE.>ntify only a single individual. 
To the contrary, i't concedes that if two or more persons are using the 
targE>t telephone "E>I!)ually" to commit the offense, and thus are "E.>qually'" 
targets of the investigation, "all must be named." Brief for the Unite& 
States, at IS n. !3'. 
18 Counsel for the United States explainE>d this position succinctly at 
oral argument: "The critical distinction ... is one between the users or 
the telephone that is being monitored on thE> one hand, and all other per-
sons throughout fhe world who may conversE> from unmonitored phones: 
an the other Tl!lnd."" Tr. of Oral Arg., P-t 13. 
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Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we find 
little support for it in the language and structure of Title 
III or in the legislative history. The statutory language 
itself refer~ only to "th~ person, if known, committing the 
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." 
That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls 
to the target telephone flS it is to a suspect placing calls 
from that telephone. It is true, as the United States sug~ 
gests, that whe11 read in the context of the other sub-
divisions of § 2518 (1) (b), an argument can be made th~tt 
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user 
of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other 
sections of the statute th~tt Congress expected that wiretfl,p 
applications would name more than one individual. For 
example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served 
upon "the persons named in the order or the application." 
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8)(d) (emphasis f.ldded). And § 2518 
(1)(e) requires that an interc~pt applic~ttion dis~lose all 
previous intercept applications 1'involving any of the same 
persons . . . specified in the application" (emphasis added). 
It may well be that Congress anticipated that a given 
application would cover more than one telephone or that 
several suspects would use one telephone, and that an appli-
cation for those reasons alone would require identification 
of more than one individuaL But nothing Oll the face of 
the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from 
the identification requirement those suspects whose inter-
cepted conununications originated on a telephone other than 
that listed in the wiretap application .14 
1 ' Indeed , th!:' contrary conclusion is ::>uggest!•d by the fart that, iden-
tification of an individual in an a.pplication for an intrr-cept order 
trigg!:'rs othrr statutory prov1;;ions. First, § 2518 (1) (e) requires an in-
tcrc!:'pt apphcat1on 1o disclose all previous applications "involving any 
of the same persons . . . spe<"ifiecl in the application." To the extrnt 
tl1at Congress thought it necessary to provide the iS::luing judge with 
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Nor can we find support in the legislative history for the 
"principal target" interpretation. Title III originated a& 
a combination of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception 
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several 
months prior to this Court's decision in Berger v. New York , 
388 U. S. 41 (1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance 
Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few 
days after the Berger decision. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 
~ Sess., 66 (1968). Both bills required that wiretap ap-r 
plications include a full and complete statement of the 
facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant and 
specification of the nature and location of the commu-
nication facilities involved. Although neither bill contained 
an express identification requirement such as that at issue 
here, both bills required the application to include "a full 
and complete statement of the facts concerning aU previous 
applications ... involvi'ny any person named in the appli .. 
cation as committing, having committed, or being about to 
commit an offense." Hea.rings on Controlling Crime Through 
More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcommittee 
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8 (a) (3) and 
1006, § 2518 (a)( 4) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even 
at this early stage, it was recognized that an application 
could identify several individuals, and there is no indic~ttion 
that the identification would be limited to principal targets. 
S. 971 combined the major provisions of S. 675 and S. 2050 
and eventually was enacted. While it was pending before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court decided Kats 
such information, therr is no indication of congressional intent to requir~ 
provision of such infGrmation only if a suspect operated from one end 
of a t('lrphmw line. Second, §· 2518 (8) (d) mandates that an inven-
·tory notice be srrved· upon "the persons named in the order or the 
application ."· As with § 2518 ( 1) (e), the congressional purpose would 
·not be served by limiting that notice on the 'basis of the telephone frollJ 
which one speaks. 
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v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). S. 971 was then 
redrafted to confrom to Katz as well as Berger, and 
the identification provision was added at that time. The 
Senate Report states that the requirements set forth in the 
various subdivisions of § 2518 ( 1) (b), including the identifi-
cation requirement at issue here, " [were] intended to reflect the 
constitutional command of particularization." S. Rep. No. 
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), citing Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41,58-60, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 354-356 (1967). The United States now contends that 
although it may be that Congress read Berger and Katz to 
require, as a constitution~! matter, that the subject of the 
surveillance be named if known, Congress would hardly 
have read those cases as requiring the naming of all parties 
likely to be overheard.15 Brief, at 25-26. But to the ex-
tent that Congress thought it was meeting the constitutional 
commands of particularization established in Burger and 
Katz, Congress may have read those cases as mandating 
a broad identifi'cation requirement. The statute that we 
confronted in Berger required identification of "the person 
or persons" whose communications were to be overheard. 
388 U. S., at 59. And we expressly noted that that provi-
sion "[did] no more than identify the person whose constitu. 
tionally protected area is to be invaded .... . " . Ibid. Given 
the statute at issue in Berger and our comment upon it, 
15 At the time of the enactment of Title III, Congress did not 
have before it the view we expressed on this issue in United States 
v. Kahn, 415 U. S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment requires 
specification of "the place to be seached, a.nd the persons or things to 
be seized." In the wiretap context , those requirements are satisfied 
by idcntificntion of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular 
·conversations to be seized. It is not a constitutional requirement. that 
all those likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations 
be named. Specification of this sort "iclentif[ies] the person whose con-
~titutionally pTotected area is to be invaded rather than 'pa.rtirularly 
describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized." 
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967). 
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Congress may have concluded that the Constitution required 
the naming, in a wiretap application, of all suspects rather 
than just the primary user.10 ' 
In ~ny event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary 
to speculate as to exactly how Congress interpreted Berger 
and Kat~ with respect to the identification. issue. It is suf-
ficient to note that in response to those decisions Congress 
included an identific~tion requirement which on its face draws 
no distinction b~ed on the telephone one us~s, and the 
Uniteq States points to no evidence in the legislative history 
that supports such a distinction. Indeeq, the legislative ma-
terials apparently contain no use of the teqn "principal tar-
get" or any discqssion of a different treatment based on the 
telephone f11om which a suspect speaks.17 We therefore con-
clude that a wiretap application must hame an individual 
if the Government has probable cause to believe that the 
individual .is engaged in the criminal activity under inves-
tigation and expects to intercept the individual's conversa-
tions ov~r the 4trget telephone. 
B 
The other statutory provision at issue in this case is 
16 That Congress may have so understood the constitt~tional req4ire-
rnent is also suggested by the portion of the Sena.te Report dealing with 
that provision of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify 
"the person, if known, whose conyersations are to be intercepted." Tpe 
Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894) , which 
concerns tpe need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest 
warrant. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968) . To tpe 
extent that. Congress ma.y have considered West to apply to wiretap 
ord~rs, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its appli-· 
cability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone. 
17 At least one Senator read the identification requirement in S. 971 to-
parallel the identification requirement contained in the statute at issue• 
in Berger v. New York: "Specificity is required as to the person or 
persons whose communiCRtions are to be intercepted." 114 Cong. Rec.,. 
~t 14763 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Percy). 
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18 U. S. C. § 2pl8 (8)(d), which provides that the judge 
shf,tll cause to be served on the persons named in the order 
or application &n inventory, which must give notice of the 
entry of the orqer or application, state the disposition of 
the application, and indicate whether communications were 
intercepted.18 Although the statute mandates inventory no-
tice only for persons named in the application or the order, 
the statute also provides that the judge may order similar 
notice to other parties to intercepted communications if he 
concludes that such action is in the interest of justice.1 0 
Observing that this notice provision does not expressly re-
quire law enforcement authorities routinely to supply the 
j'udge with specific , information upon which to exercise his 
d'iscretion, the United States contends that it would be in-
appropriate to read such a requirement into the statute since 
the judge has the option of asking the law enforcement 
authorities for whatever information he requires. 
Our reading of the legislative history of the discretionary 
notice provision in light of the purposes of Title III leads 
us to reject the Government's interpretf,ttion. As reported 
from the Judiciary Committee. section 2518 (8) (d) contained 
enl'y a provision mandating notice to the persons named in 
the application or the order; the discretionary notice provi-
sion was added by amendment on the floor of the Senate. 
u The inventory notice· must be served within a reasonable time but 
not Inter than 90 days nfter- the date the application for nn intercept 
order was filed. On an ex parte showing· of good rause, service of the 
inventory may l:ie postponed: 
19 In addition to these provisions for mandatory and discretionary 
inventory notirr, the Govrrnment is rrquired to supply the issuing judge 
with recordings of the intercepted conversations, which are to be sealed 
according to hi ' dn·ection~;. 18 U. S. C. § 251/S (8) (a) . These notice 
and retum prov1~ions Rnti~f.\' constitutional requirements. See Katz v. 
United States,. 389 U. S. 347, 355-356, and. n. 16 (1967:) ; Berger v. Neu' 
York, 388 U, S. 41 , 60 (1967). , 
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In introducing that amendment, Senator Hart explained its 
purpose: 
11The amendment would give the judge who issued the 
order discretion to require notice to be served on other 
parties to intercepted conversations, even though such 
parties are not specifically named in the court order . . 
The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice 
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of 11ny 
surveillance statute. It may be that the required no-
tice must be served on all parties to intercept~d com-
munications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may 
make such notice to all parties undesirable, the amend-
ment leaves the final determination to the judge." 114 
Cong. Rec. 14485-14486 (1968). 20 
In deciding whether legitimate privacy interests justify 
withholding inventory notice from parties to intercepted con-
versations, a judge is likely to require information and assist-
ance beyolld that contained in the application papers and the 
recordings of intercepted con~ersations made available by 
law enforcement authorities. No purpose is served by hold-
ing that those authorities have no routine duty to supply 
the judge with revelant information. The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted this problem of 
20 It is worth noting that shortly before Senator Hart proposed this 
amendment to S. 971, Senator Long had read to tho Senate portidns 
of a report prcparrd by the A:ssociation of the Bar of the City of 
New York 011 federal wiretap legi~:da1ion. That report commented that 
parties to intercepted conversations other than those named in the appli-
cation or order probably should be served with inventory noticP, but it 
also recognizrd tl1a t under some circ\lmR1 ancrs the provision of such notice 
could be harmful and gave the followin~ example: 
"A, a businf'Ssman, talks to his customers, and the latter are served 
with papers ~bowing that A is being bugged[.] LT]he damage- to con-
fidence in A and to A's reputation in general may damage A unjustly. 
In this case it would seem that the customers :should not be served with 
the inventory." 114 Cong. Rec. 14476 (1968). 
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dual res~nsibility, and we adopt the balanced construction 
that c~u·rt plac~d on § 2518 (8) (d) : 
"To discha.rge this obligation the juqicial officer · must · 
havlil, at a minimum, knowledg~ of the particul&.r pate-
gorjj3s into which fap all the individuals wqose conver-
satioqs have been intercepte~ : Thus, while precise iden-
tification of each party to an iqtercept~d cpnv~rs~tion 
1 · · · · · I 
ts not required, a descript~on of tpe geQer~:~-1 cla$; or 
classes, which they cmqp'rise is essential to en&.ble the 
judge to qetermine 'whether add,itional information. ~s 
. I ' 
necessary for a proper evaluation of the interest~ df the 
various parties. F\lrthermore, alth~4gh the jqdfcial offi-
cer has the duty to oau~e the filing of ' ~he inve~topr 
(notice]. it is abund&.ntly c)e~r th~t the prosec4tipq 'hi\-! 
gr~ater access to and familiartity with the int~rc~pted 
communications. Therefore we feel justiped ip imposing 
upon the latter the duty to classify all those 'Yhose 
eonversations have been . 'nt~rcep~d, and to tl,'anstnit 
this information to t}ie j1Jdge: Sho.uld the jlfdge desine 
more information regarding these classes in order1 to 
exercise his statutory § 2518 (8) (d) discretion, ... the 
government is aJ30 required to £umish S'l\Ch information . 
as is available to it." UnitEJd States v. Chun, ·50? F . 
2d 533, 540 (1974,. 
I 
We agree with the Ninth Cirpui~ that this allocation of 
responsibility be!St serves the PllrP~&;!S of Title liL21 
21 At. oral argument , counsel for the United States recognized the mPrit 
·of the approach sp~cified in Unitefl St,ate~ v, Chun : ' 
"Perhl\-ps the appro~tch of the Cqurt of APl'eals fCif t,he Njnth QircQit, 
which suggested that ra.th~r tlvtn ~:~ubtllitt~n~ specific naJlles we should 
SUbq)it categories of r>ersons Wao had been <W~rh~rd , is a. QE)tter 
policy, woul~ be more helpful t9 the 9istrict court in exercising it~ 
discretion, and we would have no opjectiol'\ ·to following any reason-
able poli~y that the di~trict courts determine would be useft~l to them. 
in this r{)ga.rd.'' T.r. of Oral .A:rg., at 6-7. · 
I I 
75-212-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. DONOVAN 17 
Currently, the policy of the Justice Department is to pro-
vide the issuing judge with the name of every person who 
h~ts been overheard as to whop1 there is any reasonable pos-
sibility of indictment. Brief for the United States, 11-t 39. 
Because it fails to assure that the necessary range of infor~ 
mation will be before the issuing judge, this policy does not 
meet the test set out in Chun. Moreover, where, as 'here, 
the Government chooses to, supply the issuing judge with 
a list of all identifiable persons ra.ther than a descript~on 
of the classes into which those persons fall, the list must 
be complete. Applying these · principles, we find that the 
Government did not corpply adequa,.tely with § 2518 (8)(d), 
since the names of responqents Merlo and Lauer were not 
included on the purportedly complete list of ide11tifiable per-
sons submitted to the issuing judge. 
III 
We turn now to the question whether the District Court 
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at 
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement 
authorities to comply fully with the provisions of §§ ~5l8 (1) 
(b)(iv) and 2518 (8)(d). Section 2515 expressly prohibits 
the use at trial, and at certain other proceedings, of the 
contents of any intercepted wire COfBmunication or any evi-
dence derived therefrom "if the disclosure of that , informa-
tion would be in violatio11 of this cbapter." The circum-
stances that trigger suppression under § 2515 are in turn 
enumerated in § 2518 (10)(a) : 
" (i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval u~der 
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or 
"(iii) the interceptiou was not made in conformity 
with the order of authorization or approval." 
'There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that 
the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the 
· 15-~12-0PINWN 
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interception was not conducted in conformity with the ord~rs. 
Thus, only § 2518 (10) (a) (i) is relevant: were the com~nuni­
cations "unlawfully intercepted" given . the violations of 
§§ 2518 (1) (h) (iv) and 2518 (8) (d)? 22 
Resolution of that question must begin with United States 
v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v; 
' Chavez, 416 U.S. 56Z (1974). Those cases hold that "rnQt] 
every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided 
in Title III would ·render the interception of wire or oral 
I , 
communications 'unlawful.'" United States v. Chavez, 416 
U. 8., at 574-575. To the contrary, suppression is required 
·only for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory require~ 
ments that directly and substantially implement the con-
·gressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures 
to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this 
extraordinary device." United States v. Giordano, 416 U. 8., 
at 527. 
Giordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring 
that an application for an intercept order be approved by 
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General spe-
cially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding that 
Congress intended to condition the use of wiretap procedures 
on the judgment of senior officials in the Department of 
J'ustice, the Court required suppression for failure to com-
1 
ply with the approval provision. Chavez concerned the stat-
utory requirement that the application for an intercept order 
specify the identity of the official authorizing the applica-
tion. The problem in Chavez was one of misidentification; 
although the application had in fact been authorized by the 
Attorney General, the application erroneously identified an 
22 The a.vailability of thr suppre~sion remedy for these statutory, 
as · opposed _ to constitutional. violations, see 11n. 15 and 19, supra, turns 
on the provisions of Title III rather than the judicially fashioned ex-
clusionary rule aimed at deterring viola.tions of Fourth Amendment 
rights. United States v. Giordano, supra, 416 U. S., at 524. 
, I 
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· Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the 
application . The Court concluded that mere misidentifica-
tion of the official authorizing the application did not make 
the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518 (10) 
(a) (i) since that identification requirement did not play a 
"substantive role" in the regulatory system. 416 U. S., 
at 578. 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both 
the identification requirement of § 2518 (1)(b)(iv) and 
the notice requirement of § 2515 (8) (d) played a "central 
role" in the statutory framework, and for that reason af-
firmed the District Court's order suppressing releva.nt 
evidence. Although both statutory requirements are un-
doubtedly important, we do not think that the failure to 
comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an in-
tercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory 
requirements. 
A 
As to § 2518 (1) (b) (iv), the issue is whether the identifi-
cation in an intercept application of all those likely to be 
overheard in incriminating conversations plays a "substan-
t ive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept 
orders and consequently imposes a limitation on the use 
of intercept procedures. The statute provides that the issu-
ing judge may approve an intercept application if he deter-
mines that normal investigative techniques have failed or 
are unlikely to succeed and there is probable c~use to belif)ve 
that : (i) an individual is engaged in criminal activity, 
(ii) particular communications concerning the offense will 
be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facili-
ties are being used in connectio11 with the specified criminal 
activity. That determination is based on the "full and com-
plete statemeut" of relevant facts supplied by law enforpe-
ment authorities. If, after evaluating the statutorily· 
~num(lr~teq factors in light of the ioformation contained in 
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the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order 
should issue, the failure to identify additional persons who 
are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conver~ 
sations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial 
~uthoriza~ion . The intercept order may issue only if the 
issuing judge determines that the statutory factors are pres-
ent, and the failure to name additional targets in 110 'way 
detracts from the sufficiency of those factors. 
This case is unlike Giordano, where failure to satisfy 
the statutory requirement of prior approval by specified 
Justice Departmen't officials bypassed a congressionally 
imposed limitation on the use of the intercept procedure. 
The Court there noted that it '\Vas reasonable to believe 
that requiring prior approval from senior officials in fhe 
Justice Department "would inevitably foreclose resort to 
wiretapping · in various situations where investigative person-
nel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court 
and the court woulq very likely authorize its use." 416 U. S., 
at 528. Here, however, the statutorily, imposed precondition~ 
to judicial a~thorization were satisfied, and the issuing judge 
was simply ~paware that additional persons might be over-
heard engaging in incriminating convers~ttions. In no mean-
ingful sense can it be said · that the presence of that in for~ 
mation as to additional targets would have precluded judicial 
authorization of the intercept. ~ 3 Rather, this case resembles 
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful sim~ 
23 T here is no Rttggrf'tion in t hi" cnse t h. a t 1 hr Gov!'rnment agl:'nts 
knowingly fail~d to identify respondrnts Donovan , Robbins,' and Buzzaco 
for the purpose of keeping relevant informati011 from t.he District Court 
that. might have prompted the court. to conclude that probable cause 
was Jackiug. If ~uch a showing had been m ade, we would have a. 
different case. Nor is thrre any ~uggestion that, as a result of the. 
failure to name these thrPe respondents' they were denied t he manda tory 
inventory not ice supplied to per;;ons named in the 
1 
applica.tion . 18 
U . S. C . § 2518 (8 ) (d) . R etipondmts Donovan , Robbins, and Buzzacu. 
were among t he 37 p<"rsons servrd with t he intial ilwentory. 
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ply because the issuing judge was incorrectly informed as 
to which designated official had authorized the application. 
The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Justice Depart-
ment had performed its task of prior approval, and the 
instant intercept is lawful because the application provided 
sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to deter-
mine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied.2 ' 
Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative history 
suggests that Congress intended this broad identification re-
quirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in 
guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic 
surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S., at 578. 
Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971, 
contained an identification provision. See p. 11, supra. The 
24 No onP suggrsts th::tt thr failure t.o identify in a wiretap application 
individuals who are ·'unknown" within the meaning of the statute, see 
United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974), requires suppression of 
intcrcept("d conversations to which those individuals were parties. Though 
recognizing that the failure to identify such an "unknown" indivi<;lual 
does not. make unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents 
Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest tha.t · the opposite is true 
with respect to thr failure to identify in a wiretap application indi~ 
viduals who are "known" within the meaning of the statute. Counsel 
for these respondents suggested at oral argument that this <lifferenee 
in resplt is justified by analogy to warrantless searches or arrests. Tr. 
of Ora.L Arg., at 40. Although law enforcement officials can often take 
action without, a. warra.nt when they have been unable to fore.:;ee the 
circumstanef'S that eventually · confronted them, they still must obtain a 
search or arrest .warrant when t.heir prior knowledge is sufficient to 
establish probable cause, and it is suggested that the same principle 
applies here. The major flaw in that rea.:;oning is that this case doe!'! 
not concern warrantless actio11. Here, the omission on the part of law 
enforcement. authorities was not a failure to seek prior judicial authori-
zatio,n, but a failure t.o identify every individual who could be expected 
to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations. That the com· 
plete ab~ence of prior judicial authorizntion would make an intercept 
unlawful has no bearing on the lawfulne&& Qf an intercept order th.a.t 
f\\\1~ to identif:y every target, 
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only explanation giyen in the Senate Report fot· the in~ 
elusion of the broad identification provision was that it was 
intended to reflect what C'ongress perceived to be the con-
stitutional commallll of particularization. This explanation 
was offered with respect to all the information required by 
§ 2518 (I) (6) to be set out iJ\ an intercept application. No 
additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor debates, 




We reach the same conclusion with respect to the Gov-
ernment's duty to inform the .iuclge of all identifiable persons 
whose conversations were intercepted. As noted earlier, the 
versipn of Title: Ill that c:mergeq from the Senate Judiciary 
Committee provided only for mandatory notice to the "per-
sous named in the order or the application." The Senate 
Report detailed the purpose of that provision: 
"[Tlhe intent of the provision is that the principle 
of postuse notice will be retained. This provision alone 
should insure the community that the techniques !I-re 
reasonably employed. Through its operation all author~ 
2 " Even if wr fk'sume i,hat. Cougrr~;; though1 thn,t a broa.d idrntificntion 
requirement was ron~titutionally mandated, it dors not follow that 
{;ongrl'!'s irnpo~ed statutory :-:upprrsr;ion under §§ 2515 and ~518 (10) (a) 
(1) ns a sanction for noncompliance. In limiting m;e of the mterrept pro· 
cedure to "t.he mos1 precise and di:,;crimnm!!• circumstances," S. Rep . ~o. 
107, 90th Cong., 2d SeHI:i., 102 (196H), Congrrs:,; rrquired law enforcrm('llt 
authorities to ronvim·<' a District Court that probable cau~c exiti!<'cl to 
believe that 11. ~peeific prr~on was committing n ~pecific offen~e usmg a 
specific t<'lephone. This requirement waH ;;ati~fiE'cl here '\Vhen th<' npplica · 
tion srt forth ::;ufficirnt information to indicate that the primary targets. 
were conducting a gambling bus1nps;; over four particular telephones. 
Nothing in the lc·gi:;lativc history indicatt>;; that Congretis i!ltenclt>d to 
declare nn o1l1rnyise consntntionul mtcreevi ordt>r ''unl!Lwful" uncier-
§ 2518 (10) (a) (i)-resltlting in ::;uwre:;sion nudrr § 2515-for failun' tn. 
name additional target<>. 
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Jzed interceptions must eventually become known at least 
to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil re. 
dress, for example, under section 2520 . . . . if he feels 
that his privacy has been Ulllawfully invaded." S. Rep. 
No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1968). 
The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding the 
provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent 
to provide notice to such additional persons as may be 
constitutionally required. 
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative 
history suggests that incriminating conversations are "unlaw· 
fully intercepted'' whenever parties to those conversations 
do not receive discretionary inventory notice as a result of 
the Government's failure to inform the District Court of their 
jdentities. At the time inventory notice was served on the 
other identifiable persons, the iutercept had been complet~d 
and the conversations had been "seized" under a valid in· 
tercept order. The fact that discretionary notice reached 
39 rather than 41 identifiable persons does not in itself mean 
I 
that the conversations were unlawfully intercepted. 2n 
The legislative history i11dicates that postintercept noticE> 
2n Counsel for respondents 1\I«:'rlo and Lauer concedt>d at ornl argtllm'nt 
that the failttre to nnme those rrspondents in the proposed inventory 
ordPJ' wa:;; not. intent.ional, Tr. of Oral Arg., at 32. and wr are thrrqfore 
uot railed upon to decidr wlwt.her ;;upprt'l:ision would rn' au avai lablt• 
renwdy if the <iovi'mment knowingly Haught lo prevent the District 
Court from srrving inventory noticr on particular parties . Nor does thi;; 
ease prcst'JJ1 an opportunity t.o connnent. upon the suggestion, recognized 
hy the United States, Brief, at 49 n. 40, thnt suppre;;sion might be required 
if t ht' agmtH knrw hrfore the intercPptiou that no inwntory would be 
::;rrvrd. 
1\lol'f•over, respondents :vlrrlo and Lauer were not prejudiced by their 
failure to rt'rC'ive postmtercept notice under either of the District Court's 
inventory orders. A:-; noted earhrr. the Government madf' available to-
all drfendants the intercept orrlers, applications, and relatffi papers. Soo 
n . 7, su7Jra. And in responH<' to prrtrial diHrovery motions, the Govern-
mrnt produce(! tran1)cripts of the interrrptcd convrr::;ations. 
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was designed instead to assure the community that the 
wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recog-
nizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that 
aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that 
postintercept notice was intended to serve as an independent 
restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure. 
IV 
Although the Government was required to identify respond-
ents Donovan , Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 2() 
application for an extension of the initial intercept, failure 
to do so in the circumstances here presented did not warrant 
suppression under ~ 2518 (lO)(a)(i). Nor was suppression 
justified with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply 
because the Government inadvertently omitted their names· 
from the comprehensive list of all identifiable persons whose 
conversations had been overheard. We hold that this is the' 
correct result under the provisions of Title III, but we re-
emphasize the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez,. 
that "strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of 
Title III "vould nonetheless be more in keeping with the 
responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when au-
thority to enga.ge in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is 
sought." 416 U. S., at 580. 
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case 
is remanded to that court for further procet'dings in accord' 
w.ith this orpinitln. 
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This case presents issues concerning the construction of 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520. Specifically, we must 
decide whether 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (1)(b) (iv), which requires 
the Government to include in its wiretap applications "the 
identity of the person, if known, committing the offense, 
and whose conversations are to be intercepted," is satisfied 
when the Government identifies only the "principal targets" 
of the intercept. Second, we must decide whether the Gov-
ernment has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing 
judge of the identities of persons whose conversations were 
overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling 
him to decide whether they should be served with notice of 
the interception pursuant to 18 D. S. C. § 2518 (8)(d). 
And fina.lly, we must determine whether failure to comply 
fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of 
evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a) . 
I 
On November 28, 1972, a special agent of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation applied to th(> Fnited States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order I 
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III,l The application requested authorization to intercept 
gambling-related communications over two telephones at one 
address in North Olmstead, Ohio, and two other telephones 
1 The wiretap application procedure is set forth at 18 U. S. C. § 2518 
( 1), which provides: 
" ( 1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the inter-
ception of a wire or ornl communication shall be made in writing upon 
oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state 
the applicant's authority to make such application. Each applicatjon 
shall include the following information: 
"(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making 
the a.pplica.tion, and the officer authorizing the application; 
"(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied 
upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued, 
including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or 
is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and 
location of the facilities from which or the place where the communicn-
tion is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular descripton of the type of 
communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, 
if known, committing the offense and whose communications· are to be 
intercepted; 
"(c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investi-
gative procedmf's have been tried and failed or why they reasonably 
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous; 
"(d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is: 
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such 
that. the authorization for interception ~hottld not automatically termi-
nate when the described type of communication has been first obtained. 
a particular description of facts establishing probable catt ·e to believe that 
additional communications of the same type will occur t.hereafter; 
"(c) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning aU previous : 
applications known to the individual authorizing and making the appli-
cation, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for approval 
•of interceptions of, wire or ora I communications involving any of the 
same pt>rsons, facilities or places specified in the application, and the 
:action taken by tlw judge on each such application; and 
" (f) where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement 
setting forth the re.~mlts t1ms far obtained from the interception, or a 
reasonable explanation of the failurt> to obtain such results ." 
The issuing judge is frre to require the applicant to furni!lh additional 
information . 18 U. $ . C . §2518 (2) . · 
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at a home in Canton, Ohio. The accompanying affidavit 
recited that the telephones were being used by Albert Kotoch, 
Joseph Spaganlo, and George Florea to conduct an illegal 
gambling business, and that in conducting that business they 
would place calls to and receive calls from various persons, 
three of whom were also named in the wiretap application.2 
The affiant also stated that the Government's informants 
would refuse to testify against the persons named in the appli-
cation, that telephone records alone would be insufficient to 
support a gambling conviction, and that normal investiga-
tive techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to 
the Government's request, the District Court authorized for 
a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related 
wire communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, three 
named individuals other than the respondents, and "others 
as yet unknown," to and from the four listed telephones.8 
2 The affidavit set forth extensive information indicating that the named 
individuals were conducting a gambling opemtion. This information was 
derived from physical surveillance by agents of the FBI, an examination 
of telephone company toll records, and the personal observations of six 
informants, whose past reliability also was detailed in the affidavit. 
a The District Court's order was issued pursuant 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 
(3), (4) which provide in pertinent part : 
"(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, 
as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire 
or oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court 
in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the 
facts submitted by the applicant that-
"(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing. 
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in 
section 2516 of this chapter; 
" (b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications: 
concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception; 
" (c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed 
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous; 
" (d) there is probable cause for belief tha.t the facilities from which, 
,Qr the place where, the wire or oral communications are to he intercepted 
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During the course of the wiretap, the Government learned 
that respondents Donovan, Robbins. and Buzzaco were dis-
cussing illegal gambling activities with the named subjects. 
On December 26, 1972, the Government applied for an 
extension of the initial intercept order.4 This time it sought 
authorization to intercept gambling-related conversations of 
Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, two other named individuals, and 
11others as yet unknown," but it did not identify respondents 
are being used , or are about to be used, in connection with the commis-
. sion of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly 
used by such person. 
" ( 4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire 
or oral communication shall specify-
" (a) the identity of the person , if known, whose communications are 
to be intercepted ; 
"(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to 
which , or the place where, authority to intercept is granted; 
" (c) a particular description of the type of communication so1.1ght to 
be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it 
relates; 
"(d) the identity · of the agency authorized to intercept the communi-
cations, and of the person authorizing the application ; and 
" (e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized, 
including a statement as to whether or not. the interception shall auto-
matically terminate when the described communication has been first 
obtained." 
4 In addition to the December 26 application requesting an extension 
of the initial intercept order, the Government also filed on that date ~~ 
sepnrate application seeking authorization to monitor a third telephone 
discovered at the same North Olm~tPad addrPss. Both applications were 
accompanied by another affidavit. :setting forth the re~ults of the initial 
monitoring, the manner in which the third phone was discovered, the 
facts indicating that the newly discovered telephone was being used to 
conduct a gambling business, and reason::; why continued interception was 
necessary. A copy of thB affidavit filed on Novembpr 28 was also 
attached to thr Decrmber 26 applications. For the sakr of clarity, the . 
two n.pplications fil ed on December 26 wiJl be· treated' as a. singJ~ .. 
applicatiQJ},., 
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Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins in this second application.~ 
The District Court again authorized interception of gambling-
related conversations for a maximum of 15 days. 
On February 21, 1973, the Government submitted to the 
District Court a proposed order giving notice of the inter-
ceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Govemment ap-
parently thought included all individuals who could be iden-
tified as having discussed gambling over the monitored 
telephones.0 The District Court signed the proposed order~ 
and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons1 
including respondents Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins. On 
September 11, 1973, after the Government submitted the 
names of two additional persons whose identities allegedly hacl 
been omitted inadvertently from the initial list, the District 
Court entered an amended order giving notice to those 
individuals. As a result of what the Government labels 
"administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer 
5 The United Sta.tes conceded in the Conrt of Appeals that respond-
ents Donovan and Robbins were "known'' within the meannig of the 
statute at the time of the December 213 application, but challenged as 
clearly erroneous the District Court's finding that. respondent Buzzaco wa~ 
"known" at that time. The Ceurt of Appeals upheld the District Court'::; 
finding, and the United Sta.tes hm; not sought. review of that disposition. 
Thus, for our purposes, all three re:spondents were "known" on Decem-
'ber 26. 
6 An inventory notice must be servedr within a designatrd period of 
time upon "the persons named in the ordrr or the application." 18. 
U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d). Thr inventory must give notice of the rnt.ry of 
the interc<'pt ordrr or application , state the di~posit ion of the applicntion , 
and indicate wh<'ther communications wf•re or wrre not intercepted. Ibid . 
Upon the fiting of n motion. the judgr has discrrtion to make available 
the intercrpted communications, the applications, and the orders. ibid. 
Title III also authoriz('S the District C'omt to cause an inventory no-· 
tice to be s<>rved on "otlwr parties to interccpt<>d communications" if the 
j;udge determines thnt ~uch notice is in the interest of justice. ibid. 
Those other parties mny also br giwn 3('('1':>~:> to the intercepted commu-
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were not included in either list of names and were never 
served with inventory notice.7 
On November 1, 1973; an indictment was returned in the 
United States Dis~rict · CO'!.lrt for the . Northern District of 
Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents, and 
10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conduct-
ing a gambTing 'busiiiess in· violatioJl of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371 
and 1955. The five respondents filed '· motions to suppress 
evidence derived from the wire interception. After an evi-
dentiary hearing on the motions, the District Court sup-
pressed as to -respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
all evidence derived from the Decem~er 26 intercept order 
on the ground that failure to identify them by name in the 
application and order -of that date violated 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 
(l)(b)(iv) and 2518 ( 4) (a). With respect to Merlo and 
Lauer, w,ho were not known to the Government until after 
the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed 
all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground 
that they had not been served ' with inventory notice. 
The Cour-t of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 
513 F. 2d 337 (1975).8 On the identification issue, the 
court held that the wiretap application must identify every 
person whose conversations relating to the subject criminal 
activity the Government has probable cause to believe it 
will intercept. Agreeing with the Pistrict Court that at the 
time of the December 26 application the Government had 
7 Alt.hough respondents Merlo and Lauer were not served with inven-
, tory notice ptirsuant. to § 2518 (8) (d) , the intercept orders, applications, 
and rela.ted papers wrre madr available to all tlw defendants, including 
Merlo and Lau('r. on November 26, 1973. Thus, the introduction into 
evidence a.t trial of tlw contents of the intercepted conversations and 
evidence denved therefrom would not. be prohibited by 18 U. S. C. 
§ 2518 (9). 
8 The Government filed its appeal from the District Court's order sup~ 
}>ressing evidence under 18 tT . S. C. § 3731, and therr has bef'n no trial 
()Tl t.he charg~ with r('o;pcct to the r~pondents. 
., 
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probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan, 
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from 
the December 26 order. On the notice question , it held 
that the Government has an implied statutory duty to in-
form the issuing judge of the identities of the parties whose 
conversations were overheard so that he can determine 
whether discretionary inventory notice should be required.0 
Because the Government had failed to perform this duty 
with respect to Merlo and Lauer, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidence 
derived from both intercept orders. The court found it un-
necessary to determine whether the failure to identify re-
pondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 
26 application and to name respondents Merlo and Lauer 
in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or 
purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to 
require suppression under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a).111 
We granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which concern 
the construction of a major federal statute, 421 U. S. 907, 
and now reverse. 
II 
The United States contends that § 2518 (1)(b) (iv) re-
quires that a wiretap application identify only the principal 
9 See n . 6, supra. 
10 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a.) providt>S in pertinent part: 
" (10) (<1) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hea ring , or proceeding 
in or before any court , department, officer, ag:ency, regulatory body, or 
other authority of the United Sta.tcs, a State, or a. politi ca l subdivision 
thereof, may move to o;uppres.' the contpnt~ of any intercepted wire or 
oral communicatiOn, or evidence derived therefrom , on the grounds that-
" (i) the communication was unlawfully in tercepted ; 
" (ii) the order of authorization or approval nnder wh ich it was inter-
cepted is insufficient on its face; or 
" (iii ) the int erception was not made in conformity with the ,order of 
authorization or approval." 
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target of the interc~ption, and that § 2518 (8)(d) does not 
require the Government to provide the issuing judge with 
a list of all identifiable persons who were overheard in the 
course of an authorized interception. We think neither con-
tention is sound. 
A 
We turn first to the identification requirements of ·§ 2518 
(1)(b)(iv). That provision requires a wiretap application 
to specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing 
the offense and whose comJllunications are to be intercepted." 
In construing that language, this 8ourt already has ruled 
that the Government is not required to identify an individual 
in the application unless it has probable cause to believe 
(i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity 
under investigation and (ii) that the individual's conversa-
tions will be intercepted over the target telephone. United 
States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974). The question at issue 
here is whether the Government is required to name all 
such indivicluals.11 
The United States argues that the most reasonable in-
u Every Court of Appeals that hns considered the issue hns ronrludrd 
tl1at an individual whose conversntions probably will be interc0pted b~r H 
wiretnp must be identified in the wiretap application if the law enforce-
ment authorities have probable cause to believe the individunl is rommit~ 
ting the offense for which the wiretap is sought . UnitPd States v. 
Chiarizio, 525 F . 2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975): United States v. Bernstein, 
509 F. 2d 996 (CA4 1975), petition for rert. filed , No. 74-1486; United 
States v. Doolittle, 507 F . 2d 1368, aff'd en bane, 518 F. 2d 500 (CA5 
1975) , petitions for cert . filed Nos. 75-500, 75-509, 75-513; United States 
v. Civella, 533 F . 2d 1395 (CAS 1976) , petitions for cPrt. filPd , Nos. 
75-1813, 76-169 ; United States \' . Russo, 527 F. 2d 1150, 1156 (CAIO I 
1975) , cPrt . dPnied , - F. S. - (1976). See also United StatPs v. 
Moore, - U. S. App. D . C.-· . 513 F. 2d 485, 493-494 (1975) (inter-
preting 23 D . C. Code 547 (a) (:2) , which is almost idPntical to the provi~ 
sion at issue here). 
A number of these courts hnve concluded, and respondents Donovan, 
Robbins, and Buzzaco argue, that our drrision in United States v. Kahn, 
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terpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the 
application must identify only the principal target of the 
investigation, who "will almost always be the individual 
whose phohe is monitored." 12 Brief for the United States, 
at 18. Under this interpretation, if the Government has 
reason to believe that an individual will use the target 
telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government 
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged 
in the criminal activity under investigation, the individual 
qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the 
wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who 
uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls 
from the target telephone is not a principal target even if 
the Government has probable cause to believe that the 
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under inves-
tigation. In other words. whether one is a principal target 
of the investigation depends on whether one operates the 
target telephone to place or receive calls.13 
415 U. S. 143 ( 1974) , resolved this identification issue. See United States 
v. Chiarizio, supra.; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there i8 
language in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must identify all 
such individuals, the identification question presented here was not before 
us in Kahn . The question in that case was whether a wiretap applica-
tion mutit identify a known u~rr of the target telephone whose com-
plicity in the criminal activity under investigation was not kno\Vn at 
the time of the application . Kahn is a relevant, though not controlling, 
precedent. 
12 The United States does not, suggest that regardless of the factual 
circumstances a win'ta.p application must identify only a. single individual. 
To the contrary, i't concedes that if two or more persons are using the 
targrt. trlephone "et~ually" to commit the offense, an.d thus are "equally',. 
targets of the investigation, "all must be namrd." Brief for the Unite& 
States, at IS n . !6. 
18 Counsel for the United States explained this position succinctly at 
oral argumrnt : "TI1e critical distinction ... is one bet\Veen the users or 
the telephone that is being monitored on the on(> hand, and all other per-
sons througl10ut the world who may converse from unmonitored phones< 
m1 the Qthe~r T1.'1n<i"' Tr. of Oral Arg., g,t 13. 
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Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we find 
little support for it in the language and structure of Title 
III or in the legislative history. The statutory langua.ge 
itself refers only to "th~ person, if known, committing the 
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." 
That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls 
.to the target telephone as it is to a suspect placing calls 
from that telephone. It is true, as the United States sug~ 
gests, that when read in the context of the other sub-
divisions of §2518(1)(b) , an argument can be made that 
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user 
of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other 
sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap 
applications would nan1e more than one individual. For 
example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served 
upon "the persons named in the order or the application." 
18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d) (emphasis added). And § 2518 
( 1 )(e) requires that an intercj:)pt application disclose all 
previous intercept applications 11involving any of the same 
persons ... specified in the application" (emphasis added). 
It may well be that Congress anticipated that a given 
application would cover more than one telephone or that 
several suspects would use one telephone, and that an appli-
cation for those reasons alone would require identification 
of more than one individual, But nothing on the face of 
the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from 
the identificatiou requirement those suspects whose inter-
cepted communications originated on a telephone other than 
that listed in the wiretap application.14 
11 Indeed, 1lw contrary conclusion is suggested by the fact that iden-
tification of an i11dividual in an a.pplication for an intercept order 
triggers othrr statutory provi~ions. Fir~t, § 2518 (1) (e) requires an in-
tercept application to disclose all previous applications "involving any 
of the same persons . .. spreified in the application ." To the extent 
tlmt Congress thou"ht it necessary to provide the issuing judge with 
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Nor can we find support in the legislative history for the 
"principal target" interpretation. Title III originated a& 
a combination of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception 
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several 
months prior to this Court's decision in Berger v. New York, 
388 U. S. 41 (1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance 
Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few 
days after the Berger decision. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 
~d Sess., 66 (1968). Both bills required that wiretap ap .. 
plications include a full and complete statement of the 
facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant and 
specification of the nature and location of the commu-
nication facilities involved. Although neither bill contained 
an express identification requirement such as that at issue 
here, both bills required the application to include "a full 
and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous 
applications ... involving any person named in the appli .. 
cation as committing, having committed, or bein~ about to 
commit an offense." Hea.rings on Controlling Crime Through 
More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcommittee 
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8 (a) (3) and 
1006, § 2518 (a)(4) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even 
at this early stage, it was recognized that an application 
could identify several individuals, and there is no indic~ttion 
that the identification would be limited to principal targets. 
S. 971 combined the major provisions of S. 675 and S. 20M 
and eventually was enacted. While it was pending before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court decided Kats 
such information, there is no indication of congressional intent to require 
provision of such int'errnation only if a suspect operated from one ~Jnd 
of a telPphone line. Second, § 2518 (8) ( d') mandates tlu~t an inven-
tory notice be served· upon "the persons named in the order or the 
application."· As with §2518 (l)(e), the congressional purpose would 
·not be served 'by limiting that notice on the basis of the telephone froll} 
which one speaks. 
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v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). S. 971 was then 
redrafted to confrom to Katz as well as Berger, and 
the identification provision was added at that time. The 
Senate Report states that the requirements set forth in the 
various subdivisions of § 2518 ( 1 )(b), including the identifi-
cation requirement at issue here, " [were] intended to reflect the 
constitutional command of particularization." S. Rep. No. 
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), citing Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60, and /(atz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 354-356 (1967). The United States now contends that 
although it may be that Congress read Berger and Katz to 
require, as a constitution~! matter, that the subject of the 
surveillance be named if known, Congress would hardly 
have read those cases as requiring the naming of all parties 
likely to be overheard.15 Brief, at 25-26. But to the ex-
tent that Congress thought it was meeting the constitutional 
commands of particularization established in Burger and 
Katz, Congress may have read those cases as mandating 
a broad identification requirement. The statute that we 
confronted in Berger required identification of "the person 
or persons" whose communications were to be overheard. 
388 U. S., at 59. And we expressly noted that tha.t provi-
sion "[did] no more than identify the person whose constitu-
tionally protected area is to be invaded .. .. . " . Ibid. Given 
the statute at issue in Berger and our comment upon it, 
15 At the time of the enactment of Title III, Congress did not 
have before it the view we expressE-d on this issue in United States 
v. Kahn, 415 U. S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment requires 
specification of "the place to be sea.ched, and thP persons or things to 
be seized." In the wiretap context, those requirements are satisfied 
by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular 
·conversations to be seized. It is not a constitutional requirement that 
all those likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations 
be named. Specification of this sort "identif[ies] the person whose con-
~titutionally ·protected area is to be invaded rather than 'pa.rticularly 
~escribing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized." 
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967). 
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Congress may have concluded that the Constitution required 
the naming, in a wiretap application, of all suspects rather 
than just the primary user.1G 
In any event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary 
to speculate as to exactly how Congress interpreted Berger 
and Kat~ with respect to the ide'ntification issue. It is suf-
ficient to note that in response to those decisions Congress 
included an identific~ttion requirement which on its face draws 
no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and the 
' . 
Uniteq States points to no evidence in the legislative history 
that supports such a distinction. Indeed, the legislative ma-
terials apparently contain no use of the teqn "principal tar-
get" or any discQssion of a different treatment based on the 
telephone fvom which a suspect speaks.17 We therefore con-
clude that a wiretap application must hame an individual 
if the Government has probable cause to believe that the 
individual .is engaged in the criminal activity uncler inves-
tigation and ex~ectl:! to intercept the individual's conversa-
tions over the ~rget telephone. 
B 
The other statutory provision at issue in this case is 
1 6 That Congress may have so understood the constit1.1tional reqtjire-
ment is also suggested by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with 
that provision of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify 
"the person, if known, whose conyersations are to be intercepted." Tfle 
Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894), which 
concerns t!1e need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest 
warrant. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968). To the-
extent that Congress ma.y have considered West to a.pply to wireta.p 
ord~rs, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its appli-
cability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone. 
17 At least one Senator read the identification requirement in S. 971 to-
parallel the identification requirement contained in the statute at issue• 
in Berger v. New York: "Specificity is required as to the person or 
persons whose communications are to be intercepted." 1H Cong. Rec.,. 
~t 14763 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Percy). 
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18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8 )(d), which provides that the judge 
sh~ll cause to be served on the persons named in the order 
or application &n inventory, which must give notice of the 
entry of the orqer or application, state the disposition of 
the application, and indicate whether communications were 
intercepted.18 Although the statute mandates inventory no-
tice only for persons named in the application or the order, 
the statute also provides that the judge may order similar 
notice to other parties to intercepted communications if he 
concludes that such action is in the interest of justice.10 
Observing that this notice provision does not expressly re-
quire law enforcement authorities routinely to supply the 
j'udge with specific information upon which to exercise his 
discretion, the United States contends that it would be in-
appropriate to read such a requirement into the statute since 
the judge has the option of asking the law enforcement 
authorities for whatever information he requires. 
Our reading of the legislative history of the discretionary 
notice provision in light of the purposes of Title III leads 
us to reject the Government's interpretation. As reported 
from the Judiciary Committee, section 2518 (8)(d) contained 
0nl'y a provision mandating notice to the persons named in 
the application or the order; the discretionary notice provi-
sion was added by amendment on the floor of the Senate. 
18 The inventory notice· m\1st be served within a rea:sonable time but 
not later than 90 days after- the date th<> application for an intercept 
order was filed . On an ex part!' showing· of good ra11se, service of the 
inventory may Of:' postponed. 
10 In addition to these provisions for mandatory and discretionary 
jnventory noticr, the Government is required to :supply the issuing judge. 
with recordings of the intercepted conversation:;, which are to be scaled 
according to hi:'> directions. 18 U. S. C. § 251R (8) (a). Tlwse noticC:~ 
and retum provi::;ions sa ti sf~· constitutional rf:'qnirements. See Katz v. 
United States,.:389 11. S. 347,355-356, and in . 16 (1967.); Berger v. Ne1t~ 
York, 388 U, S, 41, 60 (1967) .. 
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In introducing that amendment, Senator Hart explained its 
purpose: 
"The amendment would give the judge who issued the 
order discretion to require notice to be served on other 
parties to intercepted conversations, even though such 
parties are not specifically named in the court order . . 
The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice 
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of a,ny 
surveillance statute. It may be that the required no-
tice must be served on all parties to intercepted com-
munications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may 
make such notice to aU parties undesirable, the amend-
ment leaves the final determination to the judge." 114 
Cong. Rec. 14485-14486 ('1968).20 
In deciding whether l~gitimate privacy interests justify 
withholding inventory notice from parties to intercepted con-
versations, a judge is likely to require information and assist-
ance beyond that contained in the application papers and the 
recordings of intercepted con~ersations made available by 
law enforcement authorities. No purpose is served by hold-
ing that those authorities have no routine duty to supply 
the judge with revelant information. The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted tqis problem of 
20 It is worth noting that shortly before Senator Hart. proposed this 
amendment. to S. 971 , Senator Long had read to tho Senate portidns 
of a report prepared by the A.;sociation of the Bar of the City of 
New York on feder:ll wir<.'tap IPgislation. That report commented that 
parties to intcrcept.ed conversations other than those named in the appli-
ea lion or order probabl~· should be served with inventory notice, but it 
also recognized tl1at under some circumstancr.; the provision of such notice 
could be harmful nnd gave the following example : 
"A, a businessman , talks to his customers, and the latter are served 
with papers ;;bowing that A is being buggedr.J LT]he damage to con-
fidence in A and to A's rrputntion in general may damage A unjustly. 
In this case it would seem that. the customer:; should not be served with 
'the inventory." 114 Cong. Ree. 14476 (1968). 
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dual respansibility, and we adopt the balanced construction 
that cou·rt placed on § 2518 (8) (d): 
"To discharge this obligation the jU<liciaJ officer must 
hav~, at a minimum, knowledge of the particu}&r pate--
gorif}s into which fall all the individuals wqose conver-
satioqs have been interceptecl~ Thus, ~bile precise iden-
tification of each party to &n intercept~d conv~rsation 
is ·not required, a description of the gener~:~-1 clas~1 or 
classes, which they couw'rise is essential to en&ble the 
judge to qetermine whether additional information 1s 
necessary for a proper evalu~ttion of the iriter~sts of tpe 
various parties. F1.trthermore, although the j-qdlcial offi-
cer has the duty to cau~e the filing of · ~he iuve~topr 
tnotice]. it is abundantly cle~r th~t the prosemttipn ' h~ 
greater access to and familiarity with the intercepted 
communications. Therefore we feel justified ip imposing 
upon the latter the duty to classify all those whose 
eonversations have been int~rcept-tJd, and to t~&nsmit 
this information to the judge: Should the jlfdge desine 
more information regarding these classes in order1 to 
exercise his statutory § 251S (8)(d) discretion, ... the 
government is also required to fumish s4ch inform~:~-tion 
as is available to it." UnitlJ4 States v. Chun, 503 F . 
2d ~33, 540 (1974,. 
We agree with the Ninth Circuit that this allocation of 
responsibility best serves the p].lrp~~s of Title IIV1 
21 At oral argumE-nt, counsel for the United States recognized the merit 
of the approach specifie<l in Unite(! States v, Chun : · 
"Perh~ps the approach of the Cqurt of Appeals fm· the Jlf!nth Circt1it, 
which suggest<-'<.! that rather than submittin~ specific nallles we should 
submit ()a.tegories llf 1113r~ons w~o had been overhj'lard, is a hetter 
poli()y, would be more helpful t9 the qistrlct cotut in exercising ite 
discretion, apq we would have no opjection to following any reason-
able policy that the di~trict courts determine would be useful to them 
in this r~gard." Tr. of Oral .Arg., at 6-7. 
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Currently, the policy of the Justice Department is to pro-
vide the issuing judge with the name of every person who 
has been overheard as to whom there is any reason~tble pos-
sibility of indictment. Brief for the United States, ~tt 39. 
Because it fails to assure that the necessary range of infor~ 
mation will be before the issuing judge, this policy does not 
meet the test set out in Chun. Moreover, where, as 'here, 
the Government chooses to supply the issuing judge with 
a list of all identifiable persons ra.ther than a descript~ou 
of the classes into which those persons fall, the list must 
be complete. Applying these principles, we find that the 
Government did not corpply adequ~tely with § 2518 (8)(d) , 
since the names of responqents Merlo and Lauer were not 
included on the purportedly complete list of identifiable per-
sons submitted to the issuing judge. 
III 
We turn now to the question whether the District Court 
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at 
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement 
authorities to comply fully with the provisions of §§ 2518 (1) 
(b)(iv) and 2518 (S)(d). Section 2515 expressly prohibits 
the use at trial , and at certain other proceedings, of the 
contents of any intercepted wire communication or any evi-
dence derived therefrom "if the disclosure of that informa~ 
tion would be in violatioQ of this chapter." The circum-
stances that trigger suppression unQer § 2515 are in turn 
enumerated in § 2518 (10) (a) : 
"(i ) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
"(ii) the order of autl~orization or approval under 
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or 
" (iii) the interception was not made in conformity 
with the order of authorization or approval." 
'There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that 
the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the 
· 15-:Z12-0PINION 
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interception was not conducted ~n conformity with the ord~rs. 
Thus, only § 2518 (10) (a) (i) is relevant: were the comJ?uni-
cations "unlawfully intercepted'' '?iver the violations of 
§§ 2518 (1) (b) (iv) and 2518 (8) (d) NY 
Resolution of that question must begin with United States 
v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v: 
' Chavez, 416 U. S. 562 (1974). Those cases hold that "[not] 
every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided 
in Title III would render the interception of wire or oral . 
communications 'unlawful.' " United States v. Chavez, 4:16 
U. S., at 574-575. To the contrary, suppression is required 
·only for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory require~ 
ments that directly and substantially implement the con-
·gressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures 
to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this 
extraordinary device." United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S., 
a.t 527. 
Giordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring 
that an application for an intercept order be approved by 
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General spe-
cially designated by the Attorney General. Concludiug that 
Congress intended to condition the use of wiretap procedures 
on the judgment of senior officials in the Department of 
justice. the Court required suppression, for failure to com-
ply with the approval provisiou. Chavez concerned the stat-
utory requirement that the application for an intercept order 
specify the identity of the official authorizing the applica-
tion. The problem in Chavez was one of misidentification; 
although the application had in fact been authorized by the 
Attorney General, the application erroneously identified an 
22 The availability of the ~nppression remedy for these statutory, 
as · opposed : to constitutional, violations, see nn. 15 and 19, supra, turns 
on the provisions of Titlr III rather than the judicially fashioned ex-
clusionary rule aimed nt deterring violations of Fourth Amendment. 
rights. United · States v. Giordano, supra, 416 U. 8 ., a.L 524. 
-=+P [lid J ~ tt-~cLJL v"~ 0-:J ~c.V If J 
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Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the 
application . The Court concluded that mere misidentifica-
tion of the official authorizing the application did not make 
the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518 (10) 
(a) (i) since that identification requirement did not play a 
"substantive role" in the regulatory system. 416 U. S., 
at 578. 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both 
the identification requirement of § 2518 ( 1 )(b) (iv) and 
the notice requirement of § 2515 (8)(d) played a "central 
role" . in the statutory framework, and for that reason af/ 
firmed the District Court's order suppressing releva.nt 
evidence. Although both statutory requirements are un-
doubtedly important, we do not think that the failure to 
comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an in-
tercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory 
requirements. 
A 
As to §2518 (l)(b)(iv), the issue is whether the identifi •. 
cation in an intercept application of all those likely to be 
overheard in incriminating conversations plays a "substan-
tive role" with respect to judicial authorization of i11tercept 
orders and consequently imposes a limitation on the use 
of intercept procedures. The statute provides that the fssu-
ing judge may approve an intercept application if he deter-
mines that normal investigative techniques have failed or 
are unlikely to succeed and there is probable c~use to believe 
that: (i) an individual is engaged in criminal activity, 
(ii) particular communications concerning the offense will 
be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facili-
ties are being used in connection with the specified criminal 
activity. That determination is based on the "full and com-
plete statement" of relevant facts supplied by law enforce-
ment authorities. If, after evaluating the statutorily· 
~num(')_r~J.teq factors in light of the information contained in 
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the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order 
should issue, the failure to identify additional persons who 
are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conver~ 
sations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial 
~uthorization . The intercept order may issue only if the 
issuing judge determines that the statutory factors are pres-
ent, and the failure to name additional targets in no way 
detracts from the sufficiency of those factors. 
This case is unlike Giordano, where failure to satisfy 
the statutory requirement of prior approval by specified 
Justice Department officials bypassed a congressionallv 
imposed limitation on the use of the intercept procedure. 
The Court there noted that it was reasonable to believe 
that requiring prior approval from senior officials in the 
Justice Department "would inevitably foreclose resort to 
wiretapping in various situations where investigative person-
nel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court 
and the court woulq very likely authorize its use." 416 U. S., 
at 528. Here. however, the statutorily imposed preconditions 
to judicial a!.fthorization were satisfied, and the issuing .i udge 
was simply ~paware that additional 1~erso11S might be over-
heard engaging in incriminating conversations. In no mean-
ingful sense can it be said · that the presence of that infor~ 
mation as to additional targets would have precluded judicial 
authorization of the intercept.t3 Rather, this case resembles· 
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful sim-
23 There it~ no ~:;uggeRtion in t hi~ en::;e that ihe Government agentR 
knowingly failed to identify respondents Donovan, Robbiqs,
1 
and Buzzaco 
for the purpose of keeping relevant informaijon from the District Court 
that might have prompted the court to conclude t hat p robable eause 
was lacking. If ~uch a showing had been made, we would have a. 
different case. 1 or is there uny i:i uggp::;iion tha.t, as a result of the. 
failure to runne the ·e thrPe rPSpondPnts' thf'y were denied t he manda to ry 
inventory notice supplied to persons named in the applica tion . 18 
U. S. C. § 2518 (8 ) (d ) . R ei:iponclent ~ Donova 11 , Robbins, and Buzzaro. 
were among the 37 person.s ;-;crvrd wii h t.he int ial ilwentory. 
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ply because the issuing judge was incorrectly informed as 
to which designated official had authorized the application. 
The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Justice Depart-
ment had performed its task of prior approval, and the 
instant intercept is lawful because the application provided 
sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to deter-
mine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied.~ 1 
Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative history 
suggests that Congress intended this broad identification re-
quirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in 
guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic 
surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U. 8., at 578. 
Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971, 
contained an identification provision. See p. 11, supra. The 
~~No one> :suggrst:s that thP failure to identify in a wiretap application 
individuals who !Lr<' "unknown" within the meaning of the statute, seP 
United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 ( 1974), requires suppression of 
interceptt>d conversations to which those individuals were parties. Though 
recognizing that the.. failure to identify such an "unknown" individua~l 
does not make unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents 
Donovan , Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest tha.t the opposite is true 
with respect to the failure to identify in a wjretap application incli-
viduals who are "known" within the meaning of the statute. Counsel 
for thes(:) respondents suggested at oral argument that t.his difference 
in result is justified by analogy to warra.ntless searches or arrests. Tr. 
of Oral Arg., at 40. Although law enforcement officials can often take 
action without a warrant when they have been unable to foresee the 
circumstances that eventually · confronted them, they still must. ohtrlin a 
search or arrest warrant when t.heir prior knowledge is sufficient to 
establish probable cause, and it. is suggested that the same principle 
applies here. The major flaw in that ren<ioning is that this case doel'l 
not concern warrantless action. Here, the omission on the part of Jaw 
enforcement. authorities was not a fa.ilure to seek prior judicial authori-
zation , but a failure to ident1fy every individual who could be expected 
to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations. That the com-
plete absence of prior judicial authorization would make an intercept 
unlawful has no bearing on the Jawf~J.Ine&S Qt un. intercept order that 
f~J:il~ to identify every target, 
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only explanation given in the Senate Report for the in~ 
cl4sion of the broad identification provision was that it was 
intended to reflect what Congress perceived to be the con-
stitutional command of particularization. This explanation 
was offered with respect to all the information required by 
§ 2518 (1) (6) to be set out in an intercept application. No 
additional guidan. ce can be gleaned from the floor debates/ 
since they contain 110 substantive discussion of the identifi. 
·cation provision.~5 ~ 
B 
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the Gov-
ernment's duty to inform the judge of all identifiable persons 
whose conversations were intercepted. As noted earlier, the 
versipn of Title III that emerged from the Senate Judiciary 
Committee provided only for mandatory notice to the "per-
sons named in the order or the application .'' The Senate 
Report detailed the purpose of that provision: 
"[T]he intent of the provision is that the principle 
of postuse notice will be retained. This provision alonf' 
should insure tl~e community that the techniques arc 
reasonably employed. Through its operation all author-
2 " Even if we a.:smnr that. Congre~« thought that a broRd idrn!tfication 
re~uirrmrnt was constitutionally mandatrd , it does not follow tha1 
Congrc:;.-; imposed statutory :::uppn>:<;;ion under §§ 2515 and 2518 (10) (a)/ 
(i) ns a sanction for noncompliance. In limiting usr of thr mtercrpt pro-
crdurc to "tlw mo~t precise and discrirrnnat(' circumstancrs," S. Hrp . No. 
107, 90th Cong., 2d Se:o:s., 102 (l9nk) . Congress rrquired law enforePmPJJt 
authorities to eonvince tt District Court that probable cause exbtrd to 
believe that. n. ~pPcific p0r~on was committing rt sprcific offense using a 
sprcific trl<'phonr. Thi~> rrquirrment wn~ :sa tisfird hrre '!"hen the Hpplica -
tion srt forth <;ufficirllt informntion to inclicat(' that the prima.ry target 1.1: 
were conducting- a gambling bmqnrs~; over fonr particular telephonr:s. 
Nothing in th<' lrgi:slativc history indicatl>:< that Congre8s intrnded to 
declare an ot110nyisE' constitutional mtrrcept ordrr "unlawful" nnciPr-
[2518 (10) (a) (i)-re8tdting in :snppre>:sl'ion undrr § 2515-for failure to. 
11ame additional t:ugcts. 
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ized interceptions must eventually become known at least 
to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil re-
dress, for example, under section 2520 . . . . if he feels 
that his privacy has been unlawfully invaded." S. Rep. 
No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1968). 
The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding the 
provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent 
to provide notice to such additional persons as may be 
constitutionally required. 
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative 
history suggests that inctimiuating conversations are "unlaw~ 
fully intercepted'' whenever parties to those conversations 
do not receive discretionary inventory notice as a result of 
the Government's failure to inform the District Court of their 
jdentities. At the time inventory notice was served on the 
other identifiable persons, the intercept had been completed 
and the conversations had been "seized" under a valid in-
tercept order. The fact that discretionary notice reached 
39 rather than 41 identifiable persons does not in itself mean 
that the conversations were unlawfully intercepted.~(; 
The legislative history i11dicates that postintercept noticf' 
2° Counsel for respondents Merlo and Lluwr roncedrd at oral argument 
that the failll!'e to tlJlme thOSI' rrspondents in the propo>ied invPntor)' 
ordrr wa1; not. intPntional, Tr. of Oral Arg .. ut 32, and we are ther~fore 
Hot rullcd upon to decidr whether >iUpprr;;sion would he an available 
remedy if the Govt:!rnment knowingly !:>ought. to prevent thr District 
Court from serving inventor~· notice ou particular partie;; . Nor doeH tlHR 
easr presrnt nn opportunity t.o commrni. upon thr 8uggestion , recognized 
hy thr United Stnies, Brief, at 49 n. 40, that suppre:;siou might be reqnirerl 
if the rrgrnto< knew before. the intrrePption thnt. no invpntory would Ul' 
srrved. 
l\loreovet, rrspondents Merlo and Lauer w«>re not prejudiced by thrtr 
failure to receive postintercept notice undPr etthcr of the District Court' 
inventory otdPrs. As notPd <'arlier, thP Government made available to-
all clrfendants the intercept orders , application:;, and relatPd papers. Sre 
n. 7, supra. And in rPsponse to pretrial discovPry motions , tlw GovPrn-
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was designed instead to assure the community that the 
wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recog-
nizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that 
aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that 
postintercept notice was intended to serve as an independent 
restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure. 
IV 
Although the Government was required to identify respond-
ents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 2(). 
application for an extension of the initial intercept, failur~ ~ 
to do so in the circumstances here presented did not warranV 
suppression under ~ 2518 (lO)(a)(i). Nor was suppression 
justified with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply 
because the Government inadvertently omitted their names· 
from the comprehensive list of all identifiable persons whose 
conversations had been overheard. We hold that this is the· 
correct result under the provisions of Title III, but we re-
emphasize the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez,. 
that "strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of 
Title III would nonetheless be more in keeping with the 
responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when au-
thority to engage in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is 
sought." 416 U. S., at 580. 
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case 
is remanded to that court for furtJ1er proceedings in accord' 
with this opinion. 
lt is so orde.:r.ed .. 
JAN 1 ~ fll7 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents issues concerning the construction of 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, 18 D. S. C. §§ 2510-2520. Specifically, we must 
decide ·whether 18 U. S. C. ~ 2518 ( 1 )(b) (iv), which requires 
the Government to include in its wiretap applications "the 
identity of the person, if known, committing the offense, 
and whose conversations are to be intercepted," is satisfieJ 
when the Government identifies only the "principal targets" 
of the intercept. Second. we must decide whether the Gov-
enunent has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing 
judge of the identities of persohs whose conversations were 
overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling 
him to decide whether they should be served with notice of 
the interception pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 25Ui (8)(cl). 
And finally, we must determine whether failure to comply 
fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of 
evidence under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a). 
I 
On Nov(•mber 28. 1972, a. special agent of the Federal 
Bureau of Iuvestigatio11 applied to the United States Dis~ 
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order 
authorizing a wiretap interception ln accordance with Title 
:ro FlL£ 
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III.' The application rcquest0cl authorization to intercept 
gambling-related commu11ications over two telephones at one 
address in North Olmstead, Ohio, and two other telephone:s 
1 Thr wirrtttp application procedure is set forth at 18 U. S. C. § 2518 
(1), which prm·idrs: 
"(1) Each appliention for an ordrr authorizing or npproving tlw intc•r-
ccplion of a wirr or oral communicntion shall br m:Hle in writing upon 
oath or nffirmation to n. judge of compf'trnt jurisdiction and shall stat0 
the n.pplirant 's nuthority to makr such nppliration. Each application 
shall include the following in formntion: 
"(a) the identity of the inv<'~tig:ltin• or hnv rnforcC'Ol('Jl( officrr making 
t)l(' applirntion, nnd thr ofllcer authorizing the nppliration; 
"(b) a full nncl completr stat<'ment of th<' facts and cirrHm::;tanc<'.· rrlicd 
upon hy thr npplirant, to justify his belief that an ordrr ::;honlcl br i~surd, 
including (i) detail~ as to thr particulnr oJTemf' that has brcn, i::; being, or 
i~ about to he colnmittrd, (ii) n parlirttlar description of the nature and 
location of the farilitir~ from which or the place whrre the communica-
tion is to be intrrcrptrd, (iii) a particular desrripton of the typr of 
communirationi' sottght to br intC'rreptrcl, (iv) thr identity of the pC'rson , 
if known, committing the offcn~e and who c communication~ are to he 
int rrcrptrd; 
'' (c) a fttll nne! complete ~tntcment as to whether or not other invr~ti­
gativc proceclurrs have been trird and failed or why the~- reasmutbly 
apprar to be unlikrly to succrrd if trircl or to be too clangrrous; 
" (<.!) a ~tatem('J)t of the JWriod of tih\e for which the intrrcrption i~ . 
required to be rnalntnined. If the natmc of the inve:;tigntion i;; i:iUCh 
that I he alit hori:tation for intrrrrptlon shoUld not automaticaJb- trrmi-
nate whrn thr de~cribrd type of communication has been fir,.;t ohtninrd , 
a pa rticulnr dc:;c·ription of facts C'stablishin~ prohablr ca.'LI:;r to h<'lir\'e thn.t 
:uldit tonal c·ommunlca tlon;; of i he same' ty)lc will occ1tr i her<':t ftrr ; 
" ( r) a f11ll nnd cohlplete ~tatrment of the fact:; conceming all previou~ . 
n.pplica.tions lmown to the lndivldtlal atlthorlzmg and mabng the appli-
cation, madr to any j1ldge for atlthorization to intercrpt, or for npproval 
of intrrerptions 'Of, Wlf(1 or oral commttnirations Involving any of the· 
~amr prrsons, facilltir,.; or plate's specified in the applieation, and the· 
act ion takrn h· t hC' judge on rarh sttch applieation; anci 
' ·(f) whc'n' I he applieatlon j~.; for tlw extension of :111 cmlrr, a statement 
~l'tting forth thr rr~11lt~ tlm~ far ohtainrcl from the intrrception , or a 
rc•nsotHtblr explanation of i he failure to obtain :;urh re:;ults." 
Th0 i~suing judgr ·is frer to rrquirc thr applicant to fttrni::;h additional 
information. lt.' ll. ~ - C. §251~ (2). 
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at a home in Canton, Ohio. The accompanying affidavit 
recited that the telephones were being used by Albert Kotoch, 
Joseph f-;paganlo. and George Florea to conduct an illegal 
gambling business, and that iu conducting that business they 
wou lei place calls to and receive calls from various persons, 
three of whom were also named in the wiretap application.~ 
The affiant also stated that the Government's informants 
would refuse to testify against the persons named in the appli-
cation. that telephone records alone would be insufficient to 
support a gambling conviction, and that normal investiga-
tive techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to 
the Government's request, the District Court authorized for 
a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related 
wire communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, three 
Hamed individuals other than the respondents. and "others 
as yet unknown," to and from the four listed telephones.3 
2 Thr affid:1vit H('t forth cxtf'n~ivr information indicating that thr nnmrd 
indiYidual~ wrre condurt ing a gambling operation. This information wn~ 
dc•rivrd from physical surYrillancr by agrntH of the FBI, an rxamination 
of trlrphonr company toll records, and the pen-;onal ob~ervation~ of ~1x 
iuformantH, whose pa~t reliability abo was drtnilf'd in the affidaYit. 
:1 The Di~trirt Court\ ordrr was issued pursuant 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 
on, (-J.) which j)fO\'icJr in prrtinent part: 
"(3) Upon I';Urh application the judge may ent<'f an ex parte order. 
as requr~trd or as modified, authorizine; or approYing intercrption of w1re 
or oral c·omm1micat ions witl1in 1l1C trrritorial juriHdiction of the court 
in whif'h thr judgr is Hitting. if the judge drtermincs on the basii.:i of tlw 
fncts ~ubmittrd by the applicant that-
" (n) t hrrc iH probable rausr for belirf that an individual is commit I ing, 
ha~ rommittrd , or i" about to commit a particular offense Pl111mrratcd in 
section 25lfi of n1is cl1aptrr; 
" (b) t hrrr is prob:1blr cau~e for brlirf that p:uticular communications 
roncrrning that offrnsc will br obtainrd through such interception; 
'' ( t) normal invr~:~tigati1'e procPdllfPi:i have brrn tried and havr failed 
or rra><onubly appear to be nnlikrly to sneered if tried or to be too 
oangrrous; 
"(d) thrrr is probable cause for brlirf tha.t the facilitieo~ from which , 
•Qr the pi:Lre wherr, thr wire or oml rommttnication~ arc to be intcrerptrd 
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During the course of the wiretap, the Government learned 
that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco were dis-
cussing illegal gambling activities with the named subjects. 
On December 26. 1972, the Government applied for an 
extension of the initial intercept order.4 This time it sought 
authorization to intercept gambling-related conversations of 
Kotoch, Rpaganlo, Florea, two other named individuals, and 
"others as yet unknown," but it did not identify respondents 
nrc being u~o;rd, or arc about to be used, in connection with the commis-
sion of ~;urh offense, or are lmscd to, listed in the name of, or commonly 
u~rd by ~uch per~on. 
"(4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire 
or oral romnnmicntion ,<.;h~tll specify-
" (n) t!H' ii:kntity of the person, if known, whose communications are 
i o lw in t rrr<'p t rd ; 
" (h) th<' natm<' and ]oration of the communications facilities as to 
\\'hi<·h, or thP phr<' where, :mthority to intcrcept is granted; 
" ( r) a, particular drscription of the type of communication sought to 
be intrrrrptcd, and a statemrnt of the particular offense to which it 
rrlatrs; 
"(d) thr idrntity of the agency authorizrd to intercept the communi-
rat ions, and of th<' person authorizing the application; and 
"(<•) the period' of lime during which such interception is authorized, 
inrlucling :t stntemrnt as to whether or not the interceptiou »hall auto-
matically tC'rminatc when the de»eribcd communication ha~; hC'cn fin;t, 
ohtainrd." 
1 In addition to the Dccrmber 26 application rrque:;ting an cxtrnsion 
of thr initial intercrpt order, the Government also filed on that date a 
Rrpnratr nppliC'ation ~rrking authorization to monitor a third trlephonc 
(oTi~rovNrd at the samr North Olmstead address. Both appl'iralions wrre 
nccompallird hy anothrr aflidavit Hctting forth the restllts of the initial 
monitonng, the mannrr in whirh thr third phone was disroYered, the 
fact.~ indicating that thr newly dJsC'o\·<'rcd trlephone was bring used to 
conduC't <l gambling lm~inrss, and rrasons why continued intrrception was 
nree~snry. A copy of th<' aflidnvit fiiPd on November 2R was also 
ttttnchrd to th0 Drcrmbcr 26 a.pplirations. For the sak<' of clarity, the-
two npplirations filed Oil DecemhPr 26 will be treated ns a single· 
appli<·ation. 
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Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins iu this second application. 5 
The District Court again authorized iuterception of gambling~ 
related conversations for a maximum of 15 days. 
On February ~1, 1973, the Government submitted to the 
District Court a proposed order giving notice of the inter-
ceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Government ap-
parently thought included all individuals who could be iden-
tified as having discussed gambling over the monitored 
telephones.6 The District Court signed the proposed order, 
and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons, 
including respondents Donovan, Buzzaco, and Robbins. On 
September 11. 1973, after the Government submitted the 
names of two additional persons whose identities allegedly had 
been omitted inadvertently from the initial list, the District 
Court entered an amended order giving notice to those 
individuals. As a result of what the Government labels 
"administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer 
5 Tho United States conceded in the Court of Appeals that respond-
ent .~ Donovan and Robbins were "known" within the mcannig of the 
statute a.t. the time of the December 2G application, but chai!Pnged as 
clearly erroneous the District Court's finding that respondent Buzzaco was 
1'known" ftf . that limo. The Co1.1rt of Appeals upheld the District Court's 
finding, and thr United States has not sought revirw of that di~position. 
Thus, for our purpo:;es, ali three respondents were "known" on Decem-
ber 26. 
6 An inventory noticr must be served within a designatrd period of 
timo upon "tho pPrsons named in the order or the application." 18 
U. S. C . § 2518 (8) (d). The invrntory must give noticr of thr entry of 
the intrreept ordrr or application, sbte the disposition of thr application, 
and indicatr whrther communieation~ wPre or wrre not intercepted. Ib£d. 
Upon thr filing of a motion. the judge has eli wetion to make available 
the interecpted communieations, the application~, and the orders. Ibid. 
Title Ill also aut horizrs the District Court to cause an inventory no-
tice to be servrd on "other parties to intrrcepted communications" if the 
judge drtermincs that such notice is in the interest of justice. Ibid. 
'Tho~r other parties may also be given accesH to the interceptrd commLt-
nications, the ••pplication ·, and the order ·. ibid. 
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were not included in either list of names and were never 
served with inventory notice.7 
On November 1, 1973, an indictment was returned in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents, and 
10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conduct-
jng a gambling business in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371 
aml Hl.55. The five respondents filed motions to suppress 
evidence derived from the wire interception. After an evi-
dentiary hearing on the motions, the District Court sup-
pressed as to respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
all evidence derived from the December 26 intercept order 
on the ground that failure to identify them by name in the 
application and order of that elate violated 18 U. S. C. §§ 2.518 
(l)(b)(iv) and 2518 (4)(a). With respect to Merlo and 
Lauer, who were not known to the Government until after 
the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed 
all rvidrnce derived from both intercept orders on the ground 
that thry had not been served with inventory notice. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmrd. 
513 F. 2d 337 (1975).8 On the identification issue, the 
court hrlcl that the wiretap application must identify every 
person whose conversations relating to the subject crimi11al 
activity the Government has probable cause to believe it 
will intercept. Agreeing with the District Court that at the 
time of the December 26 application the Government had 
7 A !though rr>ipondrnt>' ;\I rrlo and La ncr \\'rrc not >'rn·rcl with in,·rn-
lory notiec· pur~uant to§ 2518 (R) (d), the intcrcrpt ordrr~, applirntions, 
nnd rrlntrd paper~ wrre made availnblc to all the dcfrndants, including 
Mc·rlo n.nd Latwr, on K ov<•mber 21), 1973. Thus, the introduc·tion into 
c\·idrnrr nt trial of th(' eontrnt~ of the intrrrrptrd convcr~a1ions and 
cvidrnre derived tl1rrC'from would not be prohibited by 18 U. S. C. 
§ 2518 (0). 
~ Thr Govrrnment filed it::; npprnl from the Di~triC't Court 's order sup-
])!'C':<"ing f'videllcr undPr lK U. R. C. § :3731 , nnd thrrc ha;; bC'rn no trinl 
on the rharg<'>i with rc·~prrt to the rc•:,pondcntR. 
·. 
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probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan, 
Robbins, and Buzzaco "committing the offense," the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from 
the December 26 order. On the 11otice question, it hchl 
that the Government has a.n implied statutory duty to in-
form the issuing judge of the identities of the parties whose 
conversations were overheard so that he can determine 
whether discretionary inventory notice should be required." 
Because the Government had failed to perform this duty 
with respect to Merlo and Lauer, the Court of AppC'als 
affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidC'nce 
derived from both intercept orders. The court found it un-
necessary to determine whether the failure to identify re-
pondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 
26 application and to name respondents Merlo and Lauer 
in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or 
purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to 
require suppression under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (10) (a). 10 
vYe granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which conc<'rn 
the construction of a major federal statute, 421 U. S. 907, 
and now reverse. 
II 
The United States contends that § 2518 (1) (b) (iv) re-
quires that a wiretap application identify only the prin<'ipal 
D Sre n . fi, supra. 
10 18 U. S. C. § ~518 (10) (a) providrs in pNtinrnt part: 
"(10) (a) Any aggrieved prrson in any n·lal, hearing, or proceeding 
in or before any court, department, offir~t, ngency, rrgulatory body, or 
other authority of the Unltrd Stnto:s, a Statr, or a political subdiYision 
'thereof, mny mov<' to s\lpprPss tho content;; of any intercepted wire or 
ural communirntion, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that-
" (i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was inter-
cepted is inRuffiricnt on its facr; or 
"(iii) the intrrception was not made in conformity with the order of 
·authori(:ation or approval." 
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target of the interception, and tha.t § 2518 (8) (d) does not', 
require the Government to provide the issuing judge with 
a list of all identifiable persons who were overheard in the 
course of an authorized interception. We think neither con-
tention is sound. 
A 
We turn first to the identification requirements of § 2518 
( il) (b) (iv). That provision requires a wiretap application 
to specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing 
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." 
In construing that language, this Court already has ruled 
that the Government is not required to identify an individual 
hi the application unless it has probable cause to believe 
(i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity 
under investigation and (ii) that the individual's conversa-
tions will be intercepted over the target telephone. United 
States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 ( 1974). The question at issue 
here is whether the Government is required to name all 
such individuals.11 
The United States argues that the most reasonable m-
11 Every Court of A11peals that has considered the issue has concludrd 
tT1at an individual whosr conversations probably will bE> intercrptrd by a 
wirrtap must br identified in the wiretap application if the law rnforre-
ment authoritirs have probable cause to believe the individual is rommit-
ting thr offcn~e for which the wiretap i::; sought . U11itcd States v. 
('hiarizio, 525 F. 2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975); United States v. Bernstein, 
509 F. ~d 906 (CA4 1975) , petition for cert. filrd, No. 74-1486; United 
States v. Doolittle, 507 F. 2d 1368, aff'd en bane, 518 F. 2d 500 (CAS 
1075), prlitions for cert. filed Nos. 75-500, 75-509, 75-513; U11ited States 
~ Civella, 533 F. 2d 1395 (CAS 1976) , petitions for crrt. filrd, Nos. 
75-1813, 76-Hl9 ; T../nited States v. Russo, 527 F . 2d 1150, 11.'i6 (CAlO 
1975), cert. drnied, - U. S. - (1976) . See also United States v. 
Jlfoore, - U. S. App. D . C.-, 513 F. 2d 485, 493-494 (1975) (inter-
preting 2:3 D . C' . Code 547 (a) (2) , which is almost identical to the provi-
sion at i~suc here). 
A number of these courts have ronrluded, and respondents Donovan, 
I~obbins, and Duzzaco arguP, that our decision in United States v. Kahn,. 
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tcrpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the 
application must identify only the principal target of the 
investigation, who "will almost always be the individual 
"'·hose phone is monitored." '2 Brief for the United States, 
at 18. Under this interpretation, if the Government has 
reason to believe that an individual will use the target 
telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government 
has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged 
in the criminal activity under investigation, the individual 
qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the 
wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who 
uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls 
from the target' telephone is not a principal target even if 
the Government has probable cause to believe that the 
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under inves-
tigation. In other words, whether one is a principal target 
of the investigation depends on whether one operates the 
target telephone to place or receive calls.13 
415 U. R. 143 (1974), resolved thi:< identification issue. Sec United States 
v. Chiarizio , supra; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there is 
hlngnage in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must identify all 
such indiYidnal ·, th:? identification quest ion presented here was not before 
u~ in Kahn. The que~tion in that case was whether a wiretap applica-
tion must idPntify a known user of the target telephone whose rom-
plirity in the criminal activity under im·estigation was not known at 
the time of the application. Kahn i · a relevant , though not controlling. 
precedent . 
12 The United States does not o;uggest I hat regardless of the farina! 
cirrumstanrc~ a wiretap application must iclcntif:v only a single individual. 
To the contrnr~r , it concedr~:> that if two or more persons are using the 
target telephone "equally" to commit the offem;e, and thu:; are "N]nnlly" 
tnrget» of the investigation, "all mu.'t be named." Brief for the United 
Stnte~, at 1~ n. 1:3. 
n Counsel for thr United Stntes explained this position succinctly at 
oral nrgnment: "The eritiral di~tinction . .. i~:> one between the users of 
the te!Pphone that is being monitored on the one hnnd, and all other per-
son , t hronghont the world who may conver::;e from unmonitored phon~ 
on the other h:tnd." Tr. of Oral Arg., nt 1:3. 
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Whatever the merits of such a statutory scheme, we find' 
little support for it in the language and structure of Title 
Ill or in the legislative history. The statutory language 
itself refers only to "the person, if known, committing the 
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." 
That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls 
to the target telephone as it is to a suspect placing calls 
from that telephone. It is true, as the United States sug-
gests, that when read in the context of the other sub-
divisions of § 2518 ( 1) (b), an argument can be made that. 
Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user 
of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other 
sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap 
a.pplications would · name more than one individual. For 
example, Title II! requires that it1Ventory notice be served 
upon "the persons named in the order or the application." 
18 U. S. 0. § 2518 (8)(d) (emphasis added). And § 2518 
(1) (e) requires that an intercept application disclose all 
previous intercept applications "involving any of the same 
persons ... specified in the application') (emphasis added). 
Jt may well be that Congress anticipated that a given 
application would cover tnore than one telephone or that 
several suspects would use one telephone, and that an appli-
cation for those reasons alone would require identification 
of more than one individuaL But nothing on the face of 
the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from 
the identification requirement those suspects whose inter-
·ceptcd comrnuu!cati.ons originated on a telephone other than 
that listed in the wiretap application. l 1 
14 Indrrd. tlw contrni·~' eonclll~ion Is ~i\)l:gc:;trd by the fact that idrn-
t.ifirat ion of an indi\·idual in nn application for an intrrcrpt order 
trigp;cr~ othrr ~tatutory provl~iowi, First , § :2;)18 (1) (c) rrquires an in-
trrc<'pt applirat ion to di:;dosP nll prrvlo\u; applications " involving any 
'of 1 hr c;anw pt•r,;ons .. . sprrified in the n pplicntion." To the rxtrnt 
that Congrc~~ thought it nerrs:;ar~· to prov.idr thr i~:;uing judge with 
75-212-0PJNION 
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Nor can we find support in the legislative history for the 
"principal target" interpretation. Title III originated as 
a combination of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception 
Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several 
months prior to this Court's decision in Berg~ r v. New York, 
388 U. S. 41 (1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance 
Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few 
days after the Berger decision. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 
2d Sess., 66 (1968). Both bills required that wiretap ap-
plications include a full and complete statement of the 
facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant and 
specification of the nature and location of the commu-
nication facilities involved. Although neither bill contained 
an express identification requirement such as that at issue 
here, both bills required the application to include "a full 
and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous 
applications ... involving any person named in the appli-
cation as committing, having committed, or being about to 
commit an offense." Hearings on Controlling Crime Through 
More Effective Law Enforcement Before the Subcommittee 
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 77, § 8 (a) (3) and 
1006. § 2518 (a)(4) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even 
at this early stage, it was recognized that an application 
could identify several individuals, and there is no indication 
that the identification would be limited to principal targets. 
S. 971 combined the major provisions of S. 675 and S. 2050 
and eventua.lly was enacted. While it was pending before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court decided Katz 
such information, there is no indication of congressional intent to require 
provi:>ion of such information only if a suspect operated from one end 
of a telephone line. Second, § 2518 (8) (d) mandates that an inven-
tory no1icr be served upon "the persons named in the order or the 
application." As with § 2518 ( 1) (e), the congressional purpose would 
not be served by limiting that notice on the basis of the telephone from 
which. one speaks. 
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v. United States, 389 · U. S. · 347' '(1967). S. 971 was then 
redrafted to confrom to Katz as well as Berger, and 
the identification provision was added at that time. The 
Senate Report states that the requirements set forth in the 
various subdivisions of ·§ 2518 (1){b), including the identifi-
cation requirement at issue here, " [were] intended to reflect the 
constitutional command of particularization." S. Rep. No. 
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), citing Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 354-356 (1967)-. ' Tlie United States now contends that 
although it may be that Congress read Berger and Katz to 
require, as a constitutional matter, that the subject of the 
surveillance be named if known, Congress would hardly 
have read those cases as requiring the naming of all parties 
likely to be overheard.15 Brief, at 25-26. But to the ex-
tent that Congress thought it was meeting the constitutional 
commands of particularization established in Burger and 
Katz, Congress may have read those cases as mandating 
a broad identification requirement. The statute that we 
confronted in Berger required identification of "the person 
or persons" · whose communications were to be overheard. 
388 U. S .. at 59. And we expressly noted that that provi-
sion "[did] no more than identify the person whose constitu-
tionally protected area is to be invaded .... . " · Ibid. Given 
the statute at issue in Berger and our comment upon it, 
15 At the time of the enactment of Title III, Congr<'ss did not 
have before it the view we expreo;sed on this issue in United States 
v. Kahn, 415 U. S., at 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment rrquires 
specification of "the place to be sea.ched, and the persons or thing.s to 
be seized." " In the wiretap contrxt, those requirements aro satisfied 
by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular 
conver;:;~Ltions to be seized'. It is not a constitutional requirement, that 
all those likely to be overh<'ard engaging in incriminating conversations 
be named. Specification of this sort "iclentif[ies] the person whose con-
stitutionally protected ' area is to be invadrcl rather than 'particularly 
describing' the communications, conver:sations, or dio;cuso;ions tQ be seized." 
Berger v. New York, 388 U~ S. 41, 59 (1967). 
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~ongress may have concluded that the Constitution required 
the naming, in a wiretap application, of all suspects rather 
than just the primary user.~6 
In any event, for our present purposes it is unnecessary 
to speculate as to ex11ctly how Congress interpreted Berger 
and Katz with respect to the identification issue. It is suf-
ficient to note that in response to those decisions Congress 
included an identification requirement which on its face draws 
no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and the 
United States points to no evidence in the legislative history 
that supports such a distinction. Indeed, the legislative ma-
terials apparently contain no use of the term "principal tar-
get" or any discussion of a different treatment based on the 
telephone from which a suspect speaks.17 We therefore con-
clude that a wiretap application must name an individual 
if the Government has probable cause to believe that the 
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under inves-
tigation and expects to intercept the individual's conversa-
tions over the target telephone. 
B 
The other statutory provision at issue m this case is 
~ 6 That Congress may have so understood the constitutional require-
ment is also suggested by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with 
that provision of S. 971 that required the intercept order to identify 
"the person, if known, whose conversations are to be intercepted." The 
Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894), which 
concerns the need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest 
warrant. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968). To the 
extent that Congress may have considered West to apply to wiretap 
orders, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its appli-
cability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone. 
17 At least one Senator read the identification requirement in S. 971 to 
parallel the identification requirement contained in the statute at issue 
in Berger v. New Yorlc: "Specificity is required as to the person or 
persons whose communications are to be intercepted." 114 Cong. Rec., 
at 14763 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Percy) . 
--
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18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d), which provides that the judge 
shall cause to be served on the persons named in the order 
or application an inventory, which must give notice of the 
entry of the order or application, state the disposition of 
the application, and indicate whether communications were 
intercepted.18 Although the statute mandates iHventory no-
tice only for persons named in the application or the order, 
the statute also provides that the judge may order similar 
notice to other parties to intercepted communications if he 
concludes that such action is in the interest of justice.1n 
Observing that this notice provision does not expressly re-
quire law enforcement authorities routinely to supply the 
j"udge with specific information upon which to exercise his 
discretion, the United States contends that it would be in-
appropriate to read such a requirement into the statute since 
the judge has the option of asking the law enforcement 
authorities for whatever information he requires. 
Our reading of the legislative history of the discretionary 
notice provision in light of the purposes of Title III leads 
us to reject the Government's interpretation. As reported 
from the Judiciary Committee, section 2518 (8) (d) contained 
only a provision mandating notice to the persons named in 
the application or the order; the discretionary notice provi-
sion was added by amendment on the floor of the Senate. 
18 Thr inventory notice · must be served within a reasonable time but 
not Inter than 90 dltys after the date the application for an intrrcept 
Qrder was filrd. On an ex parte showing of good cause, service of the 
invrntory may be po~t paned. 
lv In addition to ~ IH•sc provisions for mandatory and discretionary 
inventory not icc , the Government "is required to supply the is~uing judgP 
with recordings of t11e int<"rceptrc1 convcr~a tions, which are to be ~en led 
according to his dirrrtions. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (a). Thrse notire 
.and rrturn provi:;;ions ,.;at i:,;fy constitutional requirements. Sec Kat.z v. 
United States, 380 U. S. 347, 355-356, and n. 16 (1967); Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967). 
·. 
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fn introducing that amendment, Senator Hart explained its 
purpos<': 
''The amendment would give the judge who issued the 
order discretion to require notice to be served on other 
parties to intercepted couversations, even though such 
parties are not specifically named in the court order. 
The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice 
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of any 
surveillance statute. It may be that the required no-
tice must be served ou all parties to intercepted com-
muuications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may 
make such notice to all parties undesirable. the amend-
ment lea.vcs the final determination to the judge." 114 
Cong. Rec. 14485-14486 (1968) .~" 
In dc>ciding whether legitimate privacy interests justify 
withholding inventory notice from parties to intercepted con-
versations, a judge is likely to require information and assist-
ance beyond that contained in the application papers and the 
recordings of intercepted conversations made available by 
law enforcement authorities. No purpose is served by hold-
ing that those authorities have no routine duty to supply 
the judge with revelant information. The Court of Appeals 
for the Niuth Circuit recently confronted this problem of 
~" It i~ worth noting that ::;hort 1)1 b(•for<' S!'na tor Hart propo~NI this 
Amendnwnt to S. 971 , Sen11tor Long had !'<'ad to the Senate portion::; 
of a report prt>parrd by the A:<soriation of thr Bar of tlw Cit~· of 
Kew York on fcdrral wirctnp kgi,.;lation. That r<'port romm!'nt<'d 1hnt 
partir" to int<'rcrpt<'d eonn~ r::;ations othrr than those named in the appli-
cntion or order probabl~· "hould hr ,.:rrv<'d with inYrntor~· notirc. but it 
:1bo rrcognizrd that under somr circum::;tancr,; the provi~ion of ::;uch noticr 
could br harmful nnd g:1ve the following rxample : 
1' !\, a hu,.;inr~,;man, t:1lk~ to hi~ ru~tomer~ , and the lntlt'r are srrvrd 
with paper~ !:lhowing t h:1 t A is bring buggrd I .1 IT] he dnmAge to con-
Jidcnce iu A and to A's rrputation in genrral ma~r damage A unju~tly. 
In thi~ t':t ~c it would ~rem that thr ru~tomer" should not br :;<•rvrd witla 
the invrntory." 114 C'ong. Tiee . 14476 (Hlfi ' ) . 
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dual responsibility, and we adopt the balanced construction 
that court placed on § 2518 (8) (d): 
"To discharge this obligation the judicial officer must 
have, at a minimum, knowledge of the particular cate-
gories into which fall all the individuals whose conver-
sations have been intercepted. Thus, while precise iden-
tification of each party to an intercepted conversation 
is not required, a description of the general class, or 
classes, which they comprise is essential to enable the 
judge to determine whether additional information is 
necessary for a proper evaluation of the interests of the 
various parties. Furthermore, although the judicial offi-
cer has the duty to cause the filing of the inventory 
[notice]. it is abundantly clear that the prosecution hag: 
greater access to and familiarity with the intercepted' 
communications. Therefore we feel justified in imposing 
upon the latter the duty to classify all those whose 
eonversations have been intercepted; and to transmit 
this information to the judge. Should the judge desire · 
more information regarding these classes in order to· 
exercise his statutory § 2518 (8) (d) discretion, ... the · 
government is also required to furnish such information 
as is available to it." United States v. Chun, 503 F. 
2d 533, 540 (1974). 
We agree with the Ninth Circuit that this allocation of 
responsibility best serves the pur:t~oses of Title III.21 
21 At oral argument, counsel for the United States recognized the merit 
of the approach specified in United States v, Chun: 
"Perhaps the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
which suggested that rather than submitting specific names we should 
submit ca.tegories of persons who had been overheard, is a. better 
policy, would be more helpful to the district court in exercising its 
discretion, and we would have no objection to following any reason-
able policy that the district courts determine would be useful to them 
in this regard." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 6-7. 
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Currently, the policy of the Justice Department is to pro-
vide the issuing judge with the name of every person who 
has been overheard as to whom there is any reasonable pos-
sibility of indictment. Brief for the United States, at 39. 
Because it fails to assure that the necessary range of infor-
mation will be before the issuing judge, this policy does not 
meet the test set out in Chun. Moreover, where, as here, 
the Government chooses to supply the issuing judge with 
a list of all identifiable persons rather than a description 
of the classes into which those persons fall, the list must 
be complete. Applying these principles, we find that the 
Government did not comply adequately with § 2518 (8)(d), 
since the names of respondents Merlo and Lauer were not 
included on the purportedly complete list of identifiable per-
sons submitted to the issuing judge. 
III 
We turn now to the question whether the District Court 
properly suppressed evidence derived from the wiretaps at 
issue solely because of the failure of the law enforcement 
authorities to comply fully with the provisions of §§ 2518 (1) 
(b)(iv) and 2518 (8) (d). Section 2515 expressly prohibits 
the use at trial, and at certain other proceedings, of the 
contents of any intercepted wire communication or any evi-
dPnce derived therefrom "if the disclosure of that informa-
tion would be in violation of this chapter." The circum-
stances that trigger suppression under § 2515 are in turn 
enumerated in § 2518 (10) (a): 
"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
"(ii) the order of authorization or approval under 
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or 
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity 
with the order of authorization or approval." 
There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that 
the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the 
(!)-
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interception wa.s not conducted in conformity with the orders. 
Thus, only § 2518 (10) (a) (i) is relevant: were the communi-
cations "unlawfully intercepted" given the violations of 
§~ 2518 (1)(b) (iv) and 2518 (8)(d)? 22 
Resolution of that question must begin with United States 
v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v. 
Chavez, 416 U. S. 562 (1974). Those cases hold that "[not] 
every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided 
22 The availability of the SUJ11HE'ssion rem<'dy for thf';:;e statutor~r, 
~s opposed to constitutionnl, violations, see nn. 15 nnd 19, supra, turns 
on thr provisions of Title III rather than the judicially fashioned ex-
clu:sionnry rule aimrd at dctrrring violations of Fourth Amendment 
rights. United States v. Giordano, supra, 416 U. S., at 524. 
The concurring opinion of THB CHIEF JusTICE contends that rc ;pond-
ents Donovan, Robbins, and 13uzzaco lack standing even to seek sup-
pn•.,:;ion. Post, at -. This contrnt ion rc~; t :; on t h<' ground that 
Congrr.:;s rf'jrc tf'd an amf'ndment propost•d by S<'nators Long and IJart 
that would have added a fourth ground justifying suppres~ion-namrl~ ·. 
that thr p<'rson against whom thr Governmf'nt sought to introduce thr 
evidence was not namrd in the court ordrr. Sine<' these thrre respond-
ents would havr bren f'ntitled to suppression under the rf'jrct Pd atmnd-
mf'nt, thr concurring opinion concludrs thry cannot seek suppre:;sion herr. 
This virw fails to recognizr that § 2.51R (10) (a) e.:;tablishing thP ·up-
pre.:;sion rrmedy provides alternative grounds on which one can seek 
suppre~siou of evidenc<' derived from a wiretap. Thus. the mer<' fact 
that Congress chose not to add a fourth alt ernat ive could not mean that 
it intendrd to prevent prrsons who would have bren coverrd by that 
altrrnative from sreking suppres::;ion on one of the other grounds. As 
the .Tnst icr Department commrnted, in the same statement cited in thr 
concmring opinion: ''Thr [Long and Hart] amendment i ~:> designed to 
limit thr scope of electronic surveillance, but it accomplishes thil:i objec-
tive i11 an artificial mannrr . So long as the court order is validly 
obtained, rvidence obtained under the ordrr should be admissible again~t 
an~' JWrHO!J... not mrrel~· against the person named in the order." 114 
Cong. nee., at 1471k (19GS) (emphaf'is added). Here. respondents 
Donovan , Hohbim;, and Buzzaco challengr the validity of the court order, 
and nothing in eithrr Congrrss' rejection of the proposed amendmrnt or 
the .Tui:iticr Departmrnt's comment thrreon sugge.;ts that § 2518 (10) (a) 
(i) is unavailable to pen;on~ who might have had a remedy undrr a 
provision not rnactecl by Congre. s. 
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in Title III would render the interception of wire or oral 
communications 'unlawful.' " United States v. Chavez, 416 
U. S., at 574- 575. 'J.1o the contrary, suppression is required 
only for a "failure to satisfy any of those statutory require-
ments that directly and substantially implement the con-
gressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures 
to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this 
extraordinary device." United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S., 
at 527. 
Giordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring 
that an application for an intercept order be approved by 
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney Genera.! spe-
cially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding that 
Congress intended to condition the use of wiretap procedures 
on the judgment of senior officials in the Department of 
Justice. the Court required suppression for failure to com-
ply with the approval provision. Cha.vez concerned the stat-
utory requirement that the application for an intercept order 
specify the identity of the official authorizing the applica-
tion. The problem in Chavez was one of misidentification; 
although the application had in fact been authorized by the 
Attorney General, the application erroneously identified an 
Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing t1,e 
application. The Court concluded that mere misidentifica-
tion of the official authorizing the application did not make 
the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518 (10) 
(a) (i) since that identification requirement did not play a 
"substantive role" in the regulatory system. 416 U. S., 
at 578. 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both 
the identification requirement of § 2518 ( 1) (b) (iv) and 
the notice requirement of § 2515 (8) (d) pla.yed a "central 
role" in the statutory framework , and for that reason af-
firmed the District Court's order suppressing relevant 
·evidence. Although both statutory requirements are un-
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doubtedly important, we do not thiuk that the failure to· 
comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an in-
tercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory 
requirements. 
A 
As to § 2518 ( 1 )(b) (iv), the issue is whether the identifi-
cation in an intercept application of all those likely to be 
overheard in incriminating conversations plays a "substan-
tive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept 
orders and consequently imposes a limitation on the use 
of intercept procedures. The statute provides that the issu-
ing judge may approve an intercept application if he deter-
mines that normal investiga.tive techniques have failed or 
are unlikely to succeed and there is probable cause to believe 
that: (i) an individual is engaged in criminal activity, 
('ii) particular communications concerning the offense will 
be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facili-
ties are being used in conBection with the specified criminal 
activity. That determination is based on the "full and com-
plete statement' ' of relevant facts supplied by law enforce-
ment authorities. If, after evaluating the statutorily 
enumerated factors in light of the information contained in 
the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order 
should issue, the failure to ideBtify additional persons who 
are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conver-
sations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial 
authorization. The intercept order may issue only if the 
issuing judge determines that the statutory factors are pres-
ent, and the failure to name additional targets in no way 
detracts from the sufficiency of those factors. 
This case is unlike G1"ordano, where failure to satisfy 
the statutory requirement of prior approval by specified 
Justice Department officials bypassed a congressionally 
imposed limitation on the use of the illtercept procedure. 
The Court there noted that it was reasonable to believe · 
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that rcqumng prior approval from senior officials in the 
Justice Department "would inevitably foreclose resort to 
wiretapping in various situations where investigative person-
nel would otherwise seck intercept authority from the court 
and the court would very likely authorize its usc." 416 F. S., 
at 528. Here, however, the statutorily imposed preconditions 
to judicial authorization were satisfied. and the issuing judge 
was simply unaware that additional persons might be over-
heard engaging in illcriminating conversations. I11 no mean-
ingful sense can it be said that the presence of that infor-
mation as to additional targets would have precluded judicial 
authorizatioll of the intercept.~'' Rather. this case resembles 
Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful sim-
ply bccause the issuing judge was incorrectly informed as 
to which designated official had authorized the application. 
The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Justice Depart-
ment had performed its task of prior approval, and the 
instant intercept is lawful because the application provided 
sufficicnt information to enable the issuing judge to deter-
mine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied. 2 ' 
23 Therr is no suggr~tiou in this cnse thnt thP Govrrnmrnt ngrnts 
knowingly fniled to identify re,pondrnls Donovnn, Robbins, nnd Buzznro 
for the purpose of keeping relevant, in format ion. from the District Court 
that might have prompted the court to conclude that probable cause 
was larking. If such a showing hnd been made, we would have a 
diiTerent case. Nor is there any suggestion that, as a result of the 
failure to namo these three respondents they were denied the mandatory 
inventory notire &1.1pplied to persons named in. the application. 18 
U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d). Respondrnts Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco 
were among the 37 persons servrd with the intial inventory. 
2•1 No one suggests that the fnilurC' to identify in n wirE'tap application 
mdividuals who are "unknown" within the menning of the statute, see 
United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974), requires suppression of 
intercepted conversations to which those individual· were parties. Though 
recognizing that the failure to identify such an "unknown" individual 
does not makP unlawful an otherwise valid intercept, order, respondents 
Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco suggest that the opposite is true 
75<H2-0PINIOi-l'· 
22 UNITED STATES v. DOi\OVAN 
Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative history 
suggests that Congress intended this broad identification re-
quirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in 
guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic 
surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S., at 578. 
Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 971, 
contained an identification provision. Sec p. 11, supra. The 
Ollly explanation given in the Senate Report for the in-
clusion of the broad iclc11tification provision was that it was 
intended to reflect what Congress perceived to be the con-
stitutional command of particularization. This explanation 
was offered with respect to all the information required by 
§" 2518 (1") (6) to b0 set out in an intercept application. No 
additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor debates, 
since they contain no substantive discussion of the identifi-
cation provision. 25 
with respect to the failure to identify in a wiretap application incli-
viduals who are ''known" within the meaning of the statute. Coun~-;c] 
for theso retipondents suggPstcd at. oral argument that this differenc(' 
in result is justiftrd by analogy to warrantiC'Ss searches or nrre:;;ts. Tr. 
of Oral Arg., at 40. Although law enforcement officials can often take 
action without n warrant when they h:we been unable to foreser 1 he 
cii·cumstanres that eventually confronted them, thc•y still must obtain a 
·earch or arrest warrant when their prior knowledge is snfT-ieient to 
establish probable cause, and it i;; suggested that the samr principle 
applies here. The major flaw in that reasoning is that thi~ rasr dor~ 
not conceru warrantletis action. Here, the omi,;sion on the part of l:iw 
enforcement authoritie;; wns not a failure to serk prior judicial nuthori-
zation, but a failure to idrntify every individual who could. be rxpect eel 
to be overheard engaging .in incriminating· conven;at ion:>. Thnt the com-
plete absence of prior judicial authorization would make an intrrcept 
unlawful ha::; no bearing on the lnwfulness of an intercept order that 
fail8 to identify eYery tar~l't. 
2 r. Evm if we as<;umc thnt Congrc~s thought that n broad idcntifieation 
requirement was cons I it ul ionally mandated, it docs not follow thnt 
Congress imposed statutor!l ;:;npprcs::;ion under §§ 2515 and 2518 ( 10) (a) 
(i) as a sanction for non('otnpliance. In limiting u~e of the intercept pro-
'Cedure to "the most precise and dis('riminate circumstance;:;," S. Hep. J\'" o .. 
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B 
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the Gov-
ernment's duty to inform the judge of all identifiable persons 
whose conversations were intercepted. As noted earlier, the 
version of Title III that emerged from the Senate Judiciary 
Committee provided only for mandatory notice to the "per-
sons named in the order or the application." The Senate 
Report detailed the purpose of that provision : 
"[T] he intent of the provision is that the principle 
of postuse notice will be retained. This provision alone 
should insure the community that the techniques are 
reasonably employed. Through its operation all author-
ized interceptions must eventually become known at least 
to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil re-
dress, for example, under section 2520 ... if he feels 
that his privacy has been unlawfully invaded." S. Rep. 
N'o. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1968). 
The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding the 
provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent 
to provide notice to such additional persons as may be 
constitutionally required. 
Nothing in the structure of the Act or this legislative 
history suggests that incriminating conversations are "unlaw-
fully intercepted)) whenever parties to those conversations 
do not receive discretionary inventory notice as a result of 
107, 90th Cong., 2d Sc.,;.;;,, 102 (196R) , Congrrss requirrd law enforrrment 
authoritirs to convince a District Court that probable cause existed to 
hrlirvo that a specific prr::;on was committing a specific offense using a 
specific tclrphone . This requirement was satisfied here when the applica-
tion set forth sufficient information to indicate that the primary targets 
were conducting a gnmbling busine"s over four particular telephones. 
Nothing in the lrgislative history indicates tlmt Congress intended to 
derln rc an ot herwisc constitutional intercept order "unlawful" under 
§ 2518 ( 10) (a) (i)-resulting in suppression under § 2515-for failure tG 
name additional targetii. 
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the Government's failure to inform the District Court of their 
identities. At the time inventory notice was served on the 
other identifiable persons, the intercept had been completed 
and the conversations had been "seized" under a valid in-
tercept order. The fact that discretionary notice reached 
39 rather than 41 identifiable persons does not in itself meall 
that the conversations were unlawfully intercepterl. 26 
The legislative history indicates that postintercept notice 
was designed instead to assure the community that the 
wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recog-
nizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that 
aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that 
postintercept notice was intended to serve as an independent 
restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure. 
IV 
Although the Government was required to identify respond-
ents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzaco in the December 26 
application for an extension of the initial intercept, failure 
to do so in the circumstances here presented did not warrant 
zr. Coum;rl for rrspondents l\Irrlo and Lauer conredrd at oral argumC:'nt 
that the failure to name tho:;e rrspondcnts in the propo:;ed inventory 
ordrr wa~ not intrntional, Tr. of Oral Arg., at 32, and we arr thrrefore 
not callrd upon to drcide whether supprrssion would br an available 
rrmedy if the Government knowingly sought to prrvent th<• Di~t rict 
Court from srrving inventory notiee on particular partir:;. Nor doc;; 1 his 
case prrl:!rnt an opportunity to comment. upon thr suggt:'::;tion , recognized 
hy thr United States, Brirf, at 49 n. 40, that suppres::;ion might be rrquirrd 
if the agrnts knew before the intrrception that no inventory would be 
srrvrd . 
Moreovrr, rt:'spondrnts :.\•Irrlo nnd Lauer wC:'re not prejudiced by thrir 
failurr to receive postintercept notice under eitht:'r ol' the District Court's 
inventorr ordrrs. As notrd earlirr, the Govermnrnt madP available to· 
all defendants the intrrcPpt orders, applications, and related paprr,;. Sec 
n. 7, supra. And in rrsponse to prrtrial disrovrry motions, the Govrm-· 
ment produced transcripts of the intcrceptrd conversations. 
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suppression under § 2518 (10)(a)(i). Nor was suppression 
justified with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply 
because the Government inadvertently omitted their names 
from the comprehensive list of all identifiable persons whose 
conversations had been overheard. We hold that this is the 
correct result under the provisions of Title III, but we re-
emphasize the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez, 
that "strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of 
Title III would nonetheless pe more iu keeping with the 
responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when au-
thority to engage in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is 
sought." 416 U. S., at 580. 
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case 
is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accord 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
